Supreme Court of India Judgements

October 22, 2024 1:21 pm

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue. Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside. Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution. Motor Accident Claims — The appellants, family members of the deceased claimed compensation for his death in a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by the negligence of the car driver — Whether the car driven by respondent no. 2 was involved in the accident and if the accident was due to the negligence of the car driver — The appellants argued that there was ample evidence showing the car’s involvement and that the lower courts misread the evidence — The respondents contended that the accident was due to the deceased’s negligence and that the car was not involved — The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts’ findings, holding that the car was involved in the accident and awarded compensation to the appellants — The Court found that the evidence, including witness testimonies and the condition of the car, supported the involvement of the car in the accident — The Court applied the principle of preponderance of probability, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt, to conclude the car’s involvement — The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were awarded compensation of Rs. 46,31,496/- with interest.

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Municipal Laws

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Constitution

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Accident

Motor Accident Claims — The appellants, family members of the deceased claimed compensation for his death in a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by the negligence of the car driver — Whether the car driven by respondent no. 2 was involved in the accident and if the accident was due to the negligence of the car driver — The appellants argued that there was ample evidence showing the car’s involvement and that the lower courts misread the evidence — The respondents contended that the accident was due to the deceased’s negligence and that the car was not involved — The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts’ findings, holding that the car was involved in the accident and awarded compensation to the appellants — The Court found that the evidence, including witness testimonies and the condition of the car, supported the involvement of the car in the accident — The Court applied the principle of preponderance of probability, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt, to conclude the car’s involvement — The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were awarded compensation of Rs. 46,31,496/- with interest.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Municipal Laws

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Constitution

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Service

Army Rules, 1954 – Rule 13(3)(III)(v) – Discharge from service – Offences for which the red ink entries are awarded, cannot be said to be such gross misconduct which would make the appellant indiscipline and liable to be discharged from service and that too, after a period of long service rendered by him – Order of discharge is wholly unjustified and not sustainable at law – Appeal allowed.

Consumer

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 2(d)(ii) – Deficiency in service – Any loss arising out of inaction and negligence on the part of the Bank, such deficiency is compensable under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Acquittal

(IPC) – Section 409 – Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent -‘criminal breach of trust’ is defined under Section 405 IPC which provides, inter alia, that whoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over a property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property contrary to law, or in violation of any law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or contravenes any legal contract, express or implied, etc. shall be held to have committed criminal breach of trust

Service

Termination–Reservation–In advertisement, authorities failed to mention in regard to reservation for handicapped person at the outset–Appellants who were handicapped person were appointed–On Contempt petition State cancelled the selection and terminated the service–Service restored with backwages.

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Municipal Laws

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Constitution

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Constitution

Airport Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act 2008 — Sections 3 and 31 — The Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) challenged judgments of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) regarding tariff determination for aeronautical services — Whether AERA, a quasi-judicial body, can file an appeal against TDSAT’s judgment — AERA argued that it has the right to appeal under Section 31 of the AERA Act — The respondents contended that AERA, being a quasi-judicial body, cannot appeal against TDSAT’s decisions — The Supreme Court examined the maintainability of AERA’s appeals and the nature of its functions — The court analyzed whether tariff determination is an adjudicatory function and the role of quasi-judicial bodies in appeals — The court discussed the principles of natural justice, the distinction between quasi-judicial and regulatory functions, and relevant case law — The judgment clarified the scope of AERA’s powers and the legal framework governing its appeals.

Oct 20, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 791 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH AIRPORTS ECONOMIC REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA — Appellant Vs. DELHI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LTD. AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Dr…

Cr P C I P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings under Section 482 in Cases with Predominantly Civil Character — The court reiterated the principle that criminal cases with overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions, matrimonial relationships, or family disputes, should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves — This principle is applied in the present case, where the dispute involved a loan transaction between the accused persons and the bank, and the parties had settled the matter through the One Time Settlement (OTS).

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 750 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH K. BHARTHI DEVI AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai and…

Service

The main issue is whether the eligibility criteria requiring AICTE approval for diplomas is valid, given the Supreme Court’s previous ruling that universities do not need AICTE approval for technical courses —The petitioners argued that the eligibility criteria were inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling and that they were unfairly excluded from the recruitment process —The respondents contended that the recruitment process was conducted according to the existing rules and that the petitioners were bound by the doctrine of acquiescence —The Supreme Court directed the Bihar Technical Service Commission to prepare a fresh select list of meritorious candidates, considering the previous High Court order and the AICTE’s stance —The Court found that changing the eligibility criteria after the selection process was completed was impermissible and that the petitioners had a legitimate right to be considered — The appeals were disposed of with directions to prepare a revised select list within three months, ensuring that eligible candidates are considered fairly.

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 763 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHASHI BHUSHAN PRASAD SINGH — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Bela M. Trivedi…

Direct Taxation Income Tax

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 139(5) — Revised Income Tax Return — The appellant filed multiple revised returns for the assessment year 1989-90, which were not considered due to being barred by limitation —Whether the assessing officer can consider claims made in a revised return filed after the time limit prescribed by Section 139(5) of the Act — The appellant argued that the assessing officer should consider the claim for deduction of deferred revenue expenditure, even if the revised return was filed late —The respondent contended that the assessing officer has no jurisdiction to consider claims made in a time-barred revised return —The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision that the assessing officer cannot consider claims in a time-barred revised return —The Court emphasized that the assessing officer’s jurisdiction is limited by the time constraints set in Section 139(5) —The Court referred to previous judgments, including Wipro Finance Ltd. and Goetze (India) Ltd., to support its decision —The appeal was dismissed, affirming that claims in a time-barred revised return cannot be considered by the assessing officer.

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 760 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S. SHRIRAM INVESTMENTS — Appellant Vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX III, CHENNAI — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S Oka…

Tenders & Contracts

Coal Mining Bid — Rejection of — Eligibility criteria — Appellants challenged the rejection of its technical bid by Respondent-BCCL for a coal mining project, while the bid of Respondent No. 8 was accepted despite non-compliance with mandatory requirements —Whether BCCL was justified in rejecting the appellant’s bid and accepting the bid of Respondent No. 8, which did not meet the eligibility criteria — Appellant argues that the rejection was arbitrary and discriminatory — The appellant complied with all requirements, while Respondent No. 8 was allowed to submit missing documents later — BCCL argues that the appellant’s bid was non-compliant due to issues with the Power of Attorney — The Tender Committee could seek shortfall documents but not replace them —The Supreme Court found BCCL’s actions arbitrary and illegal, setting aside the rejection of the appellant’s bid and the acceptance of Respondent No. 8’s bid — The appellant’s Power of Attorney was valid and notarized before submission — BCCL’s acceptance of Respondent No. 8’s bid despite non-compliance was unjustified —Government bodies must act fairly and transparently in awarding contracts — The decision-making process must be free from arbitrariness and bias —The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside BCCL’s decision and any subsequent agreements, and directed BCCL to initiate a fresh tender process.

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 757 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BANSHIDHAR CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD. — Appellant Vs. BHARAT COKING COAL LIMITED AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Bela M. Trivedi…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(6) read with Section 11(9) —Dispute over a contractual agreement — The main issue is whether the contract was breached and if so, what remedies are available —The petitioner argues that the respondent failed to fulfill their obligations under the contract —The respondent contends that they met all contractual requirements and that any issues were due to the petitioner’s actions —The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that the respondent breached the contract —The court based its decision on the evidence presented, which showed that the respondent did not meet the contractual terms —The court applied principles of contract law, focusing on the obligations and duties outlined in the agreement —The court awarded damages to the petitioner and ordered the respondent to fulfill their contractual obligations.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 710 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH AJAY MADHUSUDAN PATEL AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. JYOTRINDRA S. PATEL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y.…

Advocates Act Constitution

In view of the said Notice/Circular dated 30.12.2022 and in furtherance of the afore-stated order passed by the Coordinate Bench, it is directed that the Advocates on-Record may mark the appearances of only those Advocates who are authorized to appear and argue the case on the particular day of hearing. Such names shall be given by the Advocate on Record on each day of hearing of the case as instructed in the Notice. If there is any change in the name of the arguing Advocate, it shall be duty of the concerned Advocate-on-Record to inform the concerned Court Master in advance or at the time of hearing of the case. The concerned Officers/Court Masters shall act accordingly.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 708 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BHAGWAN SINGH — Appellant Vs. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra…

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Passports Act, 1967 — Section 12(2) — The appellant was convicted for abetting the issuance of a second passport to a person already possessing a passport — The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and acquitted appellant due to insufficient evidence proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt — Conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires each circumstance to be proven beyond reasonable doubt and the circumstances taken together should lead to an irresistible inference of guilt — Under Section 12(2), the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the accused knowingly furnished false information or suppressed material information with the intent to secure a passport or travel document — The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, and acquitted appellant of the offences alleged against her.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 721 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH YOGARANI — Appellant Vs. STATE BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE — Respondent ( Before : Sanjay Kumar and Aravind Kumar, JJ.…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(6) read with Section 11(9) —Dispute over a contractual agreement — The main issue is whether the contract was breached and if so, what remedies are available —The petitioner argues that the respondent failed to fulfill their obligations under the contract —The respondent contends that they met all contractual requirements and that any issues were due to the petitioner’s actions —The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that the respondent breached the contract —The court based its decision on the evidence presented, which showed that the respondent did not meet the contractual terms —The court applied principles of contract law, focusing on the obligations and duties outlined in the agreement —The court awarded damages to the petitioner and ordered the respondent to fulfill their contractual obligations.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 710 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH AJAY MADHUSUDAN PATEL AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. JYOTRINDRA S. PATEL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y.…

State Laws

Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 91 and 102 — The appellant had an outstanding loan from a society (R) that was wound up — The Liquidator auctioned the society’s property to recover dues, but the appellant, despite objecting to the valuation and process, did not challenge it promptly — The property was sold to respondent no. 6 for Rs. 2,51,48,000/- — The High Court dismissed the appellant’s writ petition — The Supreme Court found procedural irregularities but held the appellant’s delay in challenging them estopped any further action. Considering the outstanding dues and undervaluation, the Court invoked Article 142 to direct respondent no. 6 to pay the appellant Rs. 1,05,98,710/- as full and final settlement. The remaining balance was to be disbursed to other creditors.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 741 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE AHMEDNAGAR DISTRICT CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK LTD — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before :…

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Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Municipal Laws

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Constitution

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw