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Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 36(1)(viii) — Interpretation of “derived from” vs. “attributable to” — The phrase “derived from” connotes a requirement of a direct, first-degree nexus between the income and the specified business activity (providing long-term finance) — It is judicially settled that “derived from” is narrower than “attributable to,” thus excluding ancillary, incidental, or second-degree sources of income — If income is even a “step removed” from the core business, the nexus is broken (Paras 14, 15, 20, 33). Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) — Section 11 — Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Jurisdiction against employee of different department — The ICC constituted at the workplace/department of the “aggrieved woman” has jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment against a “respondent” who is an employee of a different department/workplace — The phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 refers to a procedural condition (directing the ICC to apply the service rules applicable to the respondent as an employee) rather than a jurisdictional constraint limiting a particular ICC to hear the complaint. (Paras 2, 25, 27, 36-46, 72(i)) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(4) — Appointment of Arbitrator — Existence of Arbitration Agreement — Non-Signatory/Third Party — The Referral Court (Appointing Authority) is required to inspect and scrutinize the dealings between the parties to prima facie examine the existence of an arbitration agreement, including whether a non-signatory is a “veritable party” to the agreement. (Paras 24, 25, 27, 28, 35) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of First Information Report (FIR) — Abuse of process of law — When civil dispute is masked as criminal complaint — Allegations in FIR (claiming criminal conspiracy, forcible occupation, and caste abuse) found inconsistent with contemporaneous civil suit filed by the informant regarding the same property and on the same day — Suit’s cause of action traced to earlier dates and did not mention the specific criminal incident alleged in the FIR — Absence of relief to set aside primary sale deeds in the suit suggests the criminal allegations are an afterthought or exaggerated — FIR quashed as a clear abuse of the process of law. (Paras 3, 6, 8, 9, 10) Service Law — Resignation — Forfeiture of past service — Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972 — Rule 26(1) — Distinction between Resignation and Voluntary Retirement — An employee who resigns from service forfeits past service as per Rule 26(1) of the 1972 Rules, regardless of the length of service completed (20 years or more) — The act of resignation cannot be re-classified as voluntary retirement to claim pensionary benefits, as this would nullify the distinction between the two concepts and render Rule 26 nugatory — Claim for pension correctly denied where the employee resigned from service. (Paras 3, 4, 6, 9, 9.1, 9.5, 9.6, 12)
Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 36(1)(viii) — Interpretation of “derived from” vs. “attributable to” — The phrase “derived from” connotes a requirement of a direct, first-degree nexus between the income and the specified business activity (providing long-term finance) — It is judicially settled that “derived from” is narrower than “attributable to,” thus excluding ancillary, incidental, or second-degree sources of income — If income is even a “step removed” from the core business, the nexus is broken (Paras 14, 15, 20, 33).

Dec 11, 2025 sclaw
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) — Section 11 — Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Jurisdiction against employee of different department — The ICC constituted at the workplace/department of the “aggrieved woman” has jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment against a “respondent” who is an employee of a different department/workplace — The phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 refers to a procedural condition (directing the ICC to apply the service rules applicable to the respondent as an employee) rather than a jurisdictional constraint limiting a particular ICC to hear the complaint. (Paras 2, 25, 27, 36-46, 72(i))

Dec 11, 2025 sclaw
Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 36(1)(viii) — Interpretation of “derived from” vs. “attributable to” — The phrase “derived from” connotes a requirement of a direct, first-degree nexus between the income and the specified business activity (providing long-term finance) — It is judicially settled that “derived from” is narrower than “attributable to,” thus excluding ancillary, incidental, or second-degree sources of income — If income is even a “step removed” from the core business, the nexus is broken (Paras 14, 15, 20, 33).
Direct Taxation Income Tax Act
Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 36(1)(viii) — Interpretation of “derived from” vs. “attributable to” — The phrase “derived from” connotes a requirement of a direct, first-degree nexus between the income and the specified business activity (providing long-term finance) — It is judicially settled that “derived from” is narrower than “attributable to,” thus excluding ancillary, incidental, or second-degree sources of income — If income is even a “step removed” from the core business, the nexus is broken (Paras 14, 15, 20, 33).
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) — Section 11 — Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Jurisdiction against employee of different department — The ICC constituted at the workplace/department of the “aggrieved woman” has jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment against a “respondent” who is an employee of a different department/workplace — The phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 refers to a procedural condition (directing the ICC to apply the service rules applicable to the respondent as an employee) rather than a jurisdictional constraint limiting a particular ICC to hear the complaint. (Paras 2, 25, 27, 36-46, 72(i))
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) — Section 11 — Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Jurisdiction against employee of different department — The ICC constituted at the workplace/department of the “aggrieved woman” has jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment against a “respondent” who is an employee of a different department/workplace — The phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 refers to a procedural condition (directing the ICC to apply the service rules applicable to the respondent as an employee) rather than a jurisdictional constraint limiting a particular ICC to hear the complaint. (Paras 2, 25, 27, 36-46, 72(i))
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(4) — Appointment of Arbitrator — Existence of Arbitration Agreement — Non-Signatory/Third Party — The Referral Court (Appointing Authority) is required to inspect and scrutinize the dealings between the parties to prima facie examine the existence of an arbitration agreement, including whether a non-signatory is a “veritable party” to the agreement. (Paras 24, 25, 27, 28, 35)
Arbitration
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(4) — Appointment of Arbitrator — Existence of Arbitration Agreement — Non-Signatory/Third Party — The Referral Court (Appointing Authority) is required to inspect and scrutinize the dealings between the parties to prima facie examine the existence of an arbitration agreement, including whether a non-signatory is a “veritable party” to the agreement. (Paras 24, 25, 27, 28, 35)
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of First Information Report (FIR) — Abuse of process of law — When civil dispute is masked as criminal complaint — Allegations in FIR (claiming criminal conspiracy, forcible occupation, and caste abuse) found inconsistent with contemporaneous civil suit filed by the informant regarding the same property and on the same day — Suit’s cause of action traced to earlier dates and did not mention the specific criminal incident alleged in the FIR — Absence of relief to set aside primary sale deeds in the suit suggests the criminal allegations are an afterthought or exaggerated — FIR quashed as a clear abuse of the process of law. (Paras 3, 6, 8, 9, 10)
Cr P C
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of First Information Report (FIR) — Abuse of process of law — When civil dispute is masked as criminal complaint — Allegations in FIR (claiming criminal conspiracy, forcible occupation, and caste abuse) found inconsistent with contemporaneous civil suit filed by the informant regarding the same property and on the same day — Suit’s cause of action traced to earlier dates and did not mention the specific criminal incident alleged in the FIR — Absence of relief to set aside primary sale deeds in the suit suggests the criminal allegations are an afterthought or exaggerated — FIR quashed as a clear abuse of the process of law. (Paras 3, 6, 8, 9, 10)
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Execution of Arbitral Award — Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) — Maintainability — Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 — Order 21 Rule 22 — Execution proceedings against legal representatives — The Act is a self-contained code restricting judicial interference — An order passed by a Single Judge in the course of executing an arbitral award is traceable to the Act, not the CPC; therefore, a Letters Patent Appeal against such an order is not maintainable — Where execution is sought against entities/persons arrayed as executors/legal representatives of the deceased judgment debtor, they step into the shoes of the judgment debtor for limited execution purposes and cannot be treated as third parties to the arbitral award for the purpose of challenging maintainability of the appeal under the Act.

Nov 23, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1334 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BHARAT KANTILAL DALAL (DEAD) THROUGH LR. Vs. CHETAN SURENDRA DALAL AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe, JJ.…

SARFAESI

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) — Priority of Debts — Section 26E — When two enactments contain non-obstante clauses, the provision incorporated later in time prevails; however, if one enactment creates a statutory ‘first charge’, that charge prevails over the general ‘priority’ conferred by the later non-obstante clause — SARFAESI Act, Section 26E, conferring priority to secured creditors’ debts registered with the Central Registry, does not override the statutory ‘first charge’ created for Provident Fund dues under the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.

Nov 23, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1335 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JALGAON DISTRICT CENTRAL COOP. BANK LTD. Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ( Before : B. R. Gavai, CJI. and K.…

Acquittal Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Inherent powers of High Court — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Arms Act, 1959 — Section 13(2A) — Prosecution of public servant (IAS officer/District Magistrate) for alleged irregularities in issuing arms licenses and criminal conspiracy (Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B IPC and Section 30 Arms Act) — Delay in investigation and sanction — Quashing justified where sanction is non-speaking and investigation is inordinately and unjustifiably delayed.

Nov 23, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1339 SUPREME COURT OF NDIA DIVISION BENCH ROBERT LALCHUNGNUNGA CHONGTHU @ R L CHONGTHU Vs. STATE OF BIHAR ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.…

Rent

Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act, 1965) — Sections 12 and 18 — Eviction for non-payment of rent — Procedure under Section 12 in Appeal against Section 12(3) eviction order — Whether the entire summary procedure under Section 12 must be repeated before the Rent Control Appellate Authority when challenging an eviction order passed under Section 12(3) — Held: A fresh application under Section 12(1) of the Act is not mandatory when challenging an eviction order under Section 12(3) before the Appellate Authority — Rent Control Appellate Authority is not the Court of first instance and only tests the exercise of jurisdiction and power by the Rent Control Court; it is not required to re-determine the issue of default or outstanding amount of rent — Insisting on repeating the entire Section 12 procedure would be superfluous, unnecessary, contrary to the statute’s spirit, and lead to an absurd/unjust result, akin to turning the summary procedure on its head.

Nov 23, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1340 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH P.U. SIDHIQUE AND OTHERS Vs. ZAKARIYA ( Before : Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan, JJ. ) Civil Appeal Nos.13901-13902 of 2025 (Arising…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(6), Section 11(12)(a), Section 2(1)(f), Section 2(2) — Applicability of Part I, including Section 11, to International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) — Dispute arising from a Buyer and Seller Agreement (BSA) where Respondent No. 1 is foreign company (incorporated in Benin) — BSA stipulates arbitration “will take place in Benin” and is governed by laws of Benin — Held: Dispute is an ICA under Section 2(1)(f) — Under Section 2(2), Part I of the Act applies only where the place of arbitration is in India — Designation of Benin as the place of arbitration, coupled with choice of Benin law as governing/curial law, unequivocally establishes Benin as the juridical seat — Indian Courts lack jurisdiction under Section 11 to appoint an arbitrator for a foreign-seated arbitration — Petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator in India is fundamentally misconceived and legally untenable.

Nov 23, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1342 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BALAJI STEEL TRADE Vs. FLUDOR BENIN S.A. AND OTHERS ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ. )…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 37 read with Section 34 — Scope of Interference — Concurrent Findings — Statutory prohibition against re-appreciation of evidence — Challenges to arbitral award upholding 24% interest rate based on loan agreement terms dismissed by Single Judge and Division Bench; Supreme Court upholds affirmation — Re-appreciation of evidence on genuineness of loan agreements or terms, including interest rate, is prohibited under Section 34(2A) proviso, particularly when Arbitrator’s findings are concurrently upheld.

Nov 22, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1327 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SRI LAKSHMI HOTEL PVT. LIMITED AND ANOTHER Vs. SRIRAM CITY UNION FINANCE LTD. AND ANOTHER ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and…

Environment

Environmental Law — Environmental Clearance (EC) — Ex Post Facto Clearance — Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, Section 3 — While EC should ordinarily be prior, the EP Act does not entirely prohibit ex post facto EC — Grant of ex post facto clearance is permissible in exceptional circumstances, in strict compliance with rules, upon imposition of heavy penalties, where denial of approval would result in adverse consequences outweighing regularisation, and where project complies with or can be made to comply with environmental norms — Adopting a ‘balanced approach’ is necessary to protect economy and livelihood.

Nov 22, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1326 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH CONFEDERATION OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS OF INDIA (CREDAI) Vs. VANASHAKTI AND ANOTHER ( Before : B.R. Gavai, CJI, Ujjal Bhuyan and…

Environment

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — Section 16(h) — Limitation period for appeal against Environmental Clearance (EC) — Communication of EC to “any person aggrieved” — The date of commencement of the 30-day limitation period (extendable by 60 days) starts from the earliest date on which the order granting EC is “communicated” to the aggrieved person by any of the duty bearers (MoEF&CC, project proponent, or Pollution Control Boards).

Nov 22, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1331 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH TALLI GRAM PANCHAYAT Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ. )…

Constitution Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 233, 235, 309, 32, 141, 142 — Higher Judicial Services (HJS) — Determination of Seniority — Source of Recruitment — Recruitment to HJS is through Regular Promotees (RP), Limited Departmental Competitive Examinations (LDCE), and Direct Recruits (DR) — Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Article 142 and other provisions to lay down uniform guidelines for judicial services across the country, independent of High Courts’ control under Article 235, to ensure a unified and robust judiciary — Overarching guidelines framed do not foreclose powers of High Courts but establish a homogenous framework for superintendence over judicial services.

Nov 22, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1328 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( Before : B.R. Gavai, CJI, Surya Kant, Vikram…

C P C Registration Act Specific Relief Act Transfer Of Property Act

Registration Act, 1908 — Section 17(1)(e) — Compulsory registration of non-testamentary instruments — Assignment of a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property — Whether such assignment deed requires compulsory registration — HELD NO – A decree for specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any right, title, or interest in or charge on the immovable property (Section 54, Transfer of Property Act, 1882)

Nov 22, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1329 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH RAJESWARI AND OTHERS Vs. SHANMUGAM AND ANOTHER ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and K. V. Viswanathan, JJ. ) Civil Appeal No.…

You missed

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 36(1)(viii) — Interpretation of “derived from” vs. “attributable to” — The phrase “derived from” connotes a requirement of a direct, first-degree nexus between the income and the specified business activity (providing long-term finance) — It is judicially settled that “derived from” is narrower than “attributable to,” thus excluding ancillary, incidental, or second-degree sources of income — If income is even a “step removed” from the core business, the nexus is broken (Paras 14, 15, 20, 33).

Dec 11, 2025 sclaw
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) — Section 11 — Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Jurisdiction against employee of different department — The ICC constituted at the workplace/department of the “aggrieved woman” has jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment against a “respondent” who is an employee of a different department/workplace — The phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 refers to a procedural condition (directing the ICC to apply the service rules applicable to the respondent as an employee) rather than a jurisdictional constraint limiting a particular ICC to hear the complaint. (Paras 2, 25, 27, 36-46, 72(i))

Dec 11, 2025 sclaw
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(4) — Appointment of Arbitrator — Existence of Arbitration Agreement — Non-Signatory/Third Party — The Referral Court (Appointing Authority) is required to inspect and scrutinize the dealings between the parties to prima facie examine the existence of an arbitration agreement, including whether a non-signatory is a “veritable party” to the agreement. (Paras 24, 25, 27, 28, 35)

Dec 10, 2025 sclaw
Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of First Information Report (FIR) — Abuse of process of law — When civil dispute is masked as criminal complaint — Allegations in FIR (claiming criminal conspiracy, forcible occupation, and caste abuse) found inconsistent with contemporaneous civil suit filed by the informant regarding the same property and on the same day — Suit’s cause of action traced to earlier dates and did not mention the specific criminal incident alleged in the FIR — Absence of relief to set aside primary sale deeds in the suit suggests the criminal allegations are an afterthought or exaggerated — FIR quashed as a clear abuse of the process of law. (Paras 3, 6, 8, 9, 10)

Dec 10, 2025 sclaw