Supreme Court of India Judgements

47030 Judgements hosted as on 11/01/2026 - Search (FREE), Subscribe, Read & Download

Category: Corporate

Corporate

Whether withdrawal of O.A. in terms of the first proviso to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act, 1993 is a condition precedent to taking recourse to the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ? NO. Whether ad valorem Court fee prescribed under Rule 7 of the 1993 is payable on an application of the NPA Act in the absence of any rule framed under NPA Act ? Yes. Whether recourse to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower in terms of Section 13(4) of the NPA Act comprehends the power to take actual possession of the immovable property.

Apr 8, 2017 sclaw

  2007(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 927 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia Civil Appeal No. 3228 of…

Corporate

Dishonour of Cheque–Offence by Company–Director of company should not automatically be vicariously liable for commission of an offence–There should be sufficient averments to show that the person who is sought to be proceeded against on the premise of his being vicariously liable for commission of an offence by the Company must be incharge and shall also be responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business.

Apr 8, 2017 sclaw

2007(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 909 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 2002…

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Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Corporate

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw