Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Category: Direct Taxation

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Sections 28, 47(vii), 2(47), 2(14) — Taxability of Amalgamation — Shares held as Stock-in-Trade vs. Capital Assets — Receipt of shares of amalgamated company in lieu of shares of amalgamating company — If the shares of the amalgamating company were held as capital assets, the receipt of shares of the amalgamated company is a “transfer” under Section 2(47) but exempt from Capital Gains tax under Section 47(vii), provided the requirements of that section are met (amalgamated company is Indian, transfer in consideration of allotment of shares). (Paras 2, 8.3, 12, 12.1, 27)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 46 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S JINDAL EQUIPMENT LEASING CONSULTANCY SERVICES LTD Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX DELHI – II, NEW DELHI ( Before : J.B.…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 37(1) — Revenue Expenditure vs. Capital Expenditure — Non-compete fee — Whether payment of non-compete fee constitutes allowable revenue expenditure or capital expenditure — Non-compete fee is paid to restrain a competitor, which protects or enhances the business profitability and facilitates carrying on the business more efficiently — Such payment neither creates a new asset nor increases the profit-earning apparatus for the payer, meaning the enduring advantage, if any, is not in the capital field — The length of time of the advantage is not determinative if the advantage merely facilitates business operations, leaving fixed assets untouched — Payment of non-compete fee made by the appellant (formed as a joint venture) to L&T (previous partner) to restrain L&T from competing for 7 years was essentially to keep a potential competitor out and ensure the appellant operated more efficiently and profitably, without creating a new capital asset or monopoly — Held: Payment of non-compete fee is an allowable revenue expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Act. (Paras 16, 25-29)

Jan 4, 2026 sclaw

2025 INSC 1481 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHARP BUSINESS SYSTEM THR. FINANCE DIRECTOR MR. YOSHIHISA MIZUNO Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-III N.D ( Before : Manoj Misra and…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Sections 37(1), 44C — Deduction of Head Office Expenditure in case of Non-Residents — Interpretation of Section 44C and ‘Head Office Expenditure’ — Distinction between ‘Common’ and ‘Exclusive’ Expenditure — Section 44C, being a special provision with a non-obstante clause, governs the quantum of allowable deduction for any expenditure incurred by a non-resident assessee that qualifies as ‘head office expenditure’ — The definition of ‘head office expenditure’ in the Explanation to Section 44C does not distinguish between common expenditure (shared among branches) and exclusive expenditure (incurred solely for Indian branches) — The term ‘attributable to’ in Section 44C(c) is broad enough to include both common and exclusive head office expenditure; exclusivity is a form of strong attribution — Therefore, Section 44C applies to head office expenditure regardless of whether it is common or exclusive, subjecting the deduction to the statutory ceiling. (Paras 2, 26, 43-45, 47-49, 59-63, 71, 86, 88)

Dec 17, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1431 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX (IT)-I, MUMBAI. Vs. M/S. AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK LTD. ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and K.V.Viswanathan, JJ. )…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 36(1)(viii) — Interpretation of “derived from” vs. “attributable to” — The phrase “derived from” connotes a requirement of a direct, first-degree nexus between the income and the specified business activity (providing long-term finance) — It is judicially settled that “derived from” is narrower than “attributable to,” thus excluding ancillary, incidental, or second-degree sources of income — If income is even a “step removed” from the core business, the nexus is broken (Paras 14, 15, 20, 33).

Dec 11, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1414 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

. Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 37(1) and Section 71 — Business Expenditure — Carrying on Business — A temporary lull in business or failure to secure a new contract does not amount to cessation of business if the assessee’s conduct evinces an intention to continue business, such as through continuous correspondence and bidding for new contracts.

Oct 26, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 1247 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH PRIDE FORAMER S.A. @ HASH COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ANOTHER ( Before : Manoj Misra and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ. )…

Direct Taxation Income Tax

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 260A — Appeals to High Court — Charitable Purpose Registration — High Court dismissed revenue’s appeals, stating issues were covered by earlier decisions, but failed to examine facts against the law. Supreme Court found impugned orders lacked factual elaboration and remanded for reconsideration in light of settled law by a larger bench decision.

Oct 11, 2025 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (EXEMPTION) LUCKNOW Vs. M/S. KHURJA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ( Before : Manoj Misra and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Direct Taxation Income Tax

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 276C(1) — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Prosecution for wilful attempt to evade tax requires proof of mens rea — Settlement Commission granted immunity from penalty after full disclosure, finding no suppression of facts or wilful evasion — Continuation of prosecution despite settlement order and lack of mens rea amounts to abuse of process of law.

Aug 31, 2025 sclaw

025 INSC 1048 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VIJAY KRISHNASWAMI @ KRISHNASWAMI VIJAYAKUMAR Vs. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX (INVESTIGATION) ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi,…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

DTAA, India-UAE, Article 5(1) — Permanent Establishment — Definition of “fixed place of business” — The definition of Permanent Establishment requires a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. The key test is whether the place is “at the disposal” of the enterprise, meaning the enterprise has the right to use the premises to carry on its business. Factors like stability, productivity, and a degree of independence are also considered.

Jul 28, 2025 sclaw

2025 INSC 891 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH HYATT INTERNATIONAL SOUTHWEST ASIA LTD. Vs. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. )…

Direct Taxation Income Tax

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 139(5) — Revised Income Tax Return — The appellant filed multiple revised returns for the assessment year 1989-90, which were not considered due to being barred by limitation —Whether the assessing officer can consider claims made in a revised return filed after the time limit prescribed by Section 139(5) of the Act — The appellant argued that the assessing officer should consider the claim for deduction of deferred revenue expenditure, even if the revised return was filed late —The respondent contended that the assessing officer has no jurisdiction to consider claims made in a time-barred revised return —The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision that the assessing officer cannot consider claims in a time-barred revised return —The Court emphasized that the assessing officer’s jurisdiction is limited by the time constraints set in Section 139(5) —The Court referred to previous judgments, including Wipro Finance Ltd. and Goetze (India) Ltd., to support its decision —The appeal was dismissed, affirming that claims in a time-barred revised return cannot be considered by the assessing officer.

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 760 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S. SHRIRAM INVESTMENTS — Appellant Vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX III, CHENNAI — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S Oka…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 17(2)(viii) – Income Tax Rules, 1962 – Rule 3(7)(i) – The appeals involve challenges to the vires of Section 17(2)(viii) of the Income Tax Act and Rule 3(7)(i) of the Income Tax Rules, concerning the taxation of perquisites in the form of interest-free/concessional loans to bank employees – The primary issues are whether these provisions result in excessive delegation of legislative function to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) and if Rule 3(7)(i) is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by using the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate as a benchmark – The Court reasoned that the legislative policy and standards are sufficiently clear in the primary legislation, and the rule-making authority’s actions fall within the permissible parameters of delegation – The Court found that the provisions align with the common understanding of ‘perquisites’ and ‘fringe benefits’ and that the use of SBI’s rate promotes tax efficiency and certainty – The Supreme Court concluded that Section 17(2)(viii) and Rule 3(7)(i) are intra vires and do not lead to excessive delegation or violate constitutional principles – The judgment emphasizes the importance of clarity, consistency, and fairness in tax legislation.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 389 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ALL INDIA BANK OFFICERS’ CONFEDERATION — Appellant Vs. THE REGIONAL MANAGER, CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjiv…

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Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Corporate

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw