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Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Constitution
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
C P C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Service
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Service
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Consumer

Section 64VB(2) of the Insurance Act, 1938 provides that: “For the purposes of this section, in the case of risks for which premium can be ascertained in advance, the risk may be assumed not earlier than the date on which the premium has been paid in cash or by cheque to the insurer.” It is the admitted position that the deceased husband of the Appellant had paid the insurance premium by a Demand Draft in favour of the Insurance Company.–As a consequence, the risk would be covered from the date of payment of the insurance premium. The loan was secured from the date on which the insurance premium was paid. The premium having been paid by the Appellant’s husband during his life-time, the loan was to be adjusted from the insurance policy

Apr 17, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ASHATAI W/O ANAND DUPARTE — Appellant Vs. SHRIRAM CITY UNION FINANCE LTD. — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.…

Customs & Excise

When an amount is paid as Dharmada along with the sale price of goods, such payment is not made in consideration of the transfer of goods – Such payment is meant for charity and is received and held in trust by the seller – If such amounts are meant to be credited to charity and do not form part of the income of the assessee they cannot be included in the transaction value or assessable value of the goods

Apr 15, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH M/S D.J. MALPANI — Appellant Vs. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NASHIK — Respondent ( Before : S.A. Bobde, Deepak Gupta and Vineet Saran, JJ.…

Customs & Excise

The present case has been tagged with the case of M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik which has been referred to this Bench vide order dated 29.07.2015. We have held that the amount of Dharmada cannot be included in the transaction value for the purposes of assessments.

Apr 15, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS, BANGALORE — Appellant Vs. M/S JSW STEEL LTD. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS JINDAL VIJAYANAGAR STEEL LTD.) — Respondent ( Before :…

Cr P C

Criminal Law–Murder–Suspension of sentence pending appeal– The mere fact that during the period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail–What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail

Apr 14, 2019 sclaw

2009(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 636 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly Criminal Appeal No. of 2009…

Acquittal

Rape–Suicide–Dying declaration–There are several inconsistencies and contradictions–Eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution i.e. PWs 13 and 15 who happen to be the brother and the friend of the deceased did not support the prosecution version and resiled from their statement made during investigation–Acquittal upheld

Apr 14, 2019 sclaw

    2009(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 629 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mukundakam Sharma Criminal Appeal No. 352…

Arbitration

Arbitrator–Appointment of –Former Chief Justice of India resigned as arbitrator stating that issues involved in arbitration were similar to issues involved in earlier award passed by him–New arbitration a retired Judge of High Court appointed as arbitrator–Petitioner alleged that since former CJI was appointed to arbitrate, this time also former CJI ought to have been appointed–Objection of petitioner cannot be sustained.

Apr 14, 2019 sclaw

2009(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 626 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterjee Arbitration Petition No. 7 of 2006 Balli Petrochemicals Limited. v. National Aluminium…

Labour Cases

High Court was not justified in passing orders from time to time to secure presence of the officers. The officers of the State discharge public functions and duties. The orders are generally presumed to be passed in good faith unless proved otherwise. The officers pass orders as a custodian of public money. Therefore, merely because an order has been passed, it does not warrant their personal presence. The summoning of officers to the court to attend proceedings, impinges upon the functioning of the officers and eventually it is the public at large who suffer on account of their absence from the duties assigned to them. The practice of summoning officers to court is not proper and does not serve the purpose of administration of justice

Apr 14, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHRI N.K. JANU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR SOCIAL FORESTARY DIVISION, AGRA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. LAKSHMI CHANDRA — Respondent ( Before : Sanjay Kishan Kaul…

You missed

Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw