Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Category: Direct Taxation

Direct Taxation Income Tax

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 139(5) — Revised Income Tax Return — The appellant filed multiple revised returns for the assessment year 1989-90, which were not considered due to being barred by limitation —Whether the assessing officer can consider claims made in a revised return filed after the time limit prescribed by Section 139(5) of the Act — The appellant argued that the assessing officer should consider the claim for deduction of deferred revenue expenditure, even if the revised return was filed late —The respondent contended that the assessing officer has no jurisdiction to consider claims made in a time-barred revised return —The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision that the assessing officer cannot consider claims in a time-barred revised return —The Court emphasized that the assessing officer’s jurisdiction is limited by the time constraints set in Section 139(5) —The Court referred to previous judgments, including Wipro Finance Ltd. and Goetze (India) Ltd., to support its decision —The appeal was dismissed, affirming that claims in a time-barred revised return cannot be considered by the assessing officer.

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 760 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S. SHRIRAM INVESTMENTS — Appellant Vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX III, CHENNAI — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S Oka…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 17(2)(viii) – Income Tax Rules, 1962 – Rule 3(7)(i) – The appeals involve challenges to the vires of Section 17(2)(viii) of the Income Tax Act and Rule 3(7)(i) of the Income Tax Rules, concerning the taxation of perquisites in the form of interest-free/concessional loans to bank employees – The primary issues are whether these provisions result in excessive delegation of legislative function to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) and if Rule 3(7)(i) is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by using the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate as a benchmark – The Court reasoned that the legislative policy and standards are sufficiently clear in the primary legislation, and the rule-making authority’s actions fall within the permissible parameters of delegation – The Court found that the provisions align with the common understanding of ‘perquisites’ and ‘fringe benefits’ and that the use of SBI’s rate promotes tax efficiency and certainty – The Supreme Court concluded that Section 17(2)(viii) and Rule 3(7)(i) are intra vires and do not lead to excessive delegation or violate constitutional principles – The judgment emphasizes the importance of clarity, consistency, and fairness in tax legislation.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 389 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ALL INDIA BANK OFFICERS’ CONFEDERATION — Appellant Vs. THE REGIONAL MANAGER, CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjiv…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 32(1) – Income Tax Rules, 1962 – Rule 5(1A) – There is no requirement under the second proviso to sub-rule (1A) of Rule 5 of the Rules that any particular mode of computing the claim of depreciation has to be opted for before the due date of filing of the return

Dec 10, 2023 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX — Appellant Vs. M/S JINDAL STEEL AND POWER LIMITED THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR — Respondent ( Before : B. V.…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 80HHC – Claim for deduction -The assessee’s attempt to broaden the deduction sources is considered impermissible, as strict interpretation aligns with specific terms in Section 80HHC – Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 80HHC emphasize that deductions are intended exclusively for profits derived from exporting goods and merchandise outside India, and including other income contradicts the section’s intended scope and purpose – Appeal Dismissed

Nov 25, 2023 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHAH ORIGINALS — Appellant Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-24, MUMBAI — Respondent ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 90 – A notification under Section 90(1) is necessary and a mandatory condition for a court, authority, or tribunal to give effect to a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), or any protocol changing its terms or conditions, which has the effect of altering the existing provisions of law – The interpretation of the expression “is” has present signification. Therefore, for a party to claim benefit of a “same treatment” clause, based on entry of DTAA between India and another state which is member of OECD, the relevant date is entering into treaty with India, and not a later date, when, after entering into DTAA with India, such country becomes an OECD member, in terms of India’s practice.

Oct 24, 2023 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ASSESSING OFFICER CIRCLE (INTERNATIONAL TAXATION) 2(2)(2) NEW DELHI — Appellant Vs. M/S NESTLE SA — Respondent ( Before : S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar…

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 35ABB – Expenditure for obtaining licence to operate telecommunication services – Payment of entry fee as well as the variable annual licence fee paid by the respondents-assessees to the DoT under the Policy of 1999 are capital in nature and may be amortised in accordance with Section 35ABB of the Act – Consequence of non-payment would result in ouster of the licensee from the trade – Thus, this is a payment which is intrinsic to the existence of the licence as well as trade itself. Such a payment has to be treated or characterized as capital only.

Oct 18, 2023 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH C.I.T., DELHI — Appellant Vs. BHARTI HEXACOM LTD. — Respondent ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. ) Civil Appeal No(S). 11128,…

Banking Direct Taxation

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 80P(4) – National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 1981 – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Sections 5(b), 22 and 56 – If a co-operative society is not a co-operative bank, then such an entity would be entitled to deduction but on the other hand, if it is a co-operative bank within the meaning of Section 56 of BR Act, 1949 read with the provisions of NABARD Act, 1981 then it would not be entitled to the benefit of deduction under sub-section (4) of Section 80P of the Act.

Oct 1, 2023 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH KERALA STATE CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD. KSCARDB — Appellant Vs. THE ASSESSING OFFICER, TRIVANDRUM AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before :…

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Constitution Service

Classification of Military casualties and the eligibility for Liberalised Family Pension — Battle Casualty —Illness Caused by Extreme Climatic Conditions as Battle Casualty — The Court establishes that a soldier’s death due to illness resulting from extreme climatic conditions while on duty near a sensitive border area (such as the Line of Control) can be categorized as a ‘Battle Casualty’ — This expands the interpretation of what constitutes a battle casualty under military regulations. – Liberalised Family Pension (LFP) — Application of Category E (f) — The judgment clarifies that deaths occurring in war-like situations, including those near international borders or lines of control due to environmental stresses, fall under clause (f) of category E of the relevant military order — This broadens the scope of eligibility for LFP under such circumstances.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw
Constitution

Temple Bye Laws — Oachira Parabrahma Temple — Ancient structure without a building or deity, governed by Bye-laws with three-tier elected committees — Appellants, elected Secretary and President, challenged two High Court orders (2020 and 2023) that removed their committee and appointed an unelected one under an Administrative Head, citing violations of the temple’s Bye-laws and customs —Legality of appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one contrary to the temple’s Bye-laws — Petitioner argues that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction and violated the temple’s governance structure by appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one without proper legal basis — The High Court’s actions were necessary for the efficient administration of the temple until a scheme could be framed and new elections held — The Supreme Court modified the High Court orders, appointing a new retired Judge as Administrative Head to conduct fair elections within four months, while directing all parties to cooperate — The Court emphasized the need to preserve temple properties and governance as per established customs and laws — The Supreme Court struck down the High Court’s order appointing an unelected committee, appointed a new Administrative Head to conduct elections, and directed all parties to cooperate, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the temple’s established governance structure and Bye-laws.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw
Acquittal

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 364, 302 and 201 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant of murder charges as the prosecution failed to prove the crucial link of the accused’s disclosure leading to the discovery of skeletal remains under Section 27 and the DNA evidence was also found to be inconclusive due to lack of proper collection of samples. – Proof of Disclosure Statements under Section 27 — Voluntariness and Uninfluenced Nature — The Court reiterates that the information provided by an accused under Section 27 must be voluntary and uninfluenced by threat, duress, or coercion.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw
Acquittal

Arms Act, 1959 — Sections 25, 54 and 59 — Buttondar knife — Specific Intent Required — The court clarifies that mere possession of a knife covered by a notification like the DAD Notification is not sufficient to constitute an offense under the Arms Act — There must be specific intent to use it for the prohibited purposes such as “manufacture, sale, or possession for sale or test.” – The prosecution must clearly allege and prove the intent of the accused to use the weapon for the specified prohibited purposes — Absence of such allegation in the charge-sheet renders the proceedings defective.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw