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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51) Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39) Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders etc. Act, 1986 — Section 3(2) — Preventive Detention — Grounds for Detention — Requirement of finding ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ — Detenu, a ‘drug offender’, was detained based on three criminal cases involving Ganja, with an apprehension that if released on bail, she would engage in similar activities — Held, mere apprehension that the detenu, if released on bail, would be likely to indulge in similar crimes would not be a sufficient ground for ordering preventive detention — Order of detention failed to indicate how the detenu’s activities were prejudicial to ‘public order’ as opposed to ‘law and order’ and was therefore unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11)
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)
Arbitration
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)
Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)
Limitation
Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence
Arbitration
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)
Corporate
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)
Narcotics

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 18 and 50 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 313 – Possession of 1kg 750 grams of opium – Conviction and sentence – Appeal against – Merely because prosecution has not examined any independent witness, same would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant has been falsely implicated.

Jan 6, 2020 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH SURINDER KUMAR — Appellant Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, R. Subhash Reddy and B.R. Gavai, JJ. ) Criminal…

Consumer

H E L D – The respondents had paid 85% of the agreed consideration, together with the agreement to sell, and even the balance at the time when the sale deed was executed on 11 February 2013. Having paid the consideration, it was evidently not in their interest to delay the receipt of possession. Though the sale deed records that possession was handed over, it is clear from the contemporaneous record that it was only on 28 August 2014 that all the sets of keys of the apartment were handed over to the respondents. Consequently, the appellant would be liable to pay reasonable compensation to the respondents for the period between 9 February 2013 and 28 August 2014, in addition to the contractual payment due for the period between 8 August 2012 and 8 February 2013.

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S LANCO HILLS TECHNOLOGY PARK PRIVATE LIMITED — Appellant Vs. MANISHA BALKRISHNA KULKARNI AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud…

C P C

INJUNCTION – The division bench held that there is no documentary evidence to prima facie show that the Appellant – Developer is in physical possession of the suit property. Furthermore, the issue whether the Appellant – Developer has paid part consideration for the entire suit property was required to be determined in the trial. The division bench took the view that the Appellant – Developer had not made out a prima facie case for grant of Temporary Injunction. The Respondents being the lawful owners of the suit property, granting such an injunction would cause irreparable loss and hardship to them.

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH SAKETA VAKSANA LLP AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. KAUKUTLA SARALA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit, Indu Malhotra and Krishna…

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 143, 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 – Sections 3 and 5 – Unlawful assembly – Persons were armed with deadly weapons like country­ made bombs etc. HELD the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited, the appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court. It is obvious that the High Court also did not find material evidence to convict the accused and, therefore, set aside the judgment and remitted the matter to the trial court. In a criminal case, remand is not to be ordered as a matter of course. It is only if there is a minis­trial or some technical issues have arisen that such an order may be made but in very rare circumstances. – The trial court was justified in acquitting the accused

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH KOOLI SASEENDRAN AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF KERALA ETC. — Respondent ( Before : Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ. ) Criminal…

Service Matters
Service

Bihar Health Service (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2013 – Rules 5 and 6(iii) – Grant of weightage on the basis of work experience – Rule 5 and 6(iii) of the Bihar Health Service (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2013 are construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non­private hospital (including those run by the Central Government, Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions; or other public authorities) within the territory of Bihar

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DR. (MAJOR) MEETA SAHAI — Appellant Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Deepak Gupta and Surya Kant, JJ. )…

Consumer

Chandigarh Housing Board {hereinafter ‘CHB’) invited bids to implement an integrated project with residential, commercial, and other related infrastructure facilities at the Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technological Park in Chandigarh- HELD We also note that the finding in the arbitration award dated 09.01.2015 as to the apportionment of liability between the Developer and CHB to pay the principal sum and general compensation, must be given effect.

Dec 23, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARD — Appellant Vs. M/S. PARASVANATH DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and R. Subhash…

Murder

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 302 and 201 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 161 – Murder – Dead body was recovered at the instance of the appellant – A complete chain which clearly leads to only one inference that it is the accusedappellant alone who could have murdered deceased – Appeal dismissed.

Dec 23, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH HARINDER SINGH @ HIRA — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB — Respondent ( Before : Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ. ) Criminal…

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Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Corporate

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw