December 19, 2024 8:36 am

In cases governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation begins to run “when the right to sue accrues” and not when the right to sue “first” accrues,- Supreme Court

Bysclaw

Jun 5, 2020

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Condonation of Delay — The appellant was penalized for deserting his family and living with another woman — The penalty was challenged due to procedural delays and alleged mistakes by his counsel — Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned and whether the penalty imposed was justified — The delay was due to the counsel’s mistake, and the penalty was disproportionate since the complainant (his wife) had withdrawn her complaint — The representations were examined and rejected, and the withdrawal of the O.A. was authorized by the appellant — The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders, holding that the appellant is entitled to all consequential benefits — The delay was sufficiently explained, and the penalty was disproportionate given the withdrawal of the complaint and lack of evidence — The court emphasized a liberal approach to condonation of delay and the need for substantial justice — The appeals were allowed, and the appellant was granted all consequential benefits.

Aug 13, 2024 sclaw

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

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Classification of Military casualties and the eligibility for Liberalised Family Pension — Battle Casualty —Illness Caused by Extreme Climatic Conditions as Battle Casualty — The Court establishes that a soldier’s death due to illness resulting from extreme climatic conditions while on duty near a sensitive border area (such as the Line of Control) can be categorized as a ‘Battle Casualty’ — This expands the interpretation of what constitutes a battle casualty under military regulations. – Liberalised Family Pension (LFP) — Application of Category E (f) — The judgment clarifies that deaths occurring in war-like situations, including those near international borders or lines of control due to environmental stresses, fall under clause (f) of category E of the relevant military order — This broadens the scope of eligibility for LFP under such circumstances.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Temple Bye Laws — Oachira Parabrahma Temple — Ancient structure without a building or deity, governed by Bye-laws with three-tier elected committees — Appellants, elected Secretary and President, challenged two High Court orders (2020 and 2023) that removed their committee and appointed an unelected one under an Administrative Head, citing violations of the temple’s Bye-laws and customs —Legality of appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one contrary to the temple’s Bye-laws — Petitioner argues that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction and violated the temple’s governance structure by appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one without proper legal basis — The High Court’s actions were necessary for the efficient administration of the temple until a scheme could be framed and new elections held — The Supreme Court modified the High Court orders, appointing a new retired Judge as Administrative Head to conduct fair elections within four months, while directing all parties to cooperate — The Court emphasized the need to preserve temple properties and governance as per established customs and laws — The Supreme Court struck down the High Court’s order appointing an unelected committee, appointed a new Administrative Head to conduct elections, and directed all parties to cooperate, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the temple’s established governance structure and Bye-laws.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 364, 302 and 201 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant of murder charges as the prosecution failed to prove the crucial link of the accused’s disclosure leading to the discovery of skeletal remains under Section 27 and the DNA evidence was also found to be inconclusive due to lack of proper collection of samples. – Proof of Disclosure Statements under Section 27 — Voluntariness and Uninfluenced Nature — The Court reiterates that the information provided by an accused under Section 27 must be voluntary and uninfluenced by threat, duress, or coercion.

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Arms Act, 1959 — Sections 25, 54 and 59 — Buttondar knife — Specific Intent Required — The court clarifies that mere possession of a knife covered by a notification like the DAD Notification is not sufficient to constitute an offense under the Arms Act — There must be specific intent to use it for the prohibited purposes such as “manufacture, sale, or possession for sale or test.” – The prosecution must clearly allege and prove the intent of the accused to use the weapon for the specified prohibited purposes — Absence of such allegation in the charge-sheet renders the proceedings defective.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw