Latest Post

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Orrder 11 Rules 1(4) & 5 (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015, Sch.) — Additional documents, filing of — Standard of “reasonable cause” — Held, plaintiff obliged to file all documents in its possession along with plaint; leave to file additional documents within 30 days of institution of suit permissible only on establishing reasonable cause for non-disclosure and justification for subsequent discovery — Distinction between “reasonable cause” (applicable standard under Or. XI Rr. 1(4)/(5)) and “sufficient cause” reaffirmed, following Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B., (2021) 13 SCC 71 — However, even applying the lower threshold of “reasonable cause”, application for additional documents rightly rejected where documents were in appellant’s possession since inception of suit and no explanation furnished for delay of over five years — Commercial Courts Act, 2015

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA…….” clear that all questions with regard to the validity of a Trade Mark is required to be decided by the Registrar or the High Court under the 1958 Act or by the Registrar or the IPAB under the 1999 Act and not by the Civil Court. The Civil Court, infact, is not empowered by the Act to decide the said question.”

(2017) AIR(SCW) 5619 : (2017) AIR(SC) 5619 : (2018) 1 ApexCourtJudgments(SC) 543 : (2018) 1 BCR 324 : (2017) 12 JT 577 : (2017) 4 LawHerald(SC) 2838 : (2018) 4…

Weakness in defence cannot become strength of prosecution, “An accused is not required to establish or prove his defence beyond all reasonable doubt, unlike the prosecution. If the accused takes a defence, which is not improbable and appears likely, there is material in support of such defence, the accused is not required to prove anything further. ” Supreme Court

Weakness in defence cannot become strength of prosecution,  “An accused is not required to establish or prove his defence beyond all reasonable doubt, unlike the prosecution. If the accused takes a defence, which…

Section 143A of Negotiable Instruments Act on Interim Compensation is not retrospective, SC -In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the Act must, therefore, be held to be prospective in nature and confined to cases where offences were committe

Section 143A of Negotiable Instruments Act on Interim Compensation is not retrospective, SC [Read Judgment] Murali Krishnan July 31 2019 FacebookTwitterWhatsAppShare282 The Supreme Court yesterday ruled that the Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,which provides for…

You missed