Supreme Court of India Judgements

46855 Judgements hosted as on 02/09/2025 - Search (FREE), Subscribe, Read & Download

Category: POCSO

POCSO

Goa Children’s Act, 2003 — Section 8(2) and Section 2(m) — Child Abuse — Conviction unsustainable — Accused allegedly casually hit injured child with own son’s school bag — No evidence of deliberate maltreatment, cruelty, exploitation or ill-treatment intended to cause harm — Act exceeded mere incidental quarrel — Medical examination could not rule out possibility of injury from fall — High Court also reduced sentence substantially — Held, conviction for child abuse not made out.

Aug 31, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1041 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SANTOSH SAHADEV KHAJNEKAR Vs. THE STATE OF GOA ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No(s).…

I P C POCSO

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 376(2), 450 — Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 4 — Sexual assault on a minor — Evidence of prosecutrix — Conviction can be based solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony if it inspires confidence — Corroboration of testimony of prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence — Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out the evidence of the prosecutrix.

Aug 9, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 929 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DEEPAK KUMAR SAHU Vs. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH ( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and N.V. Anjaria, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No. …..of…

POCSO

POCSO Act, 2012 and Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Offences under — Suspension of sentence — High Court’s refusal to suspend sentence was based on general gravity of offence and complicity of appellant, without applying correct principles for suspension of fixed-term sentences, leading to setting aside of order and remand for fresh consideration.

Aug 9, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 944 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH AASIF @ PASHA Vs. THE STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. ) Criminal…

Cr P C POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) — Sections 3/4(2), 42 — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 376(3) — Appeal against suspension of sentence by High Court — Supreme Court held High Court was not justified. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 389 — Suspension of Sentence — Scope of — High Court while considering suspension of sentence must adhere to parameters laid down in law — Prima facie satisfaction about chances of acquittal is necessary, not reappreciation of evidence or picking loopholes.

Aug 9, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 935 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JAMNALAL Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and K. V. Viswanathan, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No…of…

POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 6 — Aggravated Penetrative sexual assault — Punishment introduced by 2019 amendment — Retrospective application — Constitution of India — Article 20(1) — Prohibition against ex-post facto laws and enhanced penalty — Offence committed before amended Act came into force — Sentencing under amended provisions violates constitutional bar against imposing greater penalty than that which was permissible at the time of commission of the offence.

Jul 27, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 892 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SATAURAM MANDAVI Vs. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANOTHER ( Before : Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 4 — Section 376 (3) IPC — Rape — Conviction upheld — Evidence of victim’s mother and medical evidence — Reliability of victim’s mother’s testimony confirmed despite lengthy cross-examination, finding it natural and trustworthy and corroborated by other witnesses and medical evidence — Medical evidence, though partially presented by defense, conclusively supported sexual assault, citing perineal tear and abrasions around anus

Jun 29, 2025 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHAMBHU YADAV Vs. THE STATE OF BIHAR ( Before : Sandeep Mehta and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. ) Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9155…

Constitution POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 15 — Scope of Section 15 — The court clarified that Section 15 of the POCSO Act criminalizes the storage or possession of any child pornographic material involving a child, regardless of whether the accused has the intention to share or transmit the material. The court further distinguished between the three distinct offences punishable under Section 15(1), (2), and (3) of the POCSO Act. Information Technology Act, 2000 — Section 67B — Scope of Section 67B — The court held that Section 67B of the IT Act criminalizes the publication, transmission, or creation of any material depicting children in sexually explicit acts or conduct — The court clarified that the act of merely viewing or downloading child pornography, without any intention to publish, transmit, or create such material, does not fall within the purview of Section 67B of the IT Act.

Sep 29, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 716 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JUST RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN ALLIANCE AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. S. HARISH AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya…

POCSO

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(i) and 342 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 14(3)– The appeal involves a Child in Conflict with Law (CCL) challenging the High Court’s order which set aside the Juvenile Justice Board’s decision and directed the trial to be conducted by the Children’s Court – The core issue is whether the CCL should be tried as a juvenile by the Board or as an adult by the Children’s Court, based on the preliminary assessment reports – The CCL’s counsel argued against the practice of passing orders without detailed reasons, the legality of the orders passed by the Board, and the deprivation of the CCL’s right to appeal – The State’s counsel contended that the Children’s Court can reconsider the Board’s decision and that the time limit for preliminary assessment under the Act is not mandatory – The judgment discusses the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, the mandatory or directory nature of the time period for preliminary assessment, and the exercise of revisional power by the High Court – The Court examines the procedural anomalies in the Act, the validity of the Board’s orders, and the remedy of appeal available to the appellant – The reasoning includes interpretation of the Act’s provisions, the role of the Board and the Children’s Court, and the application of the rules for preliminary assessment – The Court concludes with directions and reliefs based on the analysis of the arguments and legal provisions involved.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 387 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH LAW THROUGH HIS MOTHER — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before…

Acquittal POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Supreme Court found significant discrepancies and contradictions in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, including the victim’s, casting doubt on the prosecution’s version of events – Due to these inconsistencies and lack of corroborative evidence, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellants, setting aside their convictions and sentences – The judgment emphasizes the importance of credible evidence and the consequences of accusations on the lives of individuals, highlighting the need for careful examination of testimonies in sexual harassment cases.

Mar 12, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH NIRMAL PREMKUMAR AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE — Respondent ( Before : Dipankar Datta, K.V. Viswanathan and Sandeep…

POCSO

Accused-appellant also providing for the day-to-day expenses of the victim and her child and therefore, further imprisonment will impact not only his family but also the victim’s – Ends of justice would be met if the period of imprisonment awarded against the accused-appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him – Conviction u/s. u/S. 3(a) r/w Sec. 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is hereby confirmed – Sentence imposed by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court is hereby modified and reduced to the period already undergone – Appeal allowed in part.

Feb 18, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH RAJASEKAR — Appellant Vs. THE STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.…

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Consumer

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 25 — Enforcement of orders — Pre-2002 amendment and post-2019 Act, all orders could be enforced as decrees. The period between 15.03.2003 to 20.07.2020 saw an anomaly where only interim orders (and monetary recovery) were clearly enforceable under Section 25, leaving final non-monetary orders in a gap. Interpretation of Statutes — Casus omissus — Court can fill gaps in legislation using interpretative tools like purposive construction when literal interpretation leads to absurdity or defeats the object of the Act, especially for remedial legislation like the Consumer Act.

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Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14, 39(d) and 43 — Equal pay for equal work — Contractual Assistant Professors performing identical duties as regularly appointed or ad-hoc Assistant Professors are entitled to the minimum pay scale of Assistant Professors.

Sep 2, 2025 sclaw
State Laws

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 — Chapter I-A — Slum Rehabilitation Schemes — Preferential right of landowner to redevelop — Section 3B(4)(e) and Section 13(1) confer a preferential right on the landowner to redevelop a Slum Rehabilitation Area (SR Area) — SRA can undertake redevelopment only if the landowner fails to come forward with a scheme within a reasonable time

Sep 2, 2025 sclaw
State Laws

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 — Sections 3C, 13, 14 — Waiver of preferential right — Waiver of landowner’s preferential right to redevelop requires clear and overt communication by the owner of intention not to exercise the right — Mere inaction or delay, particularly when the owner has consistently shown intent to redevelop, does not constitute waiver, especially if no invitation for redevelopment was issued.

Sep 2, 2025 sclaw