November 22, 2024 2:15 pm

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(i) and 342 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 14(3)– The appeal involves a Child in Conflict with Law (CCL) challenging the High Court’s order which set aside the Juvenile Justice Board’s decision and directed the trial to be conducted by the Children’s Court – The core issue is whether the CCL should be tried as a juvenile by the Board or as an adult by the Children’s Court, based on the preliminary assessment reports – The CCL’s counsel argued against the practice of passing orders without detailed reasons, the legality of the orders passed by the Board, and the deprivation of the CCL’s right to appeal – The State’s counsel contended that the Children’s Court can reconsider the Board’s decision and that the time limit for preliminary assessment under the Act is not mandatory – The judgment discusses the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, the mandatory or directory nature of the time period for preliminary assessment, and the exercise of revisional power by the High Court – The Court examines the procedural anomalies in the Act, the validity of the Board’s orders, and the remedy of appeal available to the appellant – The reasoning includes interpretation of the Act’s provisions, the role of the Board and the Children’s Court, and the application of the rules for preliminary assessment – The Court concludes with directions and reliefs based on the analysis of the arguments and legal provisions involved.

Bysclaw

May 12, 2024

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By sclaw

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Constitution POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 15 — Scope of Section 15 — The court clarified that Section 15 of the POCSO Act criminalizes the storage or possession of any child pornographic material involving a child, regardless of whether the accused has the intention to share or transmit the material. The court further distinguished between the three distinct offences punishable under Section 15(1), (2), and (3) of the POCSO Act. Information Technology Act, 2000 — Section 67B — Scope of Section 67B — The court held that Section 67B of the IT Act criminalizes the publication, transmission, or creation of any material depicting children in sexually explicit acts or conduct — The court clarified that the act of merely viewing or downloading child pornography, without any intention to publish, transmit, or create such material, does not fall within the purview of Section 67B of the IT Act.

Sep 29, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Supreme Court found significant discrepancies and contradictions in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, including the victim’s, casting doubt on the prosecution’s version of events – Due to these inconsistencies and lack of corroborative evidence, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellants, setting aside their convictions and sentences – The judgment emphasizes the importance of credible evidence and the consequences of accusations on the lives of individuals, highlighting the need for careful examination of testimonies in sexual harassment cases.

Mar 12, 2024 sclaw

Accused-appellant also providing for the day-to-day expenses of the victim and her child and therefore, further imprisonment will impact not only his family but also the victim’s – Ends of justice would be met if the period of imprisonment awarded against the accused-appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him – Conviction u/s. u/S. 3(a) r/w Sec. 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is hereby confirmed – Sentence imposed by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court is hereby modified and reduced to the period already undergone – Appeal allowed in part.

Feb 18, 2024 sclaw

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw