Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on. State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected
C P C I B C

Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.

Jul 15, 2026 sclaw
Constitution

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.

Jul 15, 2026 sclaw
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.
C P C I B C
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.
Constitution
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
C P C State Laws
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
POCSO
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
Arbitration

The power under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be exercised only if, for some reason, the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible mere existence of a reason for terminating the proceedings is not sufficient. The reason must be such that the continuation of the proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible.

May 26, 2024 sclaw

    2024 INSC 433 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6462 OF 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) no.19301 of 2023)…

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 393 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SELVAMANI — Appellant Vs. THE STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai and Sandeep…

Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 394 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VIJAY LAXMAN BHAWE SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS — Appellant Vs. P & S NIRMAN PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS —…

Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 396 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH K.P. KHEMKA AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before…

Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 395 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MRS. BHUMIKABEN N. MODI AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA — Respondent ( Before : A. S.…

Child Custody

Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 – Sections 7, 9 and 25 – Custody Dispute – The case revolves around a custody dispute over two minor children following the deterioration of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent – The High Court granted shared custody, which was challenged by the appellant – The primary issue is the guardianship and welfare of the children, considering their preferences and the capabilities of each parent – The appellant argued that the children have been residing with him for nine years and expressed a desire to continue doing so – The respondent argued that the appellant retained custody against various court orders and alleged ‘parental alienation syndrome’ – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order, and reinstated the Family Court’s decision granting custody to the appellant, subject to the respondent’s visitation rights – The court found no evidence of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ and recognized the support system provided by the Indian Armed Forces for the children’s welfare – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant should retain custody of the children, with the respondent granted visitation rights as per the Family Court’s order.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 397 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH COL. RAMNEESH PAL SINGH — Appellant Vs. SUGANDHI AGGARWAL — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.…

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C P C I B C

Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.

Jul 15, 2026 sclaw
Constitution

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.

Jul 15, 2026 sclaw
C P C State Laws

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw