Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 165 and 166 — Liability for injuries sustained due to falling tree branch — Injuries caused by falling tree branch while vehicle was stationary under the tree during rain — Held, not an accident “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” as the motor vehicle did not play an active role. [
Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Service
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Service
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
RTI
Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.
C P C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.
Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 32 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 154, 173 — Clubbing/Transfer of FIRs — Multiple FIRs registered against petitioners in different jurisdictions arising from same set of transactions relating to a real estate project — Held, multiplicity of FIRs and parallel investigations on same facts leads to avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, conflicting findings and serious prejudice to the accused — Principle laid down in T.T — Antony v — State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181, that there cannot be multiple FIRs for the same occurrence or transaction, squarely applies — FIR No. 30/2019 (EOW, Delhi) directed to be transferred and clubbed with FIR No. 439/2024 (Gurugram, Haryana) for investigation — Blanket direction restraining coercive steps in future FIRs declined, but petitioners permitted to avail remedies in law if future FIRs are based on the same transaction.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 509 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH AMIT KATYAL AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER ( Before : Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. )…

Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Abuse of Process of Court — Discharge of Accused — Vague Allegations — Where allegations in FIR and charge sheet are general and do not specify the role of the accused, continuation of criminal proceedings amounts to abuse of process of court and may cause prejudice.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 510 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SUSANTA KUMAR DALEI @ SUSANTA KUMAR DALAI Vs. STATE OF ODISHA (VIGILANCE) ( Before : Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale,…

C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 2(2), Order 20 Rule 18 — Preliminary vs. Final Decree — A Preliminary Decree declares rights and liabilities, leaving actual results to be worked out in further proceedings — A Final Decree is passed after further inquiries, completely disposing of the suit — A Preliminary Decree cannot be executed directly unless it is partly final — Provisions of Order 20 Rule 18 allow a court to pass a Preliminary Decree declaring rights and giving further directions if partition cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry in suits for partition of immovable property — The Supreme Court noted that the High Court erred by focusing on the nomenclature of the decree rather than its executable portions, especially when the property was not divisible by metes and bounds.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 502 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JENNIFER MESSIAS Vs. LEONARD G LOBO ( Before : K.V. Viswanathan and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ. ) Civil Appeal Nos. ….of 2026…

Constitution Narcotics Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Section 43-D(5) — Bail — Constitutional Courts’ power to grant bail — The Supreme Court reiterated that statutory restrictions on bail under the UAP Act do not oust the power of constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of fundamental rights, particularly the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution — The Court emphasized that the rigors of Section 43-D(5) can “melt down” when there is no likelihood of trial completion within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration is substantial.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 503 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SYED IFTIKHAR ANDRABI Vs. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, JAMMU ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No….of…

Acquittal I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 304-A — Causing death by negligence — Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 134(b) and Section 187 — Duty of driver in case of accident and injury to a person and Punishment for offences relating to accident — Appeal against conviction and sentence — Driver convicted under Section 304-A IPC and Sections 134(b) and 187 MVA — High Court partly allowed revision, setting aside conviction for Section 279 IPC but maintaining conviction for Section 304-A IPC.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 504 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MAHADEVANNA D.M. Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 307 — Attempt to Murder — Essential ingredients are intention/knowledge to commit murder and an overt act in pursuance of that intention/knowledge. The nature of the injury is a relevant consideration, but not determinative; intention can be inferred from circumstances like weapons used, motive, etc.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 524 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ROSHAN LAL Vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. ) Criminal…

Bail Declined

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 82, 439 — Arms Act, 1959 — Sections 3, 25, 27 — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 452, 504, 506, 307 — Bail — Cancellation of — Supreme Court’s previous order directing surrender — Accused failing to surrender and absconding — Initiation of proceedings under Section 82 CrPC — Subsequent surrender after considerable delay — High Court granting bail overlooking previous order and material on record — Held, High Court order suffers from manifest error of law and is set aside.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 526 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MOHSEEN Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. ) Criminal…

Bail Declined Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita

Bail — Grant of — High Court’s order reversed — High Court granted bail without considering material facts and circumstances, particularly the FIR, post-mortem report, recovery of weapon, and witness statements, relying solely on absence of allegations in inquest proceedings.

May 24, 2026 sclaw

2026 INSC 527 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BHAGAT SINGH Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER ( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )…

You missed

Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
RTI

Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw
C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw