Supreme Court of India Judgements

2025 INSC 1206 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MAHAVEER Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal Nos. 2154-2155 of 2011 Decided on : 08-10-2025 A. Electricity Act, 1910 — Sections 39 and 44 — Theft of energy and interference with meters — Prosecution’s case based on alleged tampering of meter box with holes leading to reduced meter readings — Evidence from prosecution witnesses found to be based on estimation, presumption, approximation or possibilities, not on concrete proof — Lack of direct evidence showing accused tampering with the meter box or using artificial means for theft — Failure of prosecution to prove dishonest abstraction or consumption of electricity and malicious injury or fraudulent alteration of meter index beyond reasonable doubt — High Court’s reversal of acquittal by Trial Court found to be erroneous. (Paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17) B. Electricity Act, 1910 — Section 39 — Theft of energy — Presumption clause — For the presumption against the consumer to take effect, it must be proved that artificial means or means not authorized by the licensee had been used in committing the theft — Presumption is not of automatic application and requires establishment of specific facts. (Para 13) C. Electricity Act, 1910 — Section 44 — Penalty for interference with meters — Requires proof of injury, tampering, malicious injury, or fraudulent alteration of meter index — Prosecution failed to demonstrate practical exercise of checking holes and wires for theft or to prove that the holes were made by the accused or used for theft. (Para 16) Criminal Appeal against Acquittal — Reversal of acquittal by High Court — Supreme Court will not ordinarily reappreciate evidence unless the decision under challenge suffers from a manifest error of law or procedure, or the conclusion reached is ex facie perverse — In this case, High Court’s reversal of acquittal was found to be erroneous due to lack of substantial evidence. (Paras 11, 12) JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. – These appeals, at the instance of the appellant-convict, are directed against the judgment and order dated 15th October, 2010, passed in Criminal Appeal No.270/1997 and Criminal Revision Application No.346/1997, whereby a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bench at Aurangabad) overturned the findings of acquittal recorded by the IIIrd Jt. Judicial Magistrate (FC) at Jalan in Reg. Criminal Case No.108/93 for the offence punishable under Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910[1]. [1] Hereinafter referred to as “The Act” 2. The facts as have been laid out by the Courts below are as follows:- 2.1 The appellant-convict was a Director of M/s. Rushi Steels and Alloys Pvt. Ltd.[2], situated at Plot No.52/7 of MIDC Area, Jalan and was responsible for conducting the business of the Company. The power supply to the Company was provided by the Maharashtra State Electricity Board[3]. [2] Hereinafter referred to as the “Company” [3] Hereinafter referred to as “MSEB” 2.2 The officials of the MSEB, in March 1993, noticed a mismatch between the units supplied to these factories visa-vis the readings taken from the meters at these factories. The alleged disparity was to the extent of 36.6 per cent. Naturally, an investigation was followed in the months of April and May 1993. During inspection of the meters placed at the factory of the appellant-convict by senior officials of MSEB, in the presence of independent witnesses, it was found that the meter had been tampered with, and the box in which it was placed had 3 holes of 4 mm each. 2.3 According to the prosecution, the officials of the MSEB concluded that the workers of the Company had been using additional wires, interfering with the meter supply and thereby causing a slowdown in the running of the meter. As such, the holes were sealed. On a subsequent reading of the meter, the disparity was now found to be around 10 per cent. 2.4 The approximate quantification of the alleged theft of electricity was to the tune of Rs.30 lakhs. 2.5 The Executive Engineer, MSEB, lodged a First Information Report with the Taluka Jalan Police Station, on 25th June 1993. Upon completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed before the Court on 1st October 1993. 3. The prosecution examined five witnesses. Statement under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure[4] of the two accused, namely Radheshyam and Mahaveer, the present appellant-convict (Mahaveer), was also recorded. It may be noted here itself that the appeal qua Radheshyam stood dismissed as abated vide order dated 30th September 2019. The defence did not lead any other evidence and furnished a whole and complete denial of the accusations levelled by the prosecution. [4] Hereinafter referred to as “Cr.PC” 4. The Trial Court, on consideration of the entire evidence, concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It could not prove abstraction, dishonest use or consumption of electrical energy. The charges under Sections 39 and 44 of the Act could not be established and as such, the following order was passed:- “1. Both the accused viz., (1) Radheshyam S/o Ratanlal Agrawal, age 40 years and 2) Mahaveer S/o Ratanlal Agrawal, age 55 years, Directors of M/s. Rushi Steel and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. Company are hereby acquitted of the punishable offence under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. 2. Both the accused are further acquitted of punishable offence U/sec. 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. 3. Both accused are acquitted under the provisions of Section 248(1) of Cr. P.C. 4. Bail bonds of both accused stand cancelled. 5. Both the accused be set at liberty forthwith. 6. Muddemal viz., meter box in question be delivered to prosecution vide Exh. 122, application of prosecution claiming meter box in question U/sec. 452 Cr.P.C. subject to condition that prosecution shall execute a bond to restore it to the court if order made under Sub Section (1) of Sec. 452 Cr.P.C. is modified or set aside an appeal or revision.” (S.D. Agrawal) 3rd Jt. Judicial Magistrate (F.C.) Jalna Date : 25.4.1997″ 5. On appeal, the High Court framed the following points for consideration:- “(i) Whether the prosecution proves that the respondents committed theft of energy? (ii) Whether the prosecution proves that the respondents interfered with the electric meter? (iii) Whether the complaint is made by competent person as expected under Section 50 of the Electricity Act? (iv) What is the scope of appreciation of evidence when the appeal against acquittal is filed?” 6. On consideration of evidence, the High Court held that once the extra holes in the meter box were sealed, the consumption increased significantly, and since the possibility of any other user stealing the electricity had been foreclosed by the holes being plugged with a metal plate having been placed there, it stood proved that the appellant-convict(s) was responsible for the theft. Regarding Section 44 of the Act, it was concluded that the case would fall squarely under clause ‘c’ of the said Section. Further, it was observed that the appellant-convict(s) did not make any attempt to prove that the extra holes in the meter box were not caused by them. Regarding the issue that PW-3 Dinkar, being the competent authority to lodge the complaint, it was held that he was given that he had been deputed by the MSEB as the officer responsible for that area. Accordingly, a complaint at his instance would be treated as a complaint made on behalf of MSEB, and so, it would be in accordance with the law. On the next point, it was held by the learned Single Judge that the Trial Court had not appreciated the law as laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat[5]. Having recorded as above, the appeal and the revision were allowed, and the appellant-convict(s) was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.2 lakhs each, in default whereof the appellant-convict(s) was to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of 3 months. [5] (1996) 9 SCC 225 7. Hence, these appeals. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 8. The short question to be considered is whether the acquittal of the appellant-convict(s) was correctly reversed by the High Court and whether the conviction so handed down to him is sustainable in law. 9. The two provisions, of which infraction is alleged on the part of the appellant-convict(s), are reproduced below for ready reference: – Section 39 39. Theft of energy.-Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any energy shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees, or with both; and if it is proved that any artificial means or means not authorised by the licensee exist for the abstraction, consumption or use of energy by the consumer, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that any abstraction, consumption or use of energy has been dishonestly caused by such consumer.] Section 44 44. Penalty for interference with meters or licensee’s works, and for improper use of energy.-Whoever- (a) connects any meter referred to in Section 26, sub-section (1), or any meter, indicator or apparatus referred to in Section 26, sub-section (7), with any electric supply-line through which energy is supplied by a licensee, or disconnects the same from any such electric supply-line, [* * ]; or (aa) unauthorisedly re-connects any meter referred to in subsection (1) of Section 26, or any meter, indicator or apparatus referred to in sub-section (7) of Section 26, with any electric supply-line or other works, being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied, when the said electric supply line or other works has or have been cut or disconnected under sub-section (1) of Section 24; or (b) lays, or causes to be laid, or connects up any works for the purpose of communicating with any other works belonging to a licensee, [ * *]; or (c) maliciously injures any meter referred to in Section 26, subsection (1), or any meter, indicator or apparatus referred to in Section 26, sub-section (7), or wilfully or fraudulently alters the index of any such meter, indicator or apparatus, or prevents any such meter, indicator or apparatus from duly registering; or (d) improperly uses the energy of a licensee; shall be punishable with [imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both], and, in the case of continuing offence, with a daily fine which may extend to 5 [fifty] rupees; and 6 [if it is proved that any artificial means exist] for making such connection as is referred to in clause (a), [or such reconnection as is referred to in clause (aa),] or such communication as is referred to in clause (b), or for causing such alteration or prevention as is referred to in clause (c), or for facilitating such improper use as is referred to in clause (d), [and that] the meter, indicator or apparatus is under the custody or control of the consumer, whether it is his property or not, [it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved,] that such connection, [re-connection,] communication, alteration, prevention or improper use, as the case may be, has been knowingly and willfully caused by such consumer. (Emphasis supplied) 10. In Satya Narain Prasad v. Bhagwan Ramdas[6] it was observed as follows: “3. .. .It can be seen that Section 39 as such does not prescribe any sentence but yet it creates an offence by raising a fiction, namely, that whoever has dishonestly used or abstracted any energy shall be deemed to have committed the theft within the meaning of Penal Code, 1860. Therefore, dishonest abstraction of electricity is deemed to be an offence under the Penal Code by virtue of this fiction created under Section 39 of the Electricity Act. Interpreting this section, this Court in Avtar Singh case [(1965) 1 SCR 103 : AIR 1965 SC 666] held: (SCR p. 107-A-B) “To put it shortly, dishonest abstraction of electricity mentioned in Section 39 cannot be an offence under the Code for under it alone it is not an offence, the dishonest abstraction is by Section 39 made a theft within the meaning of the Code, that is, an offence of the variety described in the Code as theft. As the offence is created by raising a fiction, the section which raises the fiction, namely Section 39 of the Act, must be said to create the offence. Since the abstraction is by Section 39 to be deemed to be an offence under the Code, the fiction must be followed to the end and the offence so created would entail the punishment mentioned in the Code for that offence. The punishment is not under the Code itself for under it abstraction of energy is not an offence at all.” It looks as though the High Court has only referred to the last sentence and overlooked the fact that Section 39 expressly made dishonest abstraction of electricity, as offence punishable under the Code. Section 39, therefore, makes something which was not a theft within the Penal Code, a theft within it, and consequently that section also makes theft punishable in the manner provided in the Code because the illegal abstraction of electricity is deemed to be a theft within the meaning of Code and it must be deemed for all purposes a theft including the purpose of imposing the punishment. Therefore, in deciding whether an offence of theft as provided under Section 39 is made out or not the Court has to read Section 39 along with provision of IPC dealing with theft.” (Emphasis supplied) [6] 1995 Supp (4) SCC 629 11. It has to be noted that prior to proceeding with the merits of the case, that reversal of acquittal by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in and of itself does not call upon this Court to reappreciate the entire evidence when an appeal is preferred by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Reference to Kalamani Tex vs. P. Balasubramanian[7] would suffice. A Bench of three learned Judges records the position as under: “11. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions, we do not find any valid ground to interfere with the impugned judgment [P. Balasubramanian v. Kalamani Tex, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 35499]. It is true that the High Court would not reverse an order of acquittal merely on formation of an opinion different than that of the trial court. It is also trite in law that the High Court ought to have compelling reasons to tinker with an order of acquittal and no such interference would be warranted when there were to be two possible conclusions. [C.K. Dasegowda v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 13 SCC 119, para 14 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 599] Nonetheless, there are numerous decisions of this Court, justifying the invocation of powers by the High Court under Section 378 CrPC, if the trial court had, inter alia, committed a patent error of law or grave miscarriage of justice or it arrived at a perverse finding of fact. [State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271, para 27 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260; Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450, para 70 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60] 12. On a similar analogy, the powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution also do not encompass the reappreciation of entirety of record merely on the premise that the High Court has convicted the appellants for the first time in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. This Court in Ram Jag v. State of U.P. [Ram Jag v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 201, para 14 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 370] , Rohtas v. State of Haryana [Rohtas v. State of Haryana, (2019) 10 SCC 554, para 12 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 47] and Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P. [Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869, para 14] , evolved its own limitations on the exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution and has reiterated that while entertaining an appeal by way of special leave, there shall not ordinarily be an attempt to reappreciate the evidence on record unless the decision(s) under challenge are shown to have committed a manifest error of law or procedure or the conclusion reached is ex facie perverse.” (Emphasis supplied) [7] (2021) 5 SCC 283 12. By way of an appeal, it is urged before us that the High Court has committed a manifest error in overturning the findings of acquittal entered by the Trial Court. A perusal of the record convinces us that there may be some strength to this submission. As such, while being conscious of the self-imposed limitations qua reappreciation of evidence by this Court under the extant jurisdiction, we tread further. 13. A perusal of Section 39 of the Act reveals that any person who dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any energy commits theft of energy. The second part of the Section provides that if it is proved that any artificial means or the means that have not been authorised by the licensee, are used in such theft of energy till the contrary is proved, it shall be assumed and presumed that such theft has been committed by the consumer. What is obvious from the above is that for the presumption against the consumer to take effect, it must be proved that an artificial means or a means not authorised by the licensee had been used in committing the theft. In other words, the presumption is not of automatic application, and instead, something is required to be established for it to apply. In the instant case, therefore, it must be established by the MSEB that an artificial means had been employed. 14. As we have already noted supra, the State examined five witnesses to establish its case. Let us now examine how these five witnesses are able to establish that artificial means had been employed in the theft of electricity. 14.1 PW -1 was one Shankarrao, who was a witness to the panchnama. He states that he was called there and shown a meter box. He made a positive statement that he signed the said document. When cross-examined, he stated that when he signed the document, he had no knowledge of what had taken place there, nor was the document written as per his understanding. It was written independently, and he had only affixed his signature on it. The meter he was shown was not working. He was also shown some wires affixed to a wooden board. It is admitted that he, having noticed whatever he was shown, deduced, without confirmation, that there had been a theft of electricity. 14.2 PW-2 was Balwant, Dy. Ex. Engineer, MSEB, Officer, Jalna. In his detailed examination in chief, this witness detailed the entire process of the cloud of suspicion being cast on the company of the appellant-convict, as also the step-by-step actions taken in regard of such suspicion. In his cross-examination, it comes for that he had not checked the consumption of electricity by the other companies. It was further stated:- “.. .It is true to suggest that all the statement made by me by deposite and regarding less recording of energy are based on guesswork and nothing specific. It is true to nothing specific with regard record with less electricity can be stated by me.. I do not know as to whether previously there were separate whole at the bottom of the metre is question.. It is to do to suggest that I have been pressurised by superior in deposed before the Hon’ble Court” 14.3 PW-3 was the complainant. He testified that during the inspection of the meter box, 3 holes were found. After plugging the holes, it was stated that the discrepancy fell to 10 percent. The numbers mentioned in the report, according to him, were correct, and he has signed the same. In his cross-examination, he admits that none of the officers of the MSEB verified the possibility of – “shortening the current by insulting wires in the holes of the bottom of metre box. It is true to say that, all the conclusions reached by us in the alleged occurrence about theft of electricity in respect of metre box in question entirely based upon the inference only.” 14.4 PW-4 testified that he had come to Jalan for the purpose of conducting tests on the meters. At the time of testing, the original seal of the meter box was found to be intact. He further said that there was a direct correlation between the plugging of the holes in the meter box and the number of discrepancies, which were reduced significantly. In his cross-examination, it comes forward that he had, on the basis of what he saw during the inspection drew an inference that the energy consumed was not in a proper manner because “there was possibility due to existing the three holes in question.” The further relevant portion is reproduced as under: “I had given in my report send to S. E. the fact that, I suspected have gone behalf of accused company. It is true to suggest that, I have adopted the procedure of elimination in between the 4 consumers after making observations of all for consumers and gave my conclusion that, the losses are due to 3 holes of metre box in question.” 14.5 PW- 5 is a retired Chief Engineer, who at the relevant point in time, was the Superintending Engineer, Aurangabad Circle. He is the one who gave directions to the concerned officials to commence the investigation. He details in his testimony, the receipt of information of the discrepancy to the extent of 36.6% and the steps he took thereafter, including discussing with higher officials. In his crossexamination, he admits as follows: “it is true to suggest that, the existence of 3 holes at the bottom of the metre box of the accused is be only because for charging the accused for pilferage of energy.” 15. It is evident from the above discussion and extracts of the testimonies put forward by the prosecution that none of them have deposed with complete confidence about the alleged theft of electricity and the use of artificial means therein, by the appellant-convict. Most of the testimonies are based on estimation, presumption, approximation or possibilities. Needless to state, the same cannot be deemed to be sufficient for the purposes of proving the above. Reference may be made to Vadivelu Thevar vs. State of Madras[8], wherein this Court has explained the nature of witness testimony and its corresponding effect on the overall case. The second of the three mentioned therein is ‘wholly unreliable.’ The testimonies that make up this case appear to fall squarely into this categorization. As a necessary follow-up of the inability of the prosecution to prove the use of artificial means, the presumption against the consumer, that is, the appellant-convict, is not set in motion. [8] 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13 16. Insofar as the charge under Section 44 is concerned, we find that to be resting on shaky grounds as well. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the meter had been injured or tampered with. None of the investigators from the MSEB carried out a practical exercise of checking the holes and the wires, and the possibility of it being actually used for theft, as is alleged to have taken place. None of the witnesses or any other third person saw the accused, or, for that matter, any other person connected to the Company, openly tampering with the box. There was no categorical statement whatsoever that at the time of installation or any time prior to the inspection of the meter box by officials of the MSEB, there were no holes in the box. In other words, there are too many open possibilities for criminal liability to be affixed to any person. In our considered view, therefore, Section 44 of the Act also has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 17. Consequent to the above discussion, we hold that neither Sections 39 nor Section 44 could be established against the appellant-convict. As such, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order dated 15th October 2010, passed in Criminal Appeal No.270 of 1997 and Criminal Revision Application No. 346 of 1997, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, is set aside. Mahaveer, the instant Appellant, is acquitted of all charges. The bail bonds are discharged. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1206 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MAHAVEER Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal Nos.…

Stamp Act

Stamp Act, 1899 — Schedule 1-B, Article 40 & 57 — “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” — Stamp Duty — “Security Bond or Mortgage Deed” — Instrument’s substance, not nomenclature, determines stamp duty — Court must ascertain true legal character of instrument by examining operative recitals and clauses — Definition of Mortgage Deed (Section 2(17)) — Instrument transferring right over specified property to secure performance of engagement is a mortgage deed — Article 57 (second limb — executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract) is restricted to cases where a distinct surety executes a bond to secure the obligations of another; it does not apply when the principal debtor itself executes the deed mortgaging its own property — Principal debtor executing a deed mortgaging its own property is a mortgage deed attracting Article 40.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1207 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S GODWIN CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD. Vs. COMMISSIONER, MEERUT DIVISION & ANR. ( Before : Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.…

Direct Taxation Income Tax

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 260A — Appeals to High Court — Charitable Purpose Registration — High Court dismissed revenue’s appeals, stating issues were covered by earlier decisions, but failed to examine facts against the law. Supreme Court found impugned orders lacked factual elaboration and remanded for reconsideration in light of settled law by a larger bench decision.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (EXEMPTION) LUCKNOW Vs. M/S. KHURJA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ( Before : Manoj Misra and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Service

Recruitment Regulations — Manager (E-3) — Qualifications — Prescribed qualifications for Manager (E-3) include First Class MBA/B.Tech./B.E. or professional degree with relevant experience. For Manager (A.T.C.), specific engineering degrees in Electronics/Tele-communications/Radio Engineering/Electrical with specialization in Electronics or M.Sc. with specific specializations were required.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VIVEK YADAV Vs. AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA CHAIRMAN AND ANOTHER ( Before : Manoj Misra and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. ) Civil Appeal No.…

G S T

Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 — Section 9(2)(g) — Input Tax Credit (ITC) — Bona fide purchaser dealer paying tax to registered seller dealer — Seller dealer defaulting in depositing tax with government — High Court’s interpretation of Section 9(2)(g) — Court reading down the provision to protect bona fide purchasers — Department’s remedy against defaulting seller, not denial of ITC to purchaser — collusion exception remains.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE COMMISSIONER TRADE AND TAX DELHI Vs. M/S SHANTI KIRAN INDIA (P) LTD. ( Before : Manoj Misra and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )…

Constitution Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 233(2) — Appointment of District Judges — Eligibility for in-service candidates — Clause (2) not prescribing qualifications for those already in judicial service — Such candidates not barred from direct recruitment — Interpretation to the contrary renders first part of Clause (2) redundant.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1208 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 5 JUDGES BENCH REJANISH K.V. Vs. K. DEEPA AND OTHERS ( Before : B.R. Gavai, CJI, Aravind Kumar, Satish Chandra Sharma and K.…

Constitution

Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 — Section 4(iii)(c)(I) — Age-restriction for intending couples — Retrospective application — Intending couples who commenced surrogacy procedures (including embryo creation and freezing) before the Act’s commencement date (25.01.2022) are not subject to the age-restrictions under Section 4(iii)(c)(I). The Act, unless expressly or by necessary implication made retrospective, is presumed to be prospective. The commencement of freezing embryos signifies a vested right and a crystallized intention, preventing subsequent age-bar imposition from frustrating the process.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1209 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VIJAYA KUMARI S AND ANOTHER Vs. UNION OF INDIA ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ. ) Writ Petition…

Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 and 141 — Dishonour of Cheque — Complaint against Chairman/Trustee of a Trust without impleading the Trust as an accused — Maintainability — Held, a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is maintainable against a Trustee who has signed the cheque on behalf of the Trust, even if the Trust itself is not made an accused — The Trust does not possess independent legal status to sue or be sued.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1210 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SANKAR PADAM THAPA Vs. VIJAYKUMAR DINESHCHANDRA AGARWAL ( Before : Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No…..of…

Juvenile Justice

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 — Section 7-A — Claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case. If found to be a juvenile, the court shall forward the person to the Board, and any sentence passed shall be deemed to have no effect — This provision applies retrospectively.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1211 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH HANSRAJ Vs. STATE OF U.P. ( Before : Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih, JJ. ) Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 340…

Service

Service Law — Appointment of Teachers — Eligibility Criteria — Marks in Intermediate Examination — Relaxation for Scheduled Tribe candidates — Calculation of percentage of marks must include marks from vocational subjects unless barred by law.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1212 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH RAVI ORAON Vs. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS ( Before : Dipankar Datta and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Supreme Court of India Judgements

Latest Post

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 2(d)(ii) – Deficiency in service – Any loss arising out of inaction and negligence on the part of the Bank, such deficiency is compensable under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Service Law — Appointment of Teachers — Eligibility Criteria — Marks in Intermediate Examination — Relaxation for Scheduled Tribe candidates — Calculation of percentage of marks must include marks from vocational subjects unless barred by law.

You missed

Supreme Court of India Judgements