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Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Constitution
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
C P C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Service
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Service
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
I P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 465(2) – Sanction for prosecution – Irregularity in – Effect of – Irregularity in sanction would not by itself render the trial vitiated. Terrorist & Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act-Section 3(4) – Harbour – Meaning of – Must be understood in its ordinary meaning as for penal provision – Mens rea is not excluded from constituting harbouring.

Apr 22, 2017 sclaw

  AIR 1998 SC 201 : (1998) CriLJ 369 : (1997) 9 JT 18 : (1997) 6 SCALE 689 : (1997) 8 SCC 732 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA KALPNATH RAI…

Service Matters
Service

The criminal charge and the charge in the departmental enquiry were entirely different. The appellate court in the criminal case came to the conclusion that since the two ladies had not supported the prosecution case, the charges against the appellant were not proved – It is a settled proposition of law that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiries.

Apr 22, 2017 sclaw

  (1998) 8 SCC 723 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 257 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA STATE OF T.N. — Appellant Vs. M.A. WAHEED KHAN — Respondent ( Before : Kuldip Singh, J;…

C P C

Order 8, Rule 1 after the amendment casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does not deal with the power of the court and also does not specifically take away the power of the court to take the written statement on record though filed beyond the time as provided for.

Apr 22, 2017 sclaw

  2007(3) LAW HERALD (SC) 2232 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat The Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.K. Balasubramanyan The Hon’ble Mr. Justice…

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Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw