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Haryana School Education Act, 1995, Section 22 — Civil Court Jurisdiction — Ouster of jurisdiction by statute must be express or implied — Section 22 only ousts jurisdiction where Government or its officers have power to adjudicate — Recovery of fees by a school is not a power conferred on Government/authorities — Civil court jurisdiction not ousted in matters of reasonable fee recovery. Penal Code, 1860 — Section 498A — Cruelty by husband or relatives of husband — Allegations in FIR were vague, general, and filed one year after admitted separation of the parties — No specific instances of cruelty were mentioned — Criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR — Court can quash FIR if allegations, taken at face value, do not constitute any offence — Vague and general allegations of marital discord, without specific instances, do not prima facie constitute an offence under Section 498A IPC. Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 376(2), 450 — Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 4 — Sexual assault on a minor — Evidence of prosecutrix — Conviction can be based solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony if it inspires confidence — Corroboration of testimony of prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence — Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out the evidence of the prosecutrix. State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Section 29 — Liability of Financial Corporation taking possession of industrial unit for dues — Corporation acts as a trustee, liable only to the extent of funds in its hands after settling its dues, not personally liable. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 80 — Notice to Government or public officer — Mandatory requirement before instituting suit — Failure to issue notice or obtain leave renders suit not maintainable and decree a nullity, even if impleaded later. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 62; Section 14(1)(d) — Appeal against NCLAT order setting aside NCLT order directing return of property — NCLT had directed return of property based on CoC decision that property not required by corporate debtor — NCLAT set aside NCLT order invoking Section 14(1)(d) barring recovery of property during CIRP — Supreme Court held that Section 14(1)(d) not applicable as CoC and Resolution Professional initiated the process for returning property due to financial burden of rentals, and not a simple recovery by owner — Commercial wisdom of CoC regarding non-retention of property given primacy — NCLAT order set aside, NCLT order restored.

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