Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies. Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application. Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench. Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants. Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 – Sections 7, 9 and 25 – Custody Dispute – The case revolves around a custody dispute over two minor children following the deterioration of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent – The High Court granted shared custody, which was challenged by the appellant – The primary issue is the guardianship and welfare of the children, considering their preferences and the capabilities of each parent – The appellant argued that the children have been residing with him for nine years and expressed a desire to continue doing so – The respondent argued that the appellant retained custody against various court orders and alleged ‘parental alienation syndrome’ – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order, and reinstated the Family Court’s decision granting custody to the appellant, subject to the respondent’s visitation rights – The court found no evidence of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ and recognized the support system provided by the Indian Armed Forces for the children’s welfare – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant should retain custody of the children, with the respondent granted visitation rights as per the Family Court’s order.
I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.
I P C
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.
Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.
Limitation
Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.
Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.
Limitation
Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.
Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.
Consumer
Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.
Stamp Act State Laws

“Supreme Court Clarifies State’s Power to Levy Stamp Duty on Insurance Policies” Stamp Act, 1899 – Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 – Power to levy and collect stamp duty – The primary issues are the legislative competence of the State to levy stamp duty on insurance policies and the applicability of the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 or the 1998 Act – LIC contends that the state lacks legislative competence to impose stamp duty on insurance policies and challenges the demand for stamp duty payment for policies issued using stamps purchased from Maharashtra – The State of Rajasthan argues that it has the power to collect stamp duty on insurance policies under Entry 44 of List III, as per the rate prescribed by the Parliament under Entry 91 of List I – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upheld the High Court’s judgment, and affirmed the state’s power to levy stamp duty. However, it directed that the state shall not demand and collect the stamp duty as per the orders dated between 1993-94 and 2001-02 – The Court reasoned that the state has the legislative competence to impose and collect stamp duty on insurance policies, and the 1952 Act applies to the case – The Court analyzed the constitutional provisions and previous judgments to conclude that the state can impose stamp duty using rates prescribed by the Parliament – The Supreme Court concluded that while the state’s power to levy stamp duty is upheld, the specific demands for stamp duty payment in this case were set aside due to the circumstances presented.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 358 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri…

I P C

“Supreme Court Overturns Lower Courts, Orders Trial for Alleged Marriage Fraud and Conspiracy (IPC Sections 420 & 120-B)” Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 420 read with Section 120-B – The appellant challenged lower courts’ orders regarding the summoning of respondents for alleged dishonest inducement in a marriage – The appellant claimed he was deceived into marrying a married respondent and that all respondents conspired to induce him into marriage and leave him with a significant sum of money – The respondents argued that there was no concealment or cheating, as all facts were disclosed to the appellant from the beginning – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and Sessions Court, and restored the Magistrate’s order for the respondents to face trial – The court found that a prima facie case was made out for issuing process against the respondents, and the lower courts’ approach was not legally sustainable – The court concluded that the respondents should face trial for the alleged offences, and the case will be decided on its merits based on the evidence presented by the parties.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 342 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ANIRUDDHA KHANWALKAR — Appellant Vs. SHARMILA DAS AND OTHERS ( Before : C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

Specific Relief Act

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 6 – Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property – The appellants, owner of the property, allegedly evicted the respondent illegally and by force – The main issue was the maintainability of the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the illegal dispossession – The appellants contended voluntary handover of possession and challenged the maintainability of the suit – The respondent filed a suit within six months of dispossession under Section 6 of the Act – The Trial Court decreed in favor of the respondent, and the High Court dismissed the appellant’s revision – The High Court concurred with the Trial Court on the illegal dispossession and maintainability of the suit – The appeal was dismissed based on concurrent findings and evidence on record – The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the decisions of the lower courts.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 345 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SANJAY MARUTI JADHAV AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. AMIT TATOBA SAWANT — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra…

I P C

“Conspiracy Theory Revived: Supreme Court Orders Trial in Forged Documents Case Involving Government Land” Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477(A), 120(B) and 34 – The case involves allegations of a conspiracy to illegally transfer government land using forged documents – The respondents, along with others, are accused of manipulating judicial processes and revenue records to acquire government lands – The primary issue is whether the High Court was correct in quashing the order taking cognizance against the respondents, given the evidence of a conspiracy and manipulation of documents – The State argues that the High Court overlooked circumstantial evidence of a broader conspiracy and failed to appreciate the severity of the offences, which could undermine public trust in land administration – The respondents challenged the order of cognizance, arguing insufficient evidence directly implicating them in the conspiracy – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and directed the trial to proceed against the respondents – The Court found that the High Court’s decision was based on an incomplete assessment of facts and that a detailed trial is necessary to fully unravel the extent of the alleged conspiracy – The Court emphasized the need for a thorough examination of evidence and witnesses by the Trial Court to determine the actual harm caused to the public exchequer – The Supreme Court concluded that the case should not be dismissed at the preliminary stage and must be examined judiciously in a trial setting to ensure the integrity of ongoing investigations and judicial processes.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 346 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE STATE OF ODISHA — Appellant Vs. NIRJHARINI PATNAIK @ MOHANTY AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and…

Customs & Excise

“Central Excise Dispute: Fresh Start Ordered! Court Remands Case for Tribunal to Reassess Impact of Missing Letter on Show Cause Notices” Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35C (2) – Orders of Appellate Tribunal – The appellant, M/S Madura Coats is involved in a legal dispute with the Commissioner of Central Excise regarding the clearance of goods without payment of duty – The case involves multiple orders and appeals, with the primary contention being the non-furnishing of a crucial letter dated 20.01.2001 – The main issue is whether the non-furnishing of the letter dated 20.01.2001 has caused prejudice to the appellant’s ability to respond to the show cause notices effectively – The appellant contends that the final order by the tribunal, which directed the respondent to furnish the letter dated 20.01.2001, is binding and its non-compliance should result in the appeals being allowed – The respondent argues that the letter dated 20.01.2001 is the appellant’s own document and its absence does not prejudice the appellant’s case – They also assert that the appellant has been delaying the adjudication process – The court affirmed the High Court’s decision to remand the matter back to the tribunal for fresh adjudication of the show cause notices, subject to the appellant demonstrating how the non-furnishing of the letter has caused prejudice – The court reasoned that the letter dated 20.01.2001 was not relied upon adversely against the appellant and that the appellant should have retained a copy of their own document – The court found that the non-furnishing of the letter did not violate principles of natural justice as it was not used to draw adverse inferences against the appellant – The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs, and the matter was remanded back to the tribunal for fresh adjudication, with the appellant’s contentions kept open

May 5, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 336 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S MADURA COATS PRIVATE LIMITED — Appellant Vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Pamidighantam…

I P C

“Sudden Fight, Not Murderous Intent: Supreme Court Reclassifies Conviction, Reduces Sentenc” Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302 and 304 – The appeal challenges the High Court’s decision to uphold the appellant’s conviction for murder, arguing that the conviction under Section 302 can be converted to Part I or Part II of Section 304 of the IPC, which pertains to culpable homicide not amounting to murder – The appellant argued that the incident occurred in a sudden fight without premeditation and there was no intention to cause death, suggesting the offense falls under Section 304 – The respondent-State maintained that the concurrent findings of the courts below were correct and warranted no interference – The Supreme Court altered the conviction from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304, sentencing the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for eight years and a fine – The Court found that the incident occurred in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, without undue advantage or cruelty by the appellant – The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the conviction to Part I of Section 304 with a reduced sentence and fine, considering the time already served by the appellant.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 338 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MOHD. AHSAN — Appellant Vs. STATE OF HARYANA — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai, Aravind Kumar and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.…

State Laws

Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 – The case involves the acceptance of Change Reports for the Vahiwatdar (Administrator) and Trustees of Shri Mallikarjun Devasthan, a Public Trust – The High Court invalidated the acceptance and remanded the matters for reconsideration – The main issue was the delay in filing the Change Report for the new Vahiwatdar of the Trust, which was submitted 17 years after the previous Vahiwatdar’s death – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, confirming the acceptance of Change Report Nos. 899 of 2015 and 1177 of 2017, allowing the civil appeals – The Court found that the delay in filing the Change Report was a curable defect and did not impact the legitimacy of the new Vahiwatdar’s assumption of office – The Court emphasized a liberal approach to condonation of delay, citing precedents.

Apr 28, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 339 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHRI MALLIKARJUN DEVASTHAN, SHELGI — Appellant Vs. SUBHASH MALLIKARJUN BIRAJDAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : A.S. Bopanna and Sanjay…

Service Matters
Service

Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 – Sections 7, 8 and 9 – Procedure for resignation by employees of private schools – The appellant challenged his termination from, which was set aside by the Tribunal but reinstated by the High Court – The main issues were whether the appellant’s resignation was lawfully withdrawn and if the documents related to his resignation were fabricated – The appellant argued that his resignation withdrawal was not considered and that the school committee’s resolutions were fabricated – The respondents contended that the resignation was accepted by the management committee and the school committee, and the appellant was informed accordingly – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, dismissing the appeal and affirming that the appellant’s resignation was voluntary and lawfully accepted – The Court found no evidence of fabricated documents and determined that the management committee’s acceptance of the resignation was valid – The Court referenced the MEPS Act and Rules, concluding that non-communication of resignation acceptance does not invalidate the termination – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant’s resignation was accepted before his attempted withdrawal, and thus the termination was lawful.

Apr 28, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 337 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHRIRAM MANOHAR BANDE — Appellant Vs. UKTRANTI MANDAL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar,…

I B C

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(7) – “financial creditor” – The appeals challenge judgments related to the status of certain creditors of M/s. Mount Shivalik Industries Limited under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – The primary issue is whether the respondents are financial creditors or operational creditors within the meaning of the IBC – The appellants argue that the respondents are operational creditors, as the agreements indicate services rendered to promote the corporate debtor’s products – The respondents contend that the agreements were a means to raise finance, making them financial creditors due to the interest-bearing security deposits – The Court upheld the NCLAT’s decision, recognizing the respondents as financial creditors based on the commercial effect of the transactions – The Court examined the true nature of the transactions and found that the arrangements had the commercial effect of borrowing, satisfying the criteria for financial debt under the IBC – The Court applied the definition of financial debt and operational debt from the IBC, emphasizing the disbursal against the consideration for the time value of money – The appeals were dismissed, confirming the respondents’ status as financial creditors and allowing the resolution process to continue accordingly – The Court’s detailed analysis affirmed the NCLAT’s interpretation of the IBC provisions.

Apr 28, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 340 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH GLOBAL CREDIT CAPITAL LIMITED AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. SACH MARKETING PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Abhay…

Family Court I P C

“Husband Has No Right On Wife’s Stridhan” Matrimonial Law – The appeal concerns a matrimonial dispute involving misappropriation of gold jewellery and monetary gifts – The appellant, a widow, married the first respondent, a divorcee, and alleged misappropriation of her jewelry and money by the respondents – The core issue is whether the appellant established the misappropriation of her gold jewellery by the respondents and if the High Court erred in its judgment – The appellant claimed that her jewellery was taken under the pretext of safekeeping on her wedding night and misappropriated by the respondents to settle their financial liabilities – The respondents denied the allegations, stating no dowry was demanded and that the appellant had custody of her jewellery, which she took to her paternal home six days after the marriage – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, upheld the Family Court’s decree, and awarded the appellant Rs. 25,00,000 as compensation for her misappropriated stridhan – The Court found the High Court’s approach legally unsustainable, criticizing it for demanding a criminal standard of proof and basing findings on assumptions not supported by evidence – The Court emphasized the civil standard of proof as the balance of probabilities and noted that the appellant’s claim for return of stridhan does not require proof of acquisition – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant had established a more probable case and directed the first respondent to pay the compensation within six months, with a 6% interest per annum in case of default.

Apr 28, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 334 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MAYA GOPINATHAN — Appellant Vs. ANOOP S.B. AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta, JJ. )…

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I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw