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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 165 and 166 — Liability for injuries sustained due to falling tree branch — Injuries caused by falling tree branch while vehicle was stationary under the tree during rain — Held, not an accident “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” as the motor vehicle did not play an active role. [

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 14 – An appointment to the heirs of the employees on their retirement and/or superannuation shall be contrary to the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH AHMEDNAGAR MAHANAGAR PALIKA — Appellant Vs. AHMEDNAGAR MAHANAGAR PALIKA KAMGAR UNION — Respondent ( Before : M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ. ) Civil…

IPC Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 – Going by the allegations made in the First Information Report that the incident in question had occurred five months before the First Information Report was lodged and the attending circumstances, in our view, the case of anticipatory bail is made out.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH BEERBAL PRASAD RAJORIYA — Appellant Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit, CJI. and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.…

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) – It is for the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands – Onus in this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation – Accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section 239 of the CrPC. State appeal allowed.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH STATE THROUGH DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE — Appellant Vs. R. SOUNDIRARASU ETC. — Respondent ( Before : Dinesh Maheshwari and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ. )…

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – Section 10(1), 10(3) and 10(5) – Once the land stood vested with the Government compensation paid no justification for the appellants to claim deemed possession of the subject land in question and even if they are in physical possession, no right could be claimed in reference to the subject land by the appellants.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH GOPALBHAI PANCHABHAI ZALAVADIA (DEAD) THR LRS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S.…

Benami ownership – Where the first plaintiff had proved that the properties had been purchased, with his funds, and the sons were minors, with no source of income – Plaintiff also proved that he had possession of the property, by adducing positive evidence of tenants, who paid rent to him – Elements necessary to establish benami ownership within the meaning of Section 4(3)(a) of the Act.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH PUSHPALATA — Appellant Vs. VIJAY KUMAR (DEAD) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindrabhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia,…

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 173­L – HELD returned goods may be treated as a raw material and therefore the “value” of the raw material can be considered for the purpose of “value” while determining the refund under Section 173­L cannot be accepted – Denial of the refund is in consonance of Section 173­L (v) of the Central Excise Act – Appeal dismissed.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH M/S PEACOCK INDUSTRIES LTD. — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : M. R. Shah and Krishna Murari, JJ.…

Reduction of sentence – Court is required to go by the principle of proportionality – If undue sympathy is shown by reducing the sentence to the minimum, it may adversely affect the faith of people in efficacy of law – It is the gravity of crime which is the prime consideration for deciding what should be the appropriate punishment.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH SAHEBRAO ARJUN HON — Appellant Vs. RAOSAHEB S/O KASHINATH HON AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Surya Kant and Abhay S. Oka, JJ.…

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Section 2(12) – In the case of determination of a lease by the lease coming to an end, tenant would be liable to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate at which the landlord could have let out the premises on being vacated by the tenant

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. — Appellant Vs. SUDERA REALTY PRIVATE LIMITED — Respondent ( Before : K.M. Joseph and Pamidi Ghantam Sri Narasimha, JJ.…

Gujarat Value Added Tax, 2003 – IBC – State is a secured creditor under the GVAT Act. Section 3(30) of the IBC defines secured creditor to mean a creditor in favour of whom security interest is credited. Such security interest could be created by operation of law – Definition of secured creditor in the IBC does not exclude any Government or Governmental Authority

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH STATE TAX OFFICER (1) — Appellant Vs. RAINBOW PAPERS LIMITED — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee and A.S. Bopanna, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

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