Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 165 and 166 — Liability for injuries sustained due to falling tree branch — Injuries caused by falling tree branch while vehicle was stationary under the tree during rain — Held, not an accident “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” as the motor vehicle did not play an active role. [
Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Service
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Service
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
RTI
Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.
C P C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.
Bail Declined

Bail – HELD order refusing or granting bail does not furnish the reasons that inform the decision, there is a presumption of the non-application of mind which may require the intervention of SCOI – the interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice. Judges are duty-bound to explain the basis on which they have arrived at a conclusion.

Oct 8, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH AMINUDDIN — Appellant Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Dinesh Maheshwari and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ. ) Criminal…

Accident

HELD income of the Deceased is computed by adding the amount awarded under the two parts ( Rs 10,93,000/- + Rs 2,50,000/-), which comes to Rs 13,43,000/-. In terms of Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, forty per cent of the income has to be added towards future prospects, which would come to Rs 18,80,200/-. After deducting one-fourth towards personal expenses as per Sarla Verma  , the net amount comes to Rs 14,10,150/- per annum. Applying the multiplier of 16, the total loss of dependency on account of the Deceased’s income is calculated at Rs 2,25,62,400/-. We further grant compensation under the remaining conventional heads as per the decisions in Pranay Sethi Satinder Kaur (2021) 11 SCC 780

Oct 8, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH K. RAMYA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Surya Kant and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.…

Land Acquisition

Land Acquisition – When the matter relates to the payment of amount of compensation to the land losers, if at all two views are possible, the view that advances the cause of justice is always to be preferred rather than the other view, which may draw its strength only from technicalities.

Oct 8, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH KAZI MOINUDDIN KAZI BASHIRODDIN AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. THE MAHARASHTRA TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, THROUGH ITS SENIOR REGIONAL MANAGER REGIONAL OFFICE, MTDC, AURANGABAD, MAHARASHTRA…

Housing

HELD flat owners subsequently forming a cooperative society land allotted to builder who made construction HELD since the land was not allotted to a society but to a builder on lease, who has constructed flats for private individuals, who have subsequently formed a Cooperative Society, the 1983 Resolution and 1999 Resolution would not be applicable to the members of such a society.

Oct 8, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. MR. ASPI CHINOY AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna,…

Constitution

HELD specifically rejected the contention that writ under Article 32 was barred or not maintainable with reference to an issue which was the subject matter of an earlier decision. – that the right to privacy is a fundamental right. No doubt that the right to information is also a fundamental right. In case of such a conflict, the Court is required to achieve a sense of balance – petitioners relegated to file writ under Art 32 to protect fundamental rights of its customers.

Oct 8, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH HDFC BANK LTD. AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.…

Bail Declined

High Court has not considered the seriousness and gravity of the offence alleged against the respondent – High Court has also not noticed and/or considered that a non-bailable warrant was issued against accused and thereafter, he was arrested in the year 2021 – Order releasing respondent is hereby quashed and set aside – Appeal allowed.

Oct 5, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH BOHATTI DEVI — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : M.R. Shah and Krishna Murari, JJ. )…

Arbitration C P C

A and C Act, 1996 – Section 9 – (CPC) – Order 38 Rule 5 – – conduct on the part of the opposite/opponent party which may tantamount to any attempt on the part of the opponent/opposite party to defeat the award that may be passed in the arbitral proceedings, the Commercial Court may pass an appropriate order including the restrain order and/or any other appropriate order to secure the interest of the parties.

Oct 5, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH SANGHI INDUSTRIES LIMITED — Appellant Vs. RAVIN CABLES LTD., AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : M.R. Shah and Krishna Murari, JJ. ) Civil…

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Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
RTI

Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw