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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 227 — Discharge of Accused — Principles for deciding discharge application — Standard of proof for framing charge — The Court, at the stage of framing charge, must sift the evidence to determine if there is a “sufficient ground for proceeding”; a prima facie case must be established — If two views are possible and one gives rise to “suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion,” the trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused — The Judge is not a “mere post office” but must exercise judicial mind to determine if a case for trial is made out — The strong suspicion required to frame a charge must be founded on material that can be translated into evidence at trial — Where the profile of allegations renders the existence of strong suspicion patently absurd or inherently improbable, the accused should be discharged. (Paras 14, 15, 16, 17) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 321 — Withdrawal from prosecution — Requirement of High Court permission for withdrawal of cases against sitting or former MPs/MLAs — Following Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India — High Court must exercise judicial mind and give a reasoned order when considering an application for permission to withdraw prosecution against sitting/former legislators — Application must disclose reasons for withdrawal and records of the case must be before the High Court — Absence of requisite permission from the High Court means that the withdrawal application cannot be granted and the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on this ground — High Court’s rejection of quashing petition confirmed. (Paras 2, 7, 9, 10) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Inherent powers of High Court — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 420 (Cheating), 344 (Wrongful confinement for ten or more days), and 506 (Criminal intimidation) — Scope of quashing power: Quashing under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in exceptional situations; court must avoid delving into disputed facts at the pre-trial stage — Interference is warranted only when the case falls within recognized parameters (like those in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) — Where allegations in FIR and charge sheet, corroborated by witness statements, prima facie disclose essential ingredients of offences under Sections 420, 344, and 506 IPC, quashing is unwarranted. (Paras 12, 18, 20, 23, 25, 30, 32, 34) Service Law — Termination of Contractual Service — Qualifications — Interpretation of Educational Qualifications — Advertisement requiring “Postgraduate degree in Statistics” — Appellant holding M.Com. degree with Business Statistics and Indian Economic Statistics as principal subjects — Where no Government university offers a degree exclusively titled “Postgraduate degree in Statistics,” insisting solely on the title of the degree, without considering the actual curriculum, amounts to elevating form over substance — The interpretation must be contextual and purposive — Termination based solely on the title of the degree, ignoring expert opinion (Director, W.S.O., S.W.M., P.H.E.D.) that the appellant meets the requirement and the University certificate confirming inclusion of Statistics as principal subjects, is arbitrary and unreasonable. (Paras 3, 4, 31, 32, 37, 44) Contempt of Court — Initiating contempt proceedings — Clear and unequivocal terms of the underlying order — A Contempt Petition can be dismissed summarily only if the underlying order, the non-compliance of which is alleged, is genuinely unclear, ambiguous, or susceptible to two equally reasonable interpretations — Where the High Court dismissed a Contempt Petition holding that the underlying order was capable of two interpretations, but the Supreme Court found, upon reading the order as a whole, that there were clear and categorical directions and recorded statements regarding handing over of possession and payment of compensation, the dismissal of the Contempt Petition was erroneous. (Paras 1, 7, 8, 9, 10)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 227 — Discharge of Accused — Principles for deciding discharge application — Standard of proof for framing charge — The Court, at the stage of framing charge, must sift the evidence to determine if there is a “sufficient ground for proceeding”; a prima facie case must be established — If two views are possible and one gives rise to “suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion,” the trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused — The Judge is not a “mere post office” but must exercise judicial mind to determine if a case for trial is made out — The strong suspicion required to frame a charge must be founded on material that can be translated into evidence at trial — Where the profile of allegations renders the existence of strong suspicion patently absurd or inherently improbable, the accused should be discharged. (Paras 14, 15, 16, 17)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 321 — Withdrawal from prosecution — Requirement of High Court permission for withdrawal of cases against sitting or former MPs/MLAs — Following Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India — High Court must exercise judicial mind and give a reasoned order when considering an application for permission to withdraw prosecution against sitting/former legislators — Application must disclose reasons for withdrawal and records of the case must be before the High Court — Absence of requisite permission from the High Court means that the withdrawal application cannot be granted and the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on this ground — High Court’s rejection of quashing petition confirmed. (Paras 2, 7, 9, 10)

Whether withdrawal of O.A. in terms of the first proviso to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act, 1993 is a condition precedent to taking recourse to the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ? NO. Whether ad valorem Court fee prescribed under Rule 7 of the 1993 is payable on an application of the NPA Act in the absence of any rule framed under NPA Act ? Yes. Whether recourse to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower in terms of Section 13(4) of the NPA Act comprehends the power to take actual possession of the immovable property.

  2007(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 927 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia Civil Appeal No. 3228 of…

Dishonour of Cheque–Offence by Company–Director of company should not automatically be vicariously liable for commission of an offence–There should be sufficient averments to show that the person who is sought to be proceeded against on the premise of his being vicariously liable for commission of an offence by the Company must be incharge and shall also be responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business.

2007(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 909 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 2002…

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