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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — Application of the principle depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the ambit of earlier proceedings and the nexus of the matter to the controversy — It is founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid parties being vexed twice over for the same litigation — Parties are expected to exercise reasonable diligence and bring forward every point that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which they might and ought to have brought forward — Negligence, inadvertence, or accident in omitting a part of the case does not exempt from its application. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 165 and 166 — Liability for injuries sustained due to falling tree branch — Injuries caused by falling tree branch while vehicle was stationary under the tree during rain — Held, not an accident “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” as the motor vehicle did not play an active role. [

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Right To File Regular Appeal Cannot Be Curtailed Merely Because Application To Set Aside Ex-Parte Decree Was Dismissed. heldBut where the defendant has been pursuing the remedy bona fide under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, if the court refuses to condone the delay in the time spent in pursuing the remedy under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the defendant would be deprived of the statutory right of appeal.

Right To File Regular Appeal Cannot Be Curtailed Merely Because Application To Set Aside Ex-Parte Decree Was Dismissed: SC [Read Judgment] BY: ASHOK KINI21 Nov 2019 6:07 PM But where…

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 354, 511 and 376 – Criminal force on the victim -Rape attempt – Delay in registering the FIR HELD Husband of the complainant ­victim (P.W.3) was staying in Nandprayag while the incident occurred in the remote village of Salna – Subsequent to the incident, the complainant­ victim first travelled to meet her husband (P.W.3) – After narrating the said incident to him, she further travelled to register a complaint before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamoli, which is again far off from the place of occurrence

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH CHAITU LAL — Appellant Vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana and Ajay Rastogi, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No. 2127…

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 302 and 326 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 301, 301(2), 225 and 24(8) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 165 – Murder – Cross­examination of witnesses -‘Victim’s counsel has a limited right of assisting the prosecution, which may extend to suggesting questions to the Court or the prosecution, but not putting them by himself.’

Private Counsel Engaged By Victim To Assist Public Prosecutor Cannot Make Oral Argument/Cross Examine Witnesses: SC [Read Judgment] BY: ASHOK KINI20 Nov 2019 5:59 PM ‘Victim’s counsel has a limited…

Service Matters

Upon reaching a finding of arbitrariness in the selection process, the Court could at the most have issued a direction to the State Screening Committee to reassess the names of all candidates by giving due consideration to all relevant documents………….. it was not for the Court to sit in judgment over the merit of the candidates and substitute its reasoning for that of the Screening Committee. Appeal Allowed

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BAIDYANATH YADAV — Appellant Vs. ADITYA NARAYAN ROY AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Ajay Rastogi, JJ. ) Civil…

Having regard to the material on record and since large amounts of money belonging to innocent investors have been siphoned off, as well as for the aforesaid reasons, the High Court, in our considered opinion, should not have released the Respondent on bail………the impugned order granting interim bail to the Respondent stands set aside.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION — Appellant Vs. RAMENDU CHATTOPADHYAY — Respondent ( Before : Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

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