Latest Post

[MPID Act, S. 2(c) & 2(d)] – Amounts advanced with promise of return and interest qualify as “deposit” accepted by “financial establishment” under the Act. – Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 Section 2(c) and Section 2(d) — Deposit and Financial Establishment — Amounts advanced to individuals with promise of repayment with interest constitute a “deposit” under Section 2(c) and the recipients are “financial establishments” under Section 2(d) of the MPID Act, irrespective of the transaction being termed as a “loan” — The nomenclature of the transaction is not determinative; the essential attributes of the transaction are key. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 432 — Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 72 & 161— Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 473 & 477 — Premature release of a prisoner — Rejection of recommendation — Non-speaking order — Order rejecting premature release must provide reasons and reflect due application of mind — Absence of reasons renders the order bald and impossible to ascertain if relevant factors were considered — Violates principles of natural justice and frustrates judicial review. [Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, S. 3] – No State can levy VAT on inter-State sales; taxation power for inter-State trade vests exclusively with the Union. – Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 269 — Taxes on sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce — Levied and collected by Union but assigned to States — Parliament’s power to formulate principles for determining when such sale/purchase takes place — State legislature’s power restricted to intra-State sales. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 15 Rule 5 — Striking off defence for non-deposit of rent — This is a drastic consequence and the power to strike off a defence is not to be exercised mechanically — The court must consider whether there has been substantial compliance and whether the default is wilful or contumacious. [ Landlord and Tenant — Eviction Suit — Pleading and Proof Satisfied — In this case, the plaint contained material facts of co-landlord status and eviction grounds — Evidence, including affidavits and documents like share certificates, was provided to support these pleaded facts, fulfilling both pleading and proof requirements.

Arbitrator–Appointment of- -Once the arbitrator has become ineligible by operation of law, he cannot nominate another as an arbitrator. The arbitrator becomes ineligible as per prescription contained in Section 12(5) of the Act. It is inconceivable in law that person who is statutorily ineligible can nominate a person.

2017(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2284 (SC) : 2017 LawHerald.Org 1222 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar Hon’ble Mr. Justice…

Confession is a substantive piece of evidence, but as a ‘Rule of Prudence’ the Court should seek other corroborative evidence to test its veracity. Kidnapping and Extortion–The act of kidnapping for extorting ransom from the victim cannot be termed as an act committed “with intent to overawe the Government as by law established–TADA not applicable. Confession–Admissibility of–The mere fact that retracted subsequently is not a valid ground to reject the confession. The crucial question is whether at the time when the accused was giving the statement he was subjected to coercion, threat or any undue influence or was offered any inducement to give any confession

  2007(5) LAW HERALD (SC) 4030 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. G. Balakrishnan The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G. P. Mathur Criminal Appeal No.…

Divorce—By Mutual Consent—Waiting period of six months from date of filing application is not mandatory and is directory in nature. Divorce—By Mutual Consent—Waiving off waiting period—Court before whom proceedings are pending including Family Court/District Court can exercise the discretion. Divorce–By Mutual Consent—Waiving off waiting period— The statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties must be already over before the first motion itself.

2017(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2273 (SC) : 2017 LawHerald.Org 1394 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before                    Hon’ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday UmeshLaiit Civil…

You missed