Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Constitution
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
C P C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Service
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Service
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
I P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 379 – Uttar Pradesh Minor Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1963 – Rules 3, 57 and 7 – Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Sections 4 and 21 – Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 – Sections 3 and 4 – Theft of mining sand – Quashing of complaint – Mere violation of Section 4 which is an offence cognizable only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and not under any other law – There is no bar on the Court from taking cognizance of the offence under Section 379 of the IPC

Dec 22, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH KANWAR PAL SINGH — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : S. Abdul Nazeer and Sanjiv Khanna,…

Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 154 and 164 – Registration of FIR – Recording of confessions and statements – Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. provides about the information in cognizable cases and in effect registration of First Information Reports. The first Proviso to the sub-Section (1) of Section 154 inserted by the Amendment Act of 2013 and subsequently amended by the Amendment Act of 2018, provides for registration of First Information Report in cases of rape and sexual offences by a woman police officer or any woman officer

Dec 22, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH IN RE : ASSESSMENT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN RESPONSE TO SEXUAL OFFENCES ( Before : S.A. Bobde, CJI, B.R. Gavai and Surya…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 34 and 34(4) – Arbitral award – Legislative intention of providing Section 34(4) in the Arbitration Act was to make the award enforceable, after giving an opportunity to the Tribunal to undo the curable defects HELD that ordinarily unintelligible awards are to be set aside, while the challenge on inadequacy of reasons, has to be adjudicated based on the degree of particularity of reasoning required having regard to the nature of issues falling for consideration.

Dec 22, 2019 sclaw

  SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH M/S. DYNA TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD. — Appellant Vs. M/S. CROMPTON GREAVES LTD. — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and…

Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Complete justice – Provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution provide a unique power to the Supreme Court, to do “complete justice” between the parties, i.e., where at times law or statute may not provide a remedy, the Court can extend itself to put a quietus to a dispute in a manner which would befit the facts of the case. Divorce granted.

Dec 19, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MUNISH KAKKAR — Appellant Vs. NIDHI KAKKAR — Respondent ( Before : Sanjay Kishan Kaul and K.M. Joseph, JJ. ) Civil Appeal No. 9318…

Matrimonial

V IMP :: Supreme Court recently dissolved a marriage by exercising its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, even as it recognised that there is no statutory law for recognising irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce in India.- HELD “on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, if this is not a fit case to grant divorce, what would be a fit case!”

Dec 18, 2019 sclaw

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage: “Nothing remains in this marriage”, Supreme Court invokes Article 142 to grant divorce Rintu Mariam Biju December 18 2019 The Supreme Court recently dissolved a marriage by exercising its inherent powers…

Service Matters
Service

Candidate Not Estopped From Challenging Selection Process When Misconstruction Of Statutory Rules Is Alleged HELD candidate will not be estopped from challenging a selection process on the ground of having participated in it when there is allegation of “misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom”.

Dec 18, 2019 sclaw

Candidate Not Estopped From Challenging Selection Process When Misconstruction Of Statutory Rules Is Alleged : SC [Read Judgment] LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK 17 Dec 2019 7:58 PM In a notable judgment…

Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 205 and 205 (2) – Dispensation with personal appearance/attendance – In the case of Bhaskar Industries Ltd. V. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd., (2001) 7 SCC 401, this Court has observed that if a Court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the personal attendance of an accused before it need not be insisted on, then the court has the power to dispense with the attendance of the accused – HELD consequently the application submitted by the appellant to dispense with his appearance before the learned Trial Court on all dates of adjournments and permitting his counsel to appear on his behalf is here by allowed on the conditions.

Dec 17, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH PUNEET DALMIA — Appellant CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HYDERABAD — Respondent ( Before : Ashok Bhushan and M. R. Shah, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 34 and 302 – Murder – Common intention – Appeal against conviction and sentence – Appellant was present on the spot of the offence HELD In order to invoke the principle of joint liability in the commission of a criminal act as laid down in Section 34, the prosecution should show that the criminal act in question was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all.

Dec 17, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VIRENDER — Appellant Vs. STATE OF HARYANA — Respondent ( Before : Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and K. M. Joseph, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No.…

You missed

Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw