Supreme Court of India Judgements

47285Judgements hosted as on 12/07/2026 - Search (FREE), Subscribe @ Rs 99/- for 6 months, sclaw@sclaw.in, WA +91 9417245693.

Top Tags

Latest Post

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Orrder 11 Rules 1(4) & 5 (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015, Sch.) — Additional documents, filing of — Standard of “reasonable cause” — Held, plaintiff obliged to file all documents in its possession along with plaint; leave to file additional documents within 30 days of institution of suit permissible only on establishing reasonable cause for non-disclosure and justification for subsequent discovery — Distinction between “reasonable cause” (applicable standard under Or. XI Rr. 1(4)/(5)) and “sufficient cause” reaffirmed, following Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B., (2021) 13 SCC 71 — However, even applying the lower threshold of “reasonable cause”, application for additional documents rightly rejected where documents were in appellant’s possession since inception of suit and no explanation furnished for delay of over five years — Commercial Courts Act, 2015
C P C State Laws

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
C P C State Laws
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
POCSO
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected
Rent
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —
Evidence Act
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —
Acquittal

Arms Act, 1959 — Sections 25, 54 and 59 — Buttondar knife — Specific Intent Required — The court clarifies that mere possession of a knife covered by a notification like the DAD Notification is not sufficient to constitute an offense under the Arms Act — There must be specific intent to use it for the prohibited purposes such as “manufacture, sale, or possession for sale or test.” – The prosecution must clearly allege and prove the intent of the accused to use the weapon for the specified prohibited purposes — Absence of such allegation in the charge-sheet renders the proceedings defective.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 924 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH IRFAN KHAN — Appellant Vs. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) — Respondent ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.…

Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Fair Investigation — The Court emphasizes that the petitioner has a fundamental right to a fair investigation and trial, which is inherently linked to the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. – Transfer of Investigation to Independent Agencies — The Court clarifies that while no party has an absolute right to choose the investigating agency, transfer of an investigation to an independent agency like the CBI or SIT can be ordered in exceptional circumstances — Such transfers are justified when there are serious allegations against high-profile officials, political interference is suspected, or the integrity of the investigation is in doubt.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 930 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH KABIR SHANKAR BOSE — Appellant Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : B. V. Nagarathna and…

Service Matters
Service

Service Law — Termination — Service Benefits — The Supreme Court held that the appellant is likely an Indian citizen based on his father’s migration certificate — The Court found that the termination of his service was arbitrary and violated natural justice principles, as he was not given an opportunity to defend himself — The Court directed that appellant be entitled to all unpaid service benefits and issued a general direction for timely police verification in government appointments. – Foreigners Act, 1946 — Section 9 — Citizenship Proof — Onus of Proof — The Court reaffirmed that under Section 9, the onus of proving citizenship lies on the person claiming it. -Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 5(1)(a) — Indian Origin —The Court noted that persons of Indian origin who have been ordinary residents in India for seven years are entitled to citizenship under Section 5(1)(a).

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 940 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BASUDEV DUTTA — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and R.…

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 324 and 326 — Murder — Intent for Murder — The Court reaffirmed that intent for murder can be inferred from the circumstances of the incident, including the nature of injuries and the choice of weapon, even if there was no prior premeditation – Exception 2 to Section 300 — Private Defense — The Court clarified that the right of private defense under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC does not apply if the accused was the aggressor or if the force used was excessive and disproportionate.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 937 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH KUNHIMUHAMMED@ KUNHEETHU — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF KERALA — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.…

Service Matters
Service

Service Law — Retirement Age and the applicability of regulatory amendments in private, minority educational institutions affiliated with state universities — State-Specific Regulations Prevail — The court held that when a state government has not adopted amended regulations increasing the superannuation age, such amendments do not automatically apply to institutions within that state, even if they are governed by central regulatory bodies like AICTE and UGC.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 938 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH P.J. DHARMARAJ — Appellant Vs. CHURCH OF SOUTH INDIA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and Prasanna B.Varale,…

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 782 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH LALU YADAV — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh…

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 783 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION — Appellant Vs. SRINIVAS D. SRIDHAR — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,…

Municipal Laws

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 784 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE PATNA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. M/S TRIBRO AD BUREAU AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Vikram…

Constitution

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 789 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 5 JUDGES BENCH IN RE : SECTION 6A OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACT 1955 ( Before : Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI., Surya Kant, M.M.…

Accident

Motor Accident Claims — The appellants, family members of the deceased claimed compensation for his death in a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by the negligence of the car driver — Whether the car driven by respondent no. 2 was involved in the accident and if the accident was due to the negligence of the car driver — The appellants argued that there was ample evidence showing the car’s involvement and that the lower courts misread the evidence — The respondents contended that the accident was due to the deceased’s negligence and that the car was not involved — The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts’ findings, holding that the car was involved in the accident and awarded compensation to the appellants — The Court found that the evidence, including witness testimonies and the condition of the car, supported the involvement of the car in the accident — The Court applied the principle of preponderance of probability, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt, to conclude the car’s involvement — The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were awarded compensation of Rs. 46,31,496/- with interest.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 787 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SAJEENA IKHBAL AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. MINI BABU GEORGE AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : C.T. Ravikumar and Prashant…

You missed

C P C State Laws

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
Rent

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
Evidence Act

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw