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Multiple FIRs across States cannot be quashed or clubbed under Article 32 where they relate to distinct transactions, victims, and offences despite similar modus operandi. A. Cyber Fraud — Multiple FIRs across States — Clubbing declined — Clubbing/consolidation of FIRs registered in different States was declined where each FIR was lodged by a different complainant induced to part with money on separate occasions, with distinct victims, amounts and transactions, notwithstanding a common bank account and similar modus operandi; clubbing at a nascent investigation stage involving complex cyber-forensic tracing would impede fair investigation and cause hardship to complainants. Fixation of cut-off marks not provided under the 2014 Recruitment Rules, resulting in vacancies remaining unfilled despite eligible candidates, held arbitrary and unsustainable. – Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014 — Rules 9(B), 16(3)(a)(iii) and 17(3) — Craft Instructor Training Scheme (CITS) certificate reduced from essential to preferential qualification — Challenge thereto — Appellants having participated in selection process without objection, held estopped from challenging validity of 2014 Rules or advertisements issued thereunder — Doctrine of approbation and reprobation applied. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 — Section 11, 13, 14, 29, 34 & 36 — Adjudicatory jurisdiction — Distinction between regulatory/enforcement functions of TRAI and adjudicatory jurisdiction of TDSAT — Held, TRAI’s power under Ss. 11(1)(b) and 13 to issue directions for compliance with regulations is regulatory/administrative, not adjudicatory — Direction issued to MSO to restore signals pursuant to IC Regulations, and consequent show cause notice under S. 34 for non-compliance, do not amount to adjudication of dispute between MSO and LCOs — Adjudication of disputes between service providers is exclusive domain of TDSAT under S. 14 — TRAI’s role upon non-compliance confined to that of complainant under S. 34; it cannot itself determine guilt or levy fine under S. 29, which is exclusive province of competent criminal court — TDSAT erred in framing the issue as one of TRAI’s jurisdiction to adjudicate dispute between MSO and LCOs, when TRAI had not purported to adjudicate any such dispute Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21, 32, 14, 142 — Prisoners, rights of — Elderly and terminally ill convicts — Continued incarceration despite advanced age (above 70 years) or terminal illness — Held, imprisonment does not suspend constitutional guarantees of dignity and humane treatment — Right to life under Art. 21 continues in custody and extends to protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment — NALSA’s nationwide Special Campaign identifying 5,393 vulnerable prisoners, including 11 terminally ill and 84 above 70 years across 17 States and 1 Union Territory, disclosed systemic gap between executive policy and ground-level implementation — Continued detention causing avoidable suffering held constitutionally impermissible — Supreme Court, invoking Arts. 32 and 142, directed States/UTs to formulate uniform compassionate-release policy. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 294(b) — Obscenity — Distinction between “obscene” and “abusive”/”vulgar” language — Test of — Held, to attract S. 294(b) IPC, prosecution must prove: (i) an obscene act done, or obscene word/song/ballad uttered, in or near a public place; and (ii) such act/utterance caused annoyance to others — Word “obscene” undefined under IPC but judicially construed, in the context of S. 292 IPC, to mean material which, taken as a whole, is lascivious, appeals to prurient interest, and tends to deprave and corrupt persons likely to be exposed to it — “Community standard test” (Aveek Sarkar) applicable, not the Hicklin test — Mere vulgarity, abuse or profanity, however distasteful, uncivil or shocking, does not ipso facto constitute obscenity — Vulgarity may evoke disgust or revulsion but lacks the depraving/corrupting tendency essential to obscenity — Appellant’s utterance of abusive and expletive-laden words against complainant during a quarrel, though coarse and offensive, held neither lascivious nor appealing to prurient interest nor shown to have caused annoyance to others in the public place — Conviction under S. 294(b) IPC set aside.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 227 – Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 – Sections 15(1) and 15(7) – Payment of rent Amount of rent payable for the demised premises may be a factor which cannot be brushed aside, but the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, do not suggest any negligence, defiance or contumacious non ­payment of the amount payable to the landlord to warrant the taking of that “exceptional step” which is bound to render the tenant defenceless in his contest against the respondents­landlord.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DINA NATH (D ) BY LRS AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. SUBHASH CHAND SAINI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Arun Mishra, M.R.…

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 102 – Power of police officer to seize certain property – ‘any property’ used in sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not include immovable property. The power of seizure in Section 102 has to be limited to movable property – The phrase ‘any property’ in Section 102 will only cover moveable property and not immovable property.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH NEVADA PROPERTIES PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH ITS DIRECTORS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Ranjan Gogoi, CJI., Deepak…

Service Matters

Once, the respondent chose not to controvert the allegations made against him in the show cause notice and pursued the matter with the competent authority only for taking a lenient view, he cannot be permitted to resile from that position. It would result in allowing the respondent to approbate and reprobate.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. LT. COL. KULDEEP YADAV — Respondent ( Before : A.M. Khanwilkar and Ajay Rastogi, JJ. )…

Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 433, 434, 433(e) and 434(1)(c) – Winding up Petition – Trigger of limitation – A winding up proceeding is a proceeding ‘in rem’ and not a recovery proceeding, the trigger of limitation, so far as the winding up petition is concerned, would be the date of default.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH JIGNESH SHAH AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : R.F. Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy and Surya…

It is settled law that the fundamental right under Article 30 cannot be waived.If school is a minority institution, Rule 28 of the Rules for Management of Recognized Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) 1969, cannot possibly apply as there would be a serious infraction of the right of school to administer the institution with teachers of its choice.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH CHANDANA DAS (MALAKAR) — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : R.F. Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy and…

Wakfs Act, 1954 – Section 56 – Waqfs Act, 1995 – Sections 63 and 83(9) – Succession Act, 1925 – Section 25 – Appointment of mutawalli . The High Court’s finding that the waqif intended that the mutawalli-ship should devolve upon Kammu Mia’s descendants only after the waqif’s direct lineal descendants are exhausted is patently incorrect in as much as the waqf deed does not contain any such stipulation.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH MD. ABRAR — Appellant Vs. MEGHALAYA BOARD OF WAKF AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Ajay Rastogi,…

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