Supreme Court of India Judgements

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State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Orrder 11 Rules 1(4) & 5 (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015, Sch.) — Additional documents, filing of — Standard of “reasonable cause” — Held, plaintiff obliged to file all documents in its possession along with plaint; leave to file additional documents within 30 days of institution of suit permissible only on establishing reasonable cause for non-disclosure and justification for subsequent discovery — Distinction between “reasonable cause” (applicable standard under Or. XI Rr. 1(4)/(5)) and “sufficient cause” reaffirmed, following Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B., (2021) 13 SCC 71 — However, even applying the lower threshold of “reasonable cause”, application for additional documents rightly rejected where documents were in appellant’s possession since inception of suit and no explanation furnished for delay of over five years — Commercial Courts Act, 2015
C P C State Laws

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
C P C State Laws
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
POCSO
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected
Rent
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —
Evidence Act
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —
Corporate

Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Sections Section 47(c)(1) and 47(c)(5) and 48 – Bombay Stamp Rules, 1939 – Rules 21 and 22A – Refund of stamp duty paid for an un-executed conveyance deed – The High Court upheld the respondents’ decision, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order and orders of the respondents – The court held that the case of the appellant was fit for refund of the stamp duty paid, as the appellant was a bonafide purchaser who had paid the stamp duty in good faith but was a victim of fraud played by the vendor – The court also referred to the judgment in Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech Private Limited & Ors., which stated that when the State deals with a citizen, it should not rely on technicalities, and the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under any law may bar the remedy but not the right.

Jun 3, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 443 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BANO SAIYED PARWAZ — Appellant Vs. CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY AND INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND CONTROLLER OF STAMPS AND OTHERS…

Specific Performance

Agreement to sell – Suit for Specific performance – The appellant entered into a sale agreement with respondent 4, a Power of Attorney, for respondents 2 to 11 – The sale was to be completed by a certain date, which was extended multiple times – However, the land was sold to respondents 1 to 3, who were also Power of Attorney holders – The main issue was whether the sale agreement was valid and the appellant had the right to specific performance of the contract – The appellant argued that the agreement was valid, the earnest money was paid, and the suit was filed within the time limit – The respondents argued that not all co-owners signed the agreement, the appellant was not ready with the funds, and the suit was barred by limitation – The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, but the High Court set aside this decree, leading to the current appeal – The court found that not all co-owners signed the agreement, the Power of Attorney was not proved in the trial, and the appellant’s failure to appear as a witness was noted – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, dismissing the appeal and concluding that the appellant was not entitled to specific performance.

Jun 3, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH RAJESH KUMAR — Appellant Vs. ANAND KUMAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Pankaj Mithal and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Labour Cases

Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981- Dispute over the permanent status of certain workmen – The Court considered whether the Act, 1981 applies to the parties and if the suggestion to institute an ‘Industrial Disputes Claim’ was sustainable – The Corporation argued that the Act and the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 do not apply to them, and that certain activities, like construction, exempt them from the Act – The Union argued that the Corporation has exploited temporary employees for years and that the Inspector of Labour’s order granting permanent status should not be questioned – The Corporation’s appeal was dismissed, and the Union’s appeal was allowed – The Court found the Corporation an industrial establishment, and the employees had uninterrupted service qualifying them for permanent status – The Court analyzed the Act’s definitions, the Corporation’s activities, and previous orders and judgments – The Court concluded that the Act applies to the dispute, and the Inspector of Labour’s findings should not have been disturbed.

Jun 3, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 446 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH TAMIL NADU MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION LIMITED — Appellant Vs. TAMIL NADU MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION EMPLOYEES WELFARE UNION AND ANOTHER — Respondent…

Cr P C Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code SVT., 1989 – Sections 306 and 411 – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 39 – The case involves charges against respondents for attempting to ambush a CRPF convoy with explosives – The Special Judge, NIA, took cognizance for some offences but not others due to procedural issues – The appeal challenges the High Court’s judgment on the cognizance of charges under various sections of the RPC, 1989, and UAPA, 1967, particularly focusing on the applicability of Section 196-A of JK CrPC, 1989 – The National Investigation Agency argues that post the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, the CrPC, 1973 should apply, and the need for authorization under CrPC, 1989 is not required – The respondents argue that the complaint was conveyed when CrPC, 1989 was in force, and non-compliance recorded by the court should be upheld – The Supreme Court allows the appeal in part, allowing the appellant to seek appropriate authorization under CrPC, 1989, and directing the trial court to take cognizance if the appellant complies with the required authorization under CrPC, 1989.

Jun 3, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 447 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY NEW DELHI — Appellant Vs. OWAIS AMIN @ CHERRY AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : M. M.…

Constitution

Rule for Video Conferencing for Courts, 2020 – Rule 6 – The case involves appeals against the order of the Patna High Court which directed a de novo trial and made observations against the Special Judge’s approach in conducting the trial – The appeals raise questions regarding the legality of the High Court’s order, the conduct of the trial by the Special Judge, and the application of video conferencing rules in court proceedings – The appellant challenges the High Court’s order of remittal and the observations made against the Special Judge – The respondent defends the High Court’s decision and the observations made therein – The Supreme Court’s judgment addresses the legal provisions for conducting a trial, witness protection, fair trial principles, and the supply of documents to the accused – The Court examines the rules for video conferencing, witness protection scheme, and the importance of a fair trial in the criminal justice system – The judgment discusses the procedural safeguards in the CrPC, 1973, and their substantive elements that protect constitutional rights – The Court emphasizes the need for due compliance with procedural laws to ensure a fair trial and the rights of all stakeholders, including the accused, the victim, and society

Jun 2, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SUNITA DEVI — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : M. M. Sundresh and S. V. N. Bhatti,…

Service Matters
Service

Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005 – Rule 5(1) – Two judicial officers challenged the promotion process for Civil Judges (Senior Division) to the post of Additional District Judge, arguing that the High Court of Gujarat incorrectly applied the principle of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ instead of ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ as stipulated by the Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005 – The main issue was whether the promotion process adhered to the principle and if the final Select List was in contravention of this principle – The petitioners contended that the High Court wrongly assessed all eligible candidates for a minimum merit level and then promoted them based on seniority, which equates to ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ – The High Court argued that ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ should not be confused with pure merit and that seniority should also be considered – The Court analyzed the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32, the legislative history of the 2005 Rules, and the decision in All India Judges’ Association (3), emphasizing the need for merit-based criteria for promotion in the Higher Judicial Service – The final decision on the promotion process’s adherence to ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ was to be determined.

Jun 2, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 436 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH RAVIKUMAR DHANSUKHLAL MAHETA AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Dhananjaya Y.…

I P C Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 120(b), 153(A) and 153(AA) – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38 and 39 – The case involves the Popular Front of India (PFI), an extremist Islamic organization accused of spreading extremist ideology, committing terrorist acts, raising funds for terrorism, and recruiting members in Tamil Nadu – The central issue is whether the respondents, accused of serious offenses under the IPC and UAPA, should be granted bail – The Union of India, represented by NIA, argues that the High Court failed to appreciate the gravity of the offenses and the prima facie evidence against the respondents – The defence contends that the allegations are vague and the evidence, particularly the statements of protected witnesses, is unreliable – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, emphasizing the seriousness of the offenses and the sufficiency of prima facie evidence – The Court found that the High Court did not properly consider the material evidence and recorded perverse findings regarding the involvement of the respondents in the alleged offences – The Court relied on the provisions of the UAPA and past judgments to establish the standards for granting bail in cases involving terrorism – The Supreme Court concluded that the respondents should not be released on bail, given the reasonable grounds to believe the accusations against them are prima facie true and the potential threat to national security.

Jun 2, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 452 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA — Appellant Vs. BARAKATHULLAH ETC. — Respondent ( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal, JJ. )…

Accident

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Enhancement of compensation – Indigent person – Appellant, an indigent person, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and filed a claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) for Rs. 10 lakhs – The MACT awarded her Rs. 2,41,745 with 9% interest from the date of the claim petition till realization – The appellant then filed an appeal before the High Court of Gujarat seeking enhanced compensation – The High Court dismissed the appeal and denied the appellant permission to file the appeal as an indigent person, stating that she had received compensation by the MACT and was therefore not indigent – The appellant argued that she was still indigent despite receiving compensation from the MACT, as she had not yet received the awarded amount – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment – The court held that the appellant was still indigent despite receiving compensation from the MACT, as she had not yet received the awarded amount – The court granted the appellant liberty to appeal as an indigent person and requested the High Court to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment – The court relied on previous judgments to define the concept of an ‘indigent person’ and applied the principle that lack of monetary capability should not preclude a person from seeking justice – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and granted the appellant liberty to appeal as an indigent person.

Jun 2, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 457 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ALIFIYA HUSENBHAI KESHARIYA — Appellant Vs. SIDDIQ ISMAIL SINDHI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and Sanjay Karol,…

Acquittal SC/ST

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 4(2) – The Olympic Riding and Equestrian Academy (OREA) is facing disputes over allegations of caste-based discrimination and other complaints filed against trainees and administrators – The main issue is whether the complaints filed under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, were substantiated and whether FIRs should be registered – The appellants argued that the complaints were not made in public view and lacked specific details, thus not constituting offenses under the Act of 1989 – The respondent claimed that the complaints were ignored by the police and not investigated as mandated by the Act of 1989 – The Supreme Court allowed the criminal appeal, upholding the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order that dismissed the application for FIR registration under the Act of 1989 – The court found the allegations vague, did not specify the offenses, and were not made in public view – The impugned judgment of the High Court directing the registration of an FIR was set aside.

May 27, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 437 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH PRITI AGARWALLA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF GNCT OF DELHI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : M.…

You missed

C P C State Laws

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
Rent

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
Evidence Act

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw