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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51) Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39) Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders etc. Act, 1986 — Section 3(2) — Preventive Detention — Grounds for Detention — Requirement of finding ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ — Detenu, a ‘drug offender’, was detained based on three criminal cases involving Ganja, with an apprehension that if released on bail, she would engage in similar activities — Held, mere apprehension that the detenu, if released on bail, would be likely to indulge in similar crimes would not be a sufficient ground for ordering preventive detention — Order of detention failed to indicate how the detenu’s activities were prejudicial to ‘public order’ as opposed to ‘law and order’ and was therefore unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11)
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)
Arbitration
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)
Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)
Limitation
Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence
Arbitration
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)
Corporate
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)
Constitution

Rent–Enhancement of –Enhanced rent was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable as matter purely contractual and the appellants voluntarily entered into the lease/licence with the respondents–Appellants not entitled to seek redress under Article 226 of the Constitution for any breach of the covenants contained in the lease agreements.

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 190 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterjee The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh Nijjar Civil Appeal No. 5158 Of…

Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 138–Dishonour of the cheque–Sentence–Appellant facing criminal prosecution for the last 7 years–Appellant a petty businessman–He paid the hefty amount of compensation as a penalty for dishonour of the cheque issued by him.–No material placed on the record to indicate that the appellant had earlier committed any such or similar offence–Substantive sentence of imprisonment, set aside–Sentence of  fine of Rs.1,000/- maintained and imposition of compensation in the sum of Rs.35,000/- also maintained.  

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 188 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterjee The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh Nijjar Criminal Appeal No. 2337 Of…

I P C

– Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 302, 307, 109, 120-B/34–Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999, Section 3(1) read 2(e), 3(2) read with Section 120-B–Arms Act, Section 3 & 7, Section 25(1A), 25(1B)–Murder–Death sentence–Rarest of rare case-If a person is sentenced to imprisonment, even if it be for life, and subsequently it is found that he was innocent and was wrongly convicted, he can be set free. Of course, the imprisonment that he has suffered till then cannot be undone and the time he has spent in the prison cannot be given back. Such a reversal is not possible where a person has been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. The execution of the sentence of death in such cases makes miscarriage of justice irrevocable. It is a finality which cannot be corrected.

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 153 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mukundakam Sharma Criminal Appeal Nos. 85-86 of 2006…

Murder

Forensic– Gun Shot Injury–Cartridge of .303 bore can be fired from .315 bore weapon–High Court, therefore, conscious of the fact that in an appeal against acquittal, interference should be minimal and that too in case of perversity of the judgment of the trial Court, held that the finding were indeed perverse and accordingly reversed the judgment of acquittal–Appeal dismissed

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 150 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harjit Singh Bedi The Hon’ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur Criminal Appeal No. 1037 of…

Service Matters
Service

General Clauses Act, S.10–ServiceLaw–Computation of time– Medical Certificate–Last Date of Submission–Appellant did not obtain the medical certificate on 14th April as being a gazetted holiday & the previous days were also holidays–His application should have been considered on merit.

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 147 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Singhvi The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly Civil Appeal No. 8200 of…

C P C

Withdrawal of Suit–Trial court dismissed the suit for partition as withdrawn–In terms of order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is the privilege of the plaintiff alone to withdraw the plaint at any stage of the proceedings and the appellant being only one of the defendants having played the fraud in getting the suit dismissed as withdrawn, has no locus to object to the restoration of the suit.

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 143 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Sudershan Reddy The Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.M. Panchal Civil Appeal No. 8407 of…

Land Acquisition

Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 11A & 6–Land Acquisition–Objections–Notification and the declaration of the acquisition proceedings challenged after the expiry of the period of 2 years–Interim order was passed for four weeks, the same interim order was made final until further orders–Cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to expiry of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to the acquired lands–Two years from the date of declaration must be computed after excluding the period when parties had approached the court and obtained interim stay of such acquisition notices

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 137 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterjee The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh Nijjar Civil Appeal No. 8235 of…

Service Matters
Service

Central Civil Services Rules, 1965, Rule 10, Sub-rule 6 and 7–Suspension–Delay in reviewing suspension order–suspension of the respondent not extended–Central Administrative Tribunal quashed the suspension order of the respondent as became invalid on the expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension–High Court affirmed the orders of the Tribunal–Appeal–Held, that after the operation of Sub-rule 6 of Rule 10, since the review not been conducted within 90 days from the date of suspension, it became invalid after 90 days as neither was there any review nor extension within the said period

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 130 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6661…

Cr P C

Indian Penal Code, 1860, S. 45 and 47–Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 432, 433 and 433A–Premature release–Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases–A convict awarded life sentence has to undergo imprisonment for at least 14 years–While Sections 432 and 433 empowers the appropriate Government to suspend, remit or commute sentences, including a sentence of death and life imprisonment, a fetter has been imposed by the legislature on such powers by the introduction of Section 433A into the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Amending Act of 1978, which came into effect on and from 18th December, 1978–By virtue of the non-obstante clause used in Section 433A, the minimum term of imprisonment in respect of an offence where death is one of the punishments provided by laws or where a death sentence has been commuted to life sentence, has been prescribed as 14 years.  

Nov 11, 2018 sclaw

2010(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 125 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir The Hon’ble Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4614…

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Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Corporate

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw