December 19, 2024 10:30 am

Direct Taxation

Levy of 28% GST on lottery, betting and gambling – Definition of goods under Section 2(52) of the Act,2017 does not violate any constitutional provision nor it is in conflict with the definition of goods given under Article 366(12

Bysclaw

Dec 6, 2020

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Direct Taxation Income Tax

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 139(5) — Revised Income Tax Return — The appellant filed multiple revised returns for the assessment year 1989-90, which were not considered due to being barred by limitation —Whether the assessing officer can consider claims made in a revised return filed after the time limit prescribed by Section 139(5) of the Act — The appellant argued that the assessing officer should consider the claim for deduction of deferred revenue expenditure, even if the revised return was filed late —The respondent contended that the assessing officer has no jurisdiction to consider claims made in a time-barred revised return —The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision that the assessing officer cannot consider claims in a time-barred revised return —The Court emphasized that the assessing officer’s jurisdiction is limited by the time constraints set in Section 139(5) —The Court referred to previous judgments, including Wipro Finance Ltd. and Goetze (India) Ltd., to support its decision —The appeal was dismissed, affirming that claims in a time-barred revised return cannot be considered by the assessing officer.

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 17(2)(viii) – Income Tax Rules, 1962 – Rule 3(7)(i) – The appeals involve challenges to the vires of Section 17(2)(viii) of the Income Tax Act and Rule 3(7)(i) of the Income Tax Rules, concerning the taxation of perquisites in the form of interest-free/concessional loans to bank employees – The primary issues are whether these provisions result in excessive delegation of legislative function to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) and if Rule 3(7)(i) is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by using the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate as a benchmark – The Court reasoned that the legislative policy and standards are sufficiently clear in the primary legislation, and the rule-making authority’s actions fall within the permissible parameters of delegation – The Court found that the provisions align with the common understanding of ‘perquisites’ and ‘fringe benefits’ and that the use of SBI’s rate promotes tax efficiency and certainty – The Supreme Court concluded that Section 17(2)(viii) and Rule 3(7)(i) are intra vires and do not lead to excessive delegation or violate constitutional principles – The judgment emphasizes the importance of clarity, consistency, and fairness in tax legislation.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

Direct Taxation Income Tax Act

“Court Rules in Favor of Mobile Providers: Prepaid Sales Not Subject to TDS”

Mar 8, 2024 sclaw

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Constitution Service

Classification of Military casualties and the eligibility for Liberalised Family Pension — Battle Casualty —Illness Caused by Extreme Climatic Conditions as Battle Casualty — The Court establishes that a soldier’s death due to illness resulting from extreme climatic conditions while on duty near a sensitive border area (such as the Line of Control) can be categorized as a ‘Battle Casualty’ — This expands the interpretation of what constitutes a battle casualty under military regulations. – Liberalised Family Pension (LFP) — Application of Category E (f) — The judgment clarifies that deaths occurring in war-like situations, including those near international borders or lines of control due to environmental stresses, fall under clause (f) of category E of the relevant military order — This broadens the scope of eligibility for LFP under such circumstances.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Temple Bye Laws — Oachira Parabrahma Temple — Ancient structure without a building or deity, governed by Bye-laws with three-tier elected committees — Appellants, elected Secretary and President, challenged two High Court orders (2020 and 2023) that removed their committee and appointed an unelected one under an Administrative Head, citing violations of the temple’s Bye-laws and customs —Legality of appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one contrary to the temple’s Bye-laws — Petitioner argues that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction and violated the temple’s governance structure by appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one without proper legal basis — The High Court’s actions were necessary for the efficient administration of the temple until a scheme could be framed and new elections held — The Supreme Court modified the High Court orders, appointing a new retired Judge as Administrative Head to conduct fair elections within four months, while directing all parties to cooperate — The Court emphasized the need to preserve temple properties and governance as per established customs and laws — The Supreme Court struck down the High Court’s order appointing an unelected committee, appointed a new Administrative Head to conduct elections, and directed all parties to cooperate, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the temple’s established governance structure and Bye-laws.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 364, 302 and 201 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant of murder charges as the prosecution failed to prove the crucial link of the accused’s disclosure leading to the discovery of skeletal remains under Section 27 and the DNA evidence was also found to be inconclusive due to lack of proper collection of samples. – Proof of Disclosure Statements under Section 27 — Voluntariness and Uninfluenced Nature — The Court reiterates that the information provided by an accused under Section 27 must be voluntary and uninfluenced by threat, duress, or coercion.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Arms Act, 1959 — Sections 25, 54 and 59 — Buttondar knife — Specific Intent Required — The court clarifies that mere possession of a knife covered by a notification like the DAD Notification is not sufficient to constitute an offense under the Arms Act — There must be specific intent to use it for the prohibited purposes such as “manufacture, sale, or possession for sale or test.” – The prosecution must clearly allege and prove the intent of the accused to use the weapon for the specified prohibited purposes — Absence of such allegation in the charge-sheet renders the proceedings defective.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw