Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 165 and 166 — Liability for injuries sustained due to falling tree branch — Injuries caused by falling tree branch while vehicle was stationary under the tree during rain — Held, not an accident “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” as the motor vehicle did not play an active role. [
Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Service
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Service
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
RTI
Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.
C P C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.
I P C

Criminal Law — Kidnapping for ransom under Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Essential ingredients for conviction — The act of stopping children at pistol point and forcibly abducting a child satisfies the condition of threatening to cause death or hurt. –Proof of ransom demand — While Call Detail Records (CDRs) and Section 65-B of the Evidence Act are valuable, their absence is not fatal if the demand is established through cogent and corroborated oral testimonies of multiple witnesses, including the victim’s family and the investigating officer.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 569 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH HARJINDRA SINGH ETC. Vs. THE STATE OF U.P. ( Before : Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

Corporate

Competition Act, 2002 — Merger control (Section 6 read with Sections 10, 31) — Disclosure obligations — Substance over form (Regulation 9(4) and 9(5)) — Inter-connected steps — Duty of complete notification — Whether mere naming of agreements in a filing constitutes sufficient notice? — Held, notification is sufficient if inter-connected steps and linkages are placed on record and explained, enabling assessment, even if not labelled as per regulator’s preference.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 576 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH AMAZON.COM NV INVESTMENT HOLDINGS LLC Vs. COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( Before : Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.…

Matrimonial

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 142 — Supreme Court’s power to do complete justice — Marriage irretrievably broken down — Possibility of reconciliation non-existent — Multiple civil and criminal proceedings pending between parties — Compelling parties to remain married when ties have long been severed serves no legitimate purpose — Supreme Court can dissolve marriage under Article 142.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 577 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SALIL DHAWAN Vs. PRIYANSHI GHAI ( Before : Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ. ) Civil Appeal No…..of 2026 (Arising out…

Acquittal

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 366, 374(2) — Death Sentence — Appeal against conviction and sentence — High Court partly allowed appeals by acquitting of one charge and confirming conviction and sentences for remaining offences, including death sentence — Supreme Court considered submissions on behalf of accused-appellants and respondent-State — Supreme Court analyzed evidence and found prosecution failed to establish circumstances beyond reasonable doubt — Accordingly, judgments of trial court and High Court set aside, and appeals allowed.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 578 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH MEHTAB Vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND ( Before : Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No(s). 1342-1343…

Cheque Dishonour I B C

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Sections 138 & 141 — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) — Part III (Personal Insolvency) — Moratorium Provisions — Criminal Proceedings vs. Civil Liability — Dishonour of cheque is a criminal offence due to specific deeming fiction in Section 138, not merely a civil wrong for debt recovery, even though it arises from a debt — Held, moratorium under IBC Part III does not stay criminal proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 579 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DINESHCHAND SURANA Vs. UCO BANK ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and K. V. Viswanathan, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No….of 2026 (Arising…

I B C

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) — Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Letter of Intent (LoI) — Appellant’s claim that LoIs were conditional due to clauses concerning pending judicial orders and staff/employee litigation rejected — NCLT and NCLAT found appellant was aware of these issues and discussions in CoC meetings — Appellant’s arguments of conditional LoI were considered an “after-thought” and an attempt to renege from the plan.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 580 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SANJAY DAVE Vs. ANDHRA BANK LTD. AND OTHERS ( Before : K. V. Viswanathan and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. ) Civil…

Customs & Excise

Central Excise Act, 1944 — Section 2(f) — Manufacture — Two-fold test — For an activity to be considered “manufacture,” it must result in new, distinct goods with a new identity, character, or use (transformation test), and these resultant goods must be marketable — Both tests must be satisfied. –Section 35L(2) — Amendment retrospectivity — Amendment clarifying that taxability or excisability of goods is included in “determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty” is clarificatory and retrospective in nature.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 582 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S ALUPRO BUILDING SYSTEMS PVT. LTD Vs. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE BANGALORE-II ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.…

I P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of criminal proceedings — High Court’s power to quash proceedings is distinct from compounding offences under Section 320 CrPC and can be invoked even for non-compoundable offences — Inherent power to be exercised to secure ends of justice or prevent abuse of process of court — Nature and gravity of offence to be considered — Heinous offences generally not quashed, but cases with overwhelming civil flavour, particularly arising from commercial/financial transactions, may be quashed if parties have settled disputes and conviction is remote, to prevent oppression and injustice.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 588 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VIJAY KUMAR KELA AND ANOTHER Vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ANOTHER ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.…

Service Matters
Service

Service Law — Termination of probationer — Regulation 16(3)(a) of Vijaya Bank (Officers’) Regulations, 1982 — Termination simpliciter vs — punitive termination — Termination deemed punitive if based on allegations of misconduct without due process, even if framed as unsatisfactory performance — Bank’s attempt to terminate for misconduct shifted to termination for unsatisfactory performance to bypass inquiry, rendering it unsustainable.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 589 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH GENERAL MANAGER, BANK OF BARODA AND OTHERS Vs. ASHOK KUMAR SINGH AND OTHERS ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S.…

You missed

Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
RTI

Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw