Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies. Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application. Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench. Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants. Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 – Sections 7, 9 and 25 – Custody Dispute – The case revolves around a custody dispute over two minor children following the deterioration of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent – The High Court granted shared custody, which was challenged by the appellant – The primary issue is the guardianship and welfare of the children, considering their preferences and the capabilities of each parent – The appellant argued that the children have been residing with him for nine years and expressed a desire to continue doing so – The respondent argued that the appellant retained custody against various court orders and alleged ‘parental alienation syndrome’ – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order, and reinstated the Family Court’s decision granting custody to the appellant, subject to the respondent’s visitation rights – The court found no evidence of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ and recognized the support system provided by the Indian Armed Forces for the children’s welfare – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant should retain custody of the children, with the respondent granted visitation rights as per the Family Court’s order.
I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.
I P C
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.
Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.
Limitation
Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.
Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.
Limitation
Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.
Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.
Consumer
Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.
Electricity Act

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 12 – Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 84 and 86(1)(b) – Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998 – Section 21 – Withdrawal of petition for grant of approval of Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – – Appellants (DISCOMS) could not be permitted to change the decision at their whims and fancies and, particularly, when it is adversarial to the public interest and public good – APTEL has rightly held that the appellants-(DISCOMS) could not have been permitted to withdraw petition.

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SOUTHERN POWER DISTRIBUTION POWER COMPANY LIMITED OF ANDHRA PRADESH (APSPDCL) AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. M/S HINDUJA NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION LIMITED AND ANOTHER —…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11 – Appointment of member of the Bar as the sole Arbitrator – Appeal against – – While dealing with petition under Section 11, the Court by default would refer the matter when contentions relating to non-arbitrability are plainly arguable – In such case, the issue of non-arbitrability is left open to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal – No case for interference is made out – Appeal dismissed.

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MOHAMMED MASROOR SHAIKH — Appellant Vs. BHARAT BHUSHAN GUPTA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee and Abhay S. Oka, JJ. )…

Constitution

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Bearing in mind these exceptional facts and circumstances, by means of the saving clause in the Repealing Act, 2018, the Manipur Legislature could not have infused life into a legislation, which was recognised by the Legislature itself as unconstitutional and thereby, a nullity, prompting its repeal.

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH THE STATE OF MANIPUR AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. SURJAKUMAR OKRAM AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and…

C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Order 39 Rule 2­A – Contempt of a civil nature- The allegation of wilful disobedience being in the nature of criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the disobedience was not mere “disobedience” but “wilful” and “conscious” – Implication of exercise of contempt jurisdiction, held that the power must be exercised with caution rather than on mere probabilities

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH FUTURE COUPONS PRIVATE LIMITED AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. AMAZON.COM NV INVESTMENT HOLDINGS LLC AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, CJI,…

Service Matters
Service

Fixation of pension – his emoluments for the purpose of ascertaining the average would be taken, at what they would have been, had he not been absent from duty or suspended provided that the benefit of pay in any officiating post would be admissible only if it is certified that he would have continued to hold that officiating post but for leave or suspension

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. ANIE LUKOSE — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Tenders & Contracts

HELD The Respondent had the option not to lease out its property to the Appellant. The situation of an owner of property, executing a lease agreement in respect of his property cannot be equated with a contract of employment executed by and between an employee and a mighty employer, where the employee has little option but to accept the terms and conditions offered by the employer.

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED THROUGH ITS SENIOR MANAGER — Appellant Vs. M/S SHREE GANESH PETROLEUM RAJGURUNAGAR THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR MR. LAXMAN DAGDU THITE — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee…

Acquittal

Acquittal – Use of the gun itself is not established by the FSL report – Ingredients of Section 307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act have not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt – Trial Court and High Court committed error in convicting the appellant for the charge under Section 307/34 IPC read with Section 27 Arms Act – Conviction and sentence set­ aside.

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VASUDEV — Appellant Vs. STATE OF M.P. — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No. 388 of…

Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 397 and 401 read with Section 482 – Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 302 – Army Act, 1950 – Sections 69 and 125 – Murder- Consequence of the decision of the High Court is to foist an obligation on the Army Authorities to hold a court-martial despite a clear and unequivocal submission to the jurisdiction of the Court of Sessions – Accused shall be transferred from military custody to civil custody to face trial – Appeal allowed.

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE STATE OF SIKKIM — Appellant Vs. JASBIR SINGH AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Surya Kant, JJ.…

Will & Succession

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 14(1) – Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property – Objective of Section 14(1) – There cannot be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the said Act.

Feb 6, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JOGI RAM — Appellant Vs. SURESH KUMAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

You missed

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw