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Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on. State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected

Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.

After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned order, court find that the Division Bench has committed gross error in overlooking the contents of the order of the learned Single Judge in which the finding has been recorded that the employer has committed contempt by not paying full dues of the workmen under the award

  (2005) 7 SCC 40 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA MODI TELEFIBRES LTD. AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. SUJIT KUMAR CHOUDHARY AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : D.M. Dharmadhikari, J;…

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article – 142 – Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 – Section – 4-B – Liability to pay market fee – Whether the sugar factories engaged in purchasing sugarcane and selling sugar and sugar molasses are liable to pay market fee under the provisions of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960

  (2006) 1 SCC 509 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA HARINAGAR SUGAR MILLS LTD. AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Ashok Bhan,…

Whether an application under Section 416 of the Act could at all be maintained by a person in whose favour there was only an agreement for sale and who had not acquired the title – Writ petition filed in the High Court was not confined to raising dispute between private parties. There was essentially an element of public interest involved as serious questions alleging violations of building laws and the town planning were raised – Appeal allowed.

  (2005) 12 SCC 317 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DEBASHIS ROY AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : R.C. Lahoti, C.J.; H.K.…

Service Matters

The Court ordered District Court, Chandigarh to record finding – Held, accepting the findings of District Judge in light of evidence produced before him about respondent having relied on false and fabricated documents that suit was barred by limitation – Finding about respondent having continued to be Markfed employee and only on deputation with the Sugarfed cannot be sustained – Suit filed by respondent before Trial Court rightly dismissed – Judgments of High Court and Addl. District Judge set aside – Appeal allowed.

AIR 1997 SC 2001 : (1997) 4 JT 597 : (1997) 3 SCALE 515 : (1997) 4 SCC 756 : (1997) 3 SCR 747 : (1997) AIRSCW 1787 : (1997)…

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 32 — Two dying Declarations, one oral and one written, with several discrepancies cannot convict the accused — Oral dying declaration allegedly made by deceased before her father, uncle and grand — mother, in which names of accused mentioned. However second dying declaration recorded by Magistrate five days later stated that the victim could not recognize any accused because of fire

AIR 1999 SC 3062 : (1999) CriLJ 4070 : (1999) 2 DMC 439 : (1999) 6 JT 41 : (1999) 5 SCALE 31 : (2000) 1 SCC 310 : (1999)…

The truck driven by the respondent No. 2 almost came to the centre of the road and the appellant must have been put in a dilemma and in the agony of that moment, the appellant’s failure to swerve to the extreme left to the road did not amount to negligence. Thus, there was no contributory negligence on his part especially when the respondent No. 2, the truck driver had no case that the appellant was negligent. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Section 110-B – Contributory negligence –

(2002) ACJ 1720 : AIR 2002 SC 2864 : (2002) 6 JT 380 : (2002) 3 PLR 467 : (2002) 5 SCALE 493 : (2002) 6 SCC 455 : (2002)…

The Trial Court has found that when the version, as regards the recovery was truthfully and fully corroborated, was acceptable and there was no reason to reject the version of the witness – The medical evidence substantially establishes the intention of the accused to eliminate the deceased and the injuries sustained by the deceased discloses the coordinated vengeance with which the assault was caused by the Appellants, in order to ensure that the deceased did not survive – Appeals dismissed.

  (2013) 5 ABR 841 : (2013) 7 AD 664 : AIR 2013 SC 3510 : (2013) CriLJ 4011 : (2013) 8 SCALE 131 : (2013) 12 SCC 721 SUPREME…

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