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Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on. State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected

Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.

Theft of Electricity—Quashing—FIR can be quashed only after following procedure under S. 152 of the Act and not merely on compromise between the partiesTheft of Electricity—Quashing—FIR can be quashed only after following procedure under S. 152 of the Act and not merely on compromise between the parties

2019(2) Law Herald (SC) 865 : 2019 LawHerald.Org 724 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari Criminal Appeal Nos.469-470…

Appellants cannot be deprived of a plot allotted to her merely on the basis that she has not made any grievance in respect of possession of the plot allotted on the basis of technicities. If such allotment is found to be made, the appellant would be entitled to possession of the plot of 250 sq. yards. If it is found that the plot allotted to the appellant is not available, the Registrar or its delegate shall pass such necessary order to redress the grievance of the appellant after giving an opportunity of hearing to the affected persons

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NISHA SINGLA — Appellant Vs. ADARSH COLONY COOPERATIVE HOUSE BUILDING SOCIETY LTD AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and…

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 14, 14(1) and 14(2) – East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 – Sections 2(c) and 2(i) – Eviction – High Court while setting aside the judgment of the first appellate Court held that Shiv Dev Kaur (having life interest in property) had created a tenancy in favour of the defendant and the relationship of landlord and tenant did not cease to exist on her death. The remedy of the appellants as owners was to seek eviction under prevailing rent control legislation and not by means of a suit for possession

  SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DR RS GREWAL AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. CHANDER PARKASH SONI AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and…

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 420, 468 and 471 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 156, 160, 167(2), 173, 173(2), 173(2)(i), 173(8), 227, 228 and 319 – Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo moto pass an order for further investigation/reinvestigation after he discharges the accused.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BIKASH RANJAN ROUT — Appellant Vs. STATE THROUGH THE SECRETARY (HOME), GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI, NEW DELHI — Respondent ( Before : L.…

Section 64VB(2) of the Insurance Act, 1938 provides that: “For the purposes of this section, in the case of risks for which premium can be ascertained in advance, the risk may be assumed not earlier than the date on which the premium has been paid in cash or by cheque to the insurer.” It is the admitted position that the deceased husband of the Appellant had paid the insurance premium by a Demand Draft in favour of the Insurance Company.–As a consequence, the risk would be covered from the date of payment of the insurance premium. The loan was secured from the date on which the insurance premium was paid. The premium having been paid by the Appellant’s husband during his life-time, the loan was to be adjusted from the insurance policy

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ASHATAI W/O ANAND DUPARTE — Appellant Vs. SHRIRAM CITY UNION FINANCE LTD. — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.…

When an amount is paid as Dharmada along with the sale price of goods, such payment is not made in consideration of the transfer of goods – Such payment is meant for charity and is received and held in trust by the seller – If such amounts are meant to be credited to charity and do not form part of the income of the assessee they cannot be included in the transaction value or assessable value of the goods

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH M/S D.J. MALPANI — Appellant Vs. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NASHIK — Respondent ( Before : S.A. Bobde, Deepak Gupta and Vineet Saran, JJ.…

The present case has been tagged with the case of M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik which has been referred to this Bench vide order dated 29.07.2015. We have held that the amount of Dharmada cannot be included in the transaction value for the purposes of assessments.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS, BANGALORE — Appellant Vs. M/S JSW STEEL LTD. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS JINDAL VIJAYANAGAR STEEL LTD.) — Respondent ( Before :…

Criminal Law–Murder–Suspension of sentence pending appeal– The mere fact that during the period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail–What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail

2009(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 636 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly Criminal Appeal No. of 2009…

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