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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51) Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39) Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders etc. Act, 1986 — Section 3(2) — Preventive Detention — Grounds for Detention — Requirement of finding ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ — Detenu, a ‘drug offender’, was detained based on three criminal cases involving Ganja, with an apprehension that if released on bail, she would engage in similar activities — Held, mere apprehension that the detenu, if released on bail, would be likely to indulge in similar crimes would not be a sufficient ground for ordering preventive detention — Order of detention failed to indicate how the detenu’s activities were prejudicial to ‘public order’ as opposed to ‘law and order’ and was therefore unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Anticipatory Bail- NDPS – 50,000 Tramadol tablets – Expression “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence – Bail order releasing the respondent on post-arrest bail, is quashed

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU — Appellant Vs. MOHIT AGGARWAL — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, CJI., Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli, JJ. ) Criminal…

State of Haryana withdrew from acquisition declared as mala fide and inoperative HELD the land transfers are invalidated all transfers effected from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4, to the date of publication of the State’s decision to revoke the acquisition i.e., from 27.08.2004 to 29.01.2010 .

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH RAMESHWAR AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Pamidighantam…

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Section 2 – Restriction on the dereservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purpose – State Government or any other authority can always permit the use of any forest land or any portion thereof for non-forest purposes only with the prior approval of the Central Government

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH NARINDER SINGH AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. DIVESH BHUTANI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : A. M. Khanwilkar, Abhay S. Oka and C.…

Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act 1951 – Sections 14 36(1) – Misappropriation of government properties – Validity of the Direction to Hold Inquiry through Economic Offences Wing — Allegation of misappropriation can be gone into only by the Authorities under the Public Trusts Act

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH THE KHASGI (DEVI AHILYABAI HOLKAR CHARITIES) TRUST, INDORE AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. VIPIN DHANAITKAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : A.M.Khanwilkar, Abhay…

Specific performance -There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract and both ingredients are necessary for the relief of Specific Performance – While readiness means the capacity of the Plaintiff to perform the contract which would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the Plaintiff.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH U.N. KRISHNAMURTHY (SINCE DECEASED) THR. LRS. — Appellant Vs. A. M. KRISHNAMURTHY — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ. )…

HELD On account of competition between the existing and new sugar factory, it would be the farmers who will be the beneficiary as they would have an option to select the sugar mill which provides better service in the manner of payment of price. Keeping in view the recommendations of the Rangarajan Committee and the fact that the Central Government has exercised its jurisdiction to grant extension in time, the ultimate beneficiary would be the farmer and not the existing or the new sugar factory.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISON BENCH SWAMI SAMARTH SUGARS AND AGRO INDUSTRIES LTD. — Appellant Vs. LOKNETE MARUTRAO GHULE PATIL DNYANESHWAR SAHAKARI SAKHAR KARKHANA LTD AND OTHERS — Respondent (…

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