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Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 165 and 166 — Liability for injuries sustained due to falling tree branch — Injuries caused by falling tree branch while vehicle was stationary under the tree during rain — Held, not an accident “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” as the motor vehicle did not play an active role. [ Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) — Sections 24, 33(5), 36, 39 — Child-sensitive judicial processes — Mandatory safeguards for child victims — Courts must ensure child-friendly procedures, minimum intrusion, and psychological safety, avoiding re-traumatisation and secondary victimisation in all proceedings concerning children, especially those involving allegations of sexual abuse.

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 — Misuse of Law — Judicial Notice — The court acknowledges the recurring concern regarding the misuse of the POCSO Act, particularly in cases involving consensual adolescent relationships where the victim’s age may be manipulated, or the law is weaponized for revenge or to oppose relationships. — While judicial vigilance against misuse is important, the court deferred to the legislature on considering steps to curb the menace, such as introducing a “Romeo-Juliet clause” exempting genuine adolescent relationships or enacting mechanisms to prosecute persons who misuse the law to settle scores. (Paras 19)

2026 INSC 47 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Vs. ANURUDH AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. ) Criminal…

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 37(1) — Revenue Expenditure vs. Capital Expenditure — Non-compete fee — Whether payment of non-compete fee constitutes allowable revenue expenditure or capital expenditure — Non-compete fee is paid to restrain a competitor, which protects or enhances the business profitability and facilitates carrying on the business more efficiently — Such payment neither creates a new asset nor increases the profit-earning apparatus for the payer, meaning the enduring advantage, if any, is not in the capital field — The length of time of the advantage is not determinative if the advantage merely facilitates business operations, leaving fixed assets untouched — Payment of non-compete fee made by the appellant (formed as a joint venture) to L&T (previous partner) to restrain L&T from competing for 7 years was essentially to keep a potential competitor out and ensure the appellant operated more efficiently and profitably, without creating a new capital asset or monopoly — Held: Payment of non-compete fee is an allowable revenue expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Act. (Paras 16, 25-29)

2025 INSC 1481 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHARP BUSINESS SYSTEM THR. FINANCE DIRECTOR MR. YOSHIHISA MIZUNO Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-III N.D ( Before : Manoj Misra and…

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 118 — Competency of child witness — Effect of delay and tutoring — Although a minor child is competent to testify, the reliability and evidentiary value of testimony given many years after the event, especially when the child has been residing with the complainant’s family (maternal grandparents), is significantly affected by the high possibility of memory distortion and tutoring. (Paras 5, 7, 10.2)

2025 INSC 1475 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MAYANKKUMAR NATWARLAL KANKANA PATEL AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER ( Before : Vikram Nath and Augustine George Masih,…

Service Matters

Service Law — High Court Staff — Regularization — Discrimination — Appellants (Operator-cum-Data Entry Assistants/Routine Grade Clerks) appointed by Chief Justice under Rules 8(a)(i), 41, and 45 of Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 — High Court refused regularization of Appellants while regularizing numerous similarly situated employees appointed through the same channel — Justification based on whether initial appointment was labelled ‘ad-hoc’ or whether appointment letter stipulated an examination — Held, distinction based solely on stipulations in appointment letters, when the channel of appointment and nature of work are identical, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and superficial — Such differential treatment violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution, as equals must be treated equally without rational differentia. (Paras 3, 4, 17, 23-28)

2025 INSC 1477 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH RATNANK MISHRA AND OTHERS Vs. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 397 and 401 — Criminal Revision — Abatement on death of Revisionist (Informant/Complainant) — Rule of abatement applicable to appeals (Section 394) does not strictly apply to revision, particularly when revision is not initiated by an accused — If the main proceeding survives (e.g., trial is pending), the revision by an informant/complainant does not abate on their death — High Court erred in holding that the revision abates upon the death of the original revisionist (informant), especially since the trial against the accused was pending (Paras 17, 19)

2025 INSC 1484 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SYED SHAHNAWAZ ALI Vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Manoj Misra, JJ. )…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Inherent powers of High Court — Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 (Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency of funds) — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Scope of inquiry at pre-trial stage — When complaint discloses all necessary ingredients of Section 138 of N.I. Act, High Court should not conduct a roving inquiry into disputed questions of fact, such as whether the cheque was issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, especially in light of the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act — Quashing of complaint at the threshold by the High Court by appreciating evidence/materials is unwarranted where a prima facie case is made out.

2025 INSC 1474 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S SRI OM SALES Vs. ABHAY KUMAR @ ABHAY PATEL AND ANOTHER ( Before : Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.…

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 302 read with 34, 148, and 341 — Murder —Appeal against reversal of acquittal — Appellate court’s duty in overturning acquittal — Trial court’s acquittal based on “imaginary and illusionary reasons” and misappreciation of evidence, including attributing undue significance to minor contradictions and perceived manipulation of delayed FIR submission, justifies reversal by High Court. (Paras 31, 45, 46, 52)

2025 INSC 1478 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH PATCHAIPERUMAL @ PATCHIKUTTI AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANOTHER ( Before : Dipankar Datta and Augustine…

Service Matters

Service Law — Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) Rules, 2001 — Rule 18(b) — Recruitment: Disqualification — Second Marriage — Rule 18(b) disqualifies a person who, having a spouse living, has entered into or contracted a marriage with another person from appointment to the Force — Respondent, a CISF Constable, was dismissed from service for marrying a second time while his first marriage subsisted, violating Rule 18(b) — Held, the rule is a service condition intended to maintain discipline, public confidence, and integrity in the Force, and is not a moral censure — The rule is clear and mandatory, and the maxim “dura lex sed lex” (the law is hard, but it is the law) applies — The statutory rule prescribing penal consequences must be strictly construed — Dismissal upheld. (Paras 2, 3, 7, 9)

2025 INSC 1479 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. PRANAB KUMAR NATH ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. ) Civil…

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