Supreme Court of India Judgements

37260 Judgements hosted as on 23/06/2026 - Search (FREE), Subscribe, Read & Download

Top Tags

Latest Post

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority. Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished. Right to Information Act, 2005 — S. 24(4) — Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 — S. 2(1), S. 3 — “Intelligence and Security Organisation” — Scope and Applicability of Exemption — Jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment (SPE) — The expression “intelligence and security organisations” under Section 24 of the RTI Act implies that the concerned entity must be statutory or institutionally empowered to handle matters of intelligence and national/state security — The Special Police Establishment (SPE) of Madhya Pradesh, established under Section 2(1) of the Act of 1947, is clothed with a limited jurisdiction restricted strictly to investigating offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and select economic/fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code — Because neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE handles matters connected to general ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’, the SPE cannot be deemed an “intelligence and security organisation” under Section 24(4) of the RTI Act — Principle of institutional parity cannot be invoked to grant blanket exemptions to a anti-corruption investigation agency.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Constitution
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
C P C
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Service
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Service
Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.
Narcotics

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 18 and 50 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 313 – Possession of 1kg 750 grams of opium – Conviction and sentence – Appeal against – Merely because prosecution has not examined any independent witness, same would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant has been falsely implicated.

Jan 6, 2020 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH SURINDER KUMAR — Appellant Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, R. Subhash Reddy and B.R. Gavai, JJ. ) Criminal…

Consumer

H E L D – The respondents had paid 85% of the agreed consideration, together with the agreement to sell, and even the balance at the time when the sale deed was executed on 11 February 2013. Having paid the consideration, it was evidently not in their interest to delay the receipt of possession. Though the sale deed records that possession was handed over, it is clear from the contemporaneous record that it was only on 28 August 2014 that all the sets of keys of the apartment were handed over to the respondents. Consequently, the appellant would be liable to pay reasonable compensation to the respondents for the period between 9 February 2013 and 28 August 2014, in addition to the contractual payment due for the period between 8 August 2012 and 8 February 2013.

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S LANCO HILLS TECHNOLOGY PARK PRIVATE LIMITED — Appellant Vs. MANISHA BALKRISHNA KULKARNI AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud…

C P C

INJUNCTION – The division bench held that there is no documentary evidence to prima facie show that the Appellant – Developer is in physical possession of the suit property. Furthermore, the issue whether the Appellant – Developer has paid part consideration for the entire suit property was required to be determined in the trial. The division bench took the view that the Appellant – Developer had not made out a prima facie case for grant of Temporary Injunction. The Respondents being the lawful owners of the suit property, granting such an injunction would cause irreparable loss and hardship to them.

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH SAKETA VAKSANA LLP AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. KAUKUTLA SARALA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit, Indu Malhotra and Krishna…

Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 143, 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 – Explosive Substances Act, 1908 – Sections 3 and 5 – Unlawful assembly – Persons were armed with deadly weapons like country­ made bombs etc. HELD the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited, the appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court. It is obvious that the High Court also did not find material evidence to convict the accused and, therefore, set aside the judgment and remitted the matter to the trial court. In a criminal case, remand is not to be ordered as a matter of course. It is only if there is a minis­trial or some technical issues have arisen that such an order may be made but in very rare circumstances. – The trial court was justified in acquitting the accused

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH KOOLI SASEENDRAN AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF KERALA ETC. — Respondent ( Before : Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ. ) Criminal…

Service Matters
Service

Bihar Health Service (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2013 – Rules 5 and 6(iii) – Grant of weightage on the basis of work experience – Rule 5 and 6(iii) of the Bihar Health Service (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2013 are construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non­private hospital (including those run by the Central Government, Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions; or other public authorities) within the territory of Bihar

Dec 25, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DR. (MAJOR) MEETA SAHAI — Appellant Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Deepak Gupta and Surya Kant, JJ. )…

Consumer

Chandigarh Housing Board {hereinafter ‘CHB’) invited bids to implement an integrated project with residential, commercial, and other related infrastructure facilities at the Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technological Park in Chandigarh- HELD We also note that the finding in the arbitration award dated 09.01.2015 as to the apportionment of liability between the Developer and CHB to pay the principal sum and general compensation, must be given effect.

Dec 23, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARD — Appellant Vs. M/S. PARASVANATH DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and R. Subhash…

Murder

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 302 and 201 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 161 – Murder – Dead body was recovered at the instance of the appellant – A complete chain which clearly leads to only one inference that it is the accusedappellant alone who could have murdered deceased – Appeal dismissed.

Dec 23, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH HARINDER SINGH @ HIRA — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB — Respondent ( Before : Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ. ) Criminal…

You missed

Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk — The right to walk is a fundamental right integral to the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with other provisions of Article 19 and Article 21 — This fundamental right includes the right to demarcated footpaths, which must take precedence over the movement of motorised vehicles

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 21 — Execution proceedings — High Court’s directions for assessment of compensation in execution proceedings — Held, impermissible when original suit did not seek compensation and parties did not consent — Setting aside of trial court and first appellate court decrees, followed by direction to execute court to assess value of construction, is not supported by CPC

Jun 23, 2026 sclaw
Service

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Section 59(d), 92 and 95(1) — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Regn. 7, Schedule — Disciplinary Authority — Competency of Commissioner to dismiss Group ‘A’ Officer — Substitution of Section 59(d) by Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993, w.e.f. 01.10.1993 — Legislative Intent — Post-1993 amendment, the Commissioner is put in complete control both as the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority — Phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” used in Section 59(d) refers to regulations that may be made in future and not the existing 1959 Regulations — Commissioner held fully competent to pass dismissal orders against Group ‘A’ officers despite old regulations naming the ‘Corporation’ as the disciplinary authority.

Jun 18, 2026 sclaw
Service

Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 16 and 226 — Public Employment — Direct Recruitment — Eligibility Criteria — Workshop Experience — Pendency of workshop renewal applications — Effect on candidates — Where a recruitment notification mandates a minimum of one year of experience in a Government-approved workshop, candidates cannot be prejudiced or disqualified merely because the workshop’s application for renewal of approval was pending with the State authorities during the period they gained experience — Depriving an otherwise eligible candidate of employment due to an administrative “period of eclipse” or delay on the part of state machinery is arbitrary and discriminatory–Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 INSC 137, relied on; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, 2022 INSC 24, Distinguished.

Jun 16, 2026 sclaw