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Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ jurisdiction — Maintainability — Inclusion of advocate’s name in IBA “Caution List” — High Court dismissing writ petition on ground that Indian Banks’ Association (IBA) is not “State” under Art. 12 — Held, focus of maintainability has shifted from formal character of respondent body to nature of function performed and effect of impugned action on legally protected rights — Caution List operates as sector-wide adverse accreditation mechanism with public law element, having direct bearing on advocate’s right to practise profession under Art. 19(1)(g) — Writ petition against IBA held maintainable notwithstanding IBA not being “State” — Kishor S. Bhat v. Indian Banks’ Association, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2857, distinguished — Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691; Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649; S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 177, relied on. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 100 — Second appeal — Scope of interference with concurrent findings on genuineness of a Will — Whether suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of a Will exist, and stand explained, is essentially a question of fact; a second appellate court cannot re-appreciate evidence and substitute its own view merely because another view is possible — Interference is permissible only where the finding is perverse, based on circumstances that are mere “figments of a doubting mind,” or is vitiated by an erroneous placement of onus — High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under S. 100 CPC in reversing well-reasoned concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court discarding the Will. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 209, 244 — Commitment of case exclusively triable by Court of Session — Whether Magistrate is required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committing such a case, where the complaint is one instituted otherwise than on a police report — Held, no — Section 244 CrPC, which mandates the Magistrate to hear the prosecution and take evidence, occurs in Chapter XIX (Part B — “Cases instituted otherwise than on a police report”) and governs warrant-case trials before a Magistrate; it has no application where the offence (here, under Section 302 IPC) is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, which is governed instead by Section 209 CrPC — Under the scheme of the 1973 Code (unlike the erstwhile 1898 Code, which mandated a full committal inquiry with recording of evidence under Section 207-A), the Magistrate’s role at the pre-commitment stage is confined to ascertaining whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, and no evidence need be taken or evaluated by the Magistrate at that stage — Requiring witnesses to depose twice, once before the Magistrate and again before the Sessions Court, would serve no purpose and is not the mandate of law — High Court’s contrary view, requiring compliance with Section 244 CrPC even in a Sessions-triable case, proceeds on an erroneous reading of law and is unsustainable. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections166, 168 — Compensation — Assessment of annual income of a self-employed deceased (wholesale grocery business) — Two ITRs filed after the death of the deceased excluded by the High Court altogether from the assessment of income — Held, following the principles in Rashmirekha Tripathy and Anr. v. The Branch Manager (Legal Claims), Sriram General Insurance Company Limited and Ors. [C.A. @ SLP(C) No.27220 of 2024, 2026 INSC 661], ITRs filed post-death call for closer scrutiny with reference to surrounding financial statements, since income may be inflated in such returns, but such returns are not to be excluded outright merely for being filed post-death — In the absence of the benefit of such surrounding financial statements on record, and it being inexpedient at this stage to remand the matter, annual income fixed with reference to the nature of the deceased’s wholesale grocery business at Rs.3,25,000 — Compensation recomputed applying 40% addition for future prospects (age 28 years), 1/4th deduction for personal expenses, and a multiplier of 17, together with conventional heads (loss of estate, funeral expenses, consortium) — Total compensation enhanced to Rs.60,79,550 (as against Rs.15,36,560 awarded by the Tribunal and Rs.38,40,850 awarded by the High Court), with interest as awarded by the Tribunal — Appeal allowed. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 166, 168 — Compensation — Assessment of annual income of a self-employed deceased (Insurance Agent) from Income Tax Returns — High Court had averaged the last four ITRs on record — Held, erroneous — Following the principles laid down in Rashmirekha Tripathy and Anr. v. The Branch Manager (Legal Claims), Sriram General Insurance Company Limited and Ors. [C.A. @ SLP(C) No.27220 of 2024, 2026 INSC 661], for a self-employed person the average of up to the previous three years’ ITRs, not four, is the appropriate reference point — A performance-linked spike in the income of an Insurance Agent in a particular year does not justify reaching back to an additional, earlier ITR to dilute that spike — On the facts, taking the average of the income for AY 2015-16 (Rs.4,03,180), AY 2016-17 (Rs.9,59,665) and AY 2017-18 (Rs.7,00,559), annual income assessed at Rs.6,87,802 — Compensation recomputed applying 25% addition for future prospects (age 49 years), 1/4th deduction for personal expenses, and a multiplier of 13, together with conventional heads (loss of estate, funeral expenses, consortium) — Total compensation enhanced to Rs.87,09,282 (as against Rs.49,77,000 awarded by the Tribunal and Rs.76,09,500 awarded by the High Court), with interest as awarded by the Tribunal — Appeal allowed.

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ jurisdiction — Maintainability — Inclusion of advocate’s name in IBA “Caution List” — High Court dismissing writ petition on ground that Indian Banks’ Association (IBA) is not “State” under Art. 12 — Held, focus of maintainability has shifted from formal character of respondent body to nature of function performed and effect of impugned action on legally protected rights — Caution List operates as sector-wide adverse accreditation mechanism with public law element, having direct bearing on advocate’s right to practise profession under Art. 19(1)(g) — Writ petition against IBA held maintainable notwithstanding IBA not being “State” — Kishor S. Bhat v. Indian Banks’ Association, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2857, distinguished — Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691; Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649; S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 177, relied on.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 100 — Second appeal — Scope of interference with concurrent findings on genuineness of a Will — Whether suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of a Will exist, and stand explained, is essentially a question of fact; a second appellate court cannot re-appreciate evidence and substitute its own view merely because another view is possible — Interference is permissible only where the finding is perverse, based on circumstances that are mere “figments of a doubting mind,” or is vitiated by an erroneous placement of onus — High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under S. 100 CPC in reversing well-reasoned concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court discarding the Will.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

2026 INSC 32 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH REGENTA HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. M/S HOTEL GRAND CENTRE POINT AND OTHERS ( Before : Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih,…

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

2026 INSC 43 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ULTRATECH CEMENT LTD. Vs. THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS ( Before : Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. )…

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders etc. Act, 1986 — Section 3(2) — Preventive Detention — Grounds for Detention — Requirement of finding ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ — Detenu, a ‘drug offender’, was detained based on three criminal cases involving Ganja, with an apprehension that if released on bail, she would engage in similar activities — Held, mere apprehension that the detenu, if released on bail, would be likely to indulge in similar crimes would not be a sufficient ground for ordering preventive detention — Order of detention failed to indicate how the detenu’s activities were prejudicial to ‘public order’ as opposed to ‘law and order’ and was therefore unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11)

2026 INSC 41 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ROSHINI DEVI Vs. THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND OTHERS ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ. ) Criminal…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 2(s) and 2(o) — Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 — Sections 2(f), 100, 101, 102 — Quashing of FIRs — Jurisdiction of Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Police Station post-bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh — High Court quashed Anti-Corruption Bureau FIRs on hyper-technical ground of lack of specific notification under Section 2(s) CrPC for the relocated ACB office (Vijayawada) after the State Reorganisation — Held: The High Court’s approach leads to a travesty of justice by nipping investigations in the bud on hyper-technical grounds — Pre-bifurcation Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 268 dated 12.09.2003) declaring ACB offices as Police Stations, coupled with the express provisions of the 2014 Act (Sections 100 and 102), ensures continuity of “law” (which includes notifications/orders) in the successor State of Andhra Pradesh without requiring fresh adoption or notification — Section 102 of the 2014 Act facilitates courts/authorities to construe the existing law to apply to the new State, even absent specific adoption — Subsequent clarificatory G.O.Ms. No. 137 (14.09.2022) merely restates the position and its non-retroactive application reasoning by High Court is untenable — Hyper-technical reasoning, ignoring the spirit of the law and the continuity mandated by the Reorganisation Act, cannot be sustained. (Paras 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24)

2026 INSC 37 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE JOINT DIRECTOR (RAYALASEEMA), ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU, A.P. AND ANOTHER ETC. Vs. DAYAM PEDA RANGA RAO ETC. ( Before : M. M.…

Service Matters

Service Law — Appointment — Ayurvedic Nursing Training Course — Right to Appointment — Candidates admitted to the course in a Government institution do not acquire an automatic right to appointment as Ayurvedic Staff Nurse upon completion of training, especially when there is a significant change in Government policy and the number of candidates available due to the grant of permission to private institutions to impart the training; earlier appointments were made because of fewer candidates (20 seats) and higher demand, a situation that drastically changed with the increased number of pass-outs. (Paras 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 20, 26, 27)

2026 INSC 38 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS Vs. BHAWANA MISHRA ( Before : Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan, JJ. ) Civil Appeal No.…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Inherent power of High Court to quash criminal proceedings — Principles governing exercise of power — High Court must exercise power sparingly, cautiously, and avoid usurping function of trial court or conducting mini-trial — Only requirement is to examine whether uncontroverted allegations in FIR, taken at face value, disclose commission of any cognizable offence — Reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of evidence is not for summary determination under Section 482 CrPC; it is a matter for trial court — Where factual foundation for prosecution exists, criminal law cannot be short-circuited — Reference to Bhajan Lal case delineating categories for quashing (Paras 20-24, 30, 31).

2026 INSC 39 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH C.S. PRASAD Vs. C. SATYAKUMAR AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No.…

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 — Dishonour of Cheque — Separate Causes of Action — Quashing of Complaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Where multiple cheques are issued in relation to the same underlying liability, but are distinct instruments (drawn on different accounts, presented on different dates, and dishonoured separately), each dishonour gives rise to a separate cause of action under Section 138 NI Act — The fact that two complaints relate to the same transaction does not bar parallel prosecution, especially where the statutory requirements of presentation, dishonour, notice, and non-payment are fulfilled separately for each instrument — High Court erred in quashing one complaint on the ground that two parallel prosecutions for the same underlying liability amounted to an abuse of process of law, as this violated the principle of separate cause of action for distinct cheque instruments. (Paras 33, 35, 45(a))

2026 INSC 40 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SUMIT BANSAL Vs. M/S MGI DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. )…

Companies Act, 2013 — Section 212(6) Second Proviso and Sections 447, 448, 451 — Cognizance of Offence — Bar on Special Court — Private Complaint — Section 448 (Punishment for false statement) mandates liability under Section 447; thus, the offence under Section 448 is an “offence covered under Section 447” specified in Section 212(6) — The second proviso to Section 212(6) prohibits the Special Court from taking cognizance of such offences except upon a written complaint made by the Director, Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), or an authorized Central Government officer — Cognizance cannot be taken upon a private complaint for offences under Section 448 or Section 451 (Punishment for repeated default) as they are inextricably linked to Section 447 — Taking cognizance under Section 448 without invoking the punishment section (Section 447) to circumvent the statutory bar is impermissible — Quashing of proceedings under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act upheld. (Paras 12, 13, 26, 27, 33, 43, 44, 45, 47, 59, 60.I)

2026 INSC 42 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH YERRAM VIJAY KUMAR Vs. THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANOTHER ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )…

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) — Sections 5(l), 6, 9(g), 10 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Sections 65(1), 74, 137(2), 352 — Cancellation of Bail — Allegations of repeated aggravated penetrative sexual assault (gang rape) of a minor victim aged 14, committed under armed threat (katta), and recording the act for blackmail — High Court granting bail set aside by Supreme Court — Bail order found to suffer from serious infirmities as it failed to consider the heinous nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigour of the POCSO Act, and prima facie material (victim’s statement and medico-legal report) establishing the commission of the offence — Omission to notice the filing of the chargesheet prior to the bail order rendered the exercise of discretion erroneous. (Paras 4, 8.1, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16)

2026 INSC 44 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH X Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) Sections 302, 304 Part II, 147, 149 — Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder — Distinction between Murder (Section 302) and Culpable Homicide (Section 304) — Circumstances warranting conviction under Section 304 Part II — Initial conviction under Section 302/149 altered by High Court to Section 304 Part II, IPC — Incident arising from sudden quarrel and group fight (free fight) where two rival parties attacked each other — Both sides suffered injuries — Common object for forming an unlawful assembly (Section 149) not established in a free fight scenario, negating charges under Sections 147, 148, and 149 IPC — Individual role of appellant assessed: causing fatal head injury with a lathi — In a sudden group clash without premeditation, where the appellant also suffered serious injuries, the intention to cause death (requisite for Section 302) is negated, but knowledge that the act (hitting vulnerable part like head with lathi) was likely to cause death is inferred (Section 304 Part II) — Offence rightly reduced to Section 304 Part II, IPC. (Paras 5.1.4, 5.1.5, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6)

2026 INSC 45 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHRIKRISHNA Vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ( Before : K. Vinod Chandran and N.V. Anjaria, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No.…

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