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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51) Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39) Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders etc. Act, 1986 — Section 3(2) — Preventive Detention — Grounds for Detention — Requirement of finding ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ — Detenu, a ‘drug offender’, was detained based on three criminal cases involving Ganja, with an apprehension that if released on bail, she would engage in similar activities — Held, mere apprehension that the detenu, if released on bail, would be likely to indulge in similar crimes would not be a sufficient ground for ordering preventive detention — Order of detention failed to indicate how the detenu’s activities were prejudicial to ‘public order’ as opposed to ‘law and order’ and was therefore unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11)
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)
Arbitration
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)
Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)
Limitation
Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence
Arbitration
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)
Corporate
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)
Constitution

Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 – Section 4(d1) – Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 – Section 31 – Antitemple activities – Stopping of nitis/pujas/seva and misbehavior/misconduct HELD This Court have to authorize the Chief Administrator of the Temple, for the time being, to take appropriate steps against such servitors/incumbents, who create obstruction in seva/puja/niti and are involved in misbehavior and misconduct against the employees of the Temple Administration or with devotees

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

MRINALINI PADHI — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Arun Mishra, M.R. Shah and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ. ) Writ Petition (Civil) No. 649…

Service Matters
Service

The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Jabalpur HELD We, thus, hold that the persons such as the respondent and the intervenors on deputation to APS from Department of Posts are not entitled to the benefit of OROP. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable in law and hence set aside. The appeal is allowed.

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. LT. COL. OM DUTT SHARMA (RETD.) DEAD THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before :…

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 302 read with 34, 148 and 149 – Murder – Delay in registration of FIR – Accused persons denied their involvement in the commission of the offence – High Court, on reappreciation of the evidence on record, affirmed the finding of guilt against the appellants “R” (Accused No. 1) and “S” (Accused No. 2) but acquitted “R1” (Accused No. 4) and “D” (Accused No. 6) by giving them benefit of doubt. Appeal dismissed

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ROHTAS AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA — Respondent ( Before : A.M. Khanwilkar and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

Corporate

What is the jural relationship between a chit fund entity and the subscribers, created by a chitty agreement;HELD “the relationship between a chit subscriber and the chit foreman is a contractual obligation, which creates a debt on the day of subscription. On default taking place, the foreman is entitled to recover the consolidated amount of future subscriptions from the defaulting subscriber in a lump sum.”

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S ORIENTAL KURIES LTD. REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN P.D. JOSE — Appellant Vs. LISSA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Indu Malhotra and…

Murder

Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 201, 302, 34, 436, 498A – Murder of wife – Deposition of medical officer – “there can no doubt that the medical doctor knows exactly what medical injuries are and ordinarily in case of inconsistency, the medical report of the doctor should prevail. Having regard to the post mortem and the evidence of P.W.1, the nature of injuries noticed as explained by the deposition of P.W.1 unerringly point to the death being caused by throttling as opined by the doctor

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JAVED ABDUL RAJJAQ SHAIKH — Appellant Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA — Respondent ( Before : Sanjay Kishan Kaul and K.M. Joseph, JJ. ) Criminal…

Service Matters
Service

Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 – Sections 16 and 18 – First Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Service Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 – Appointment of teachers HELD When the impugned judgment is analysed in light of the applicable norms, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant’s appointment by the Management, was not in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Removal of Difficulties Order.

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH RAVINDRA SINGH — Appellant Vs. DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : R. Banumathi, A.S. Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.…

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 326 – Summary Court Martial proceedings – Causing grievous hurt to Subedar/Master Technical – Acquittal – Appeal against – It is settled law that if two views can be reached, the one that leads to acquittal has to be preferred to the other, which would end in conviction. That apart, there is a clear violation of Rules 179 and 180 of the Rules and the respondent was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself.

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. SEPOY PRAVAT KUMAR BEHURIA — Respondent ( Before : L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.…

Property Matters

Madras Forest Act, 1882 – Sections 6, 8 and 25 – Declaration of title – The significant proposals of the Respondent were that the title in respect of the Alagar Hills should be with that of the presiding deity of the Respondent- The finding recorded by the High Court that there is adequate material to hold that Alagar hills belong to the temple is erroneous. The trial Court is right in holding that the Respondent miserably failed in producing any material to prove its title

Nov 10, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. ETC. ETC. — Appellant Vs. ARULMIGHU KALLALAGAR THIRUKOIL ALAGAR KOIL & ORS. ETC. ETC. — Respondent (…

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Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Corporate

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw