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Environment Law — Environmental Clearance — Prior clearance — Mandatory character — Prior environmental clearance under EIA Notification, 2006 is mandatory, being founded on the precautionary principle and couched in imperative terms — Word “prior” and the graded four-stage screening, scoping, public consultation and appraisal process render an anterior assessment the sine qua non of the clearance regime — Decriminalisation of contraventions under Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 does not alter this mandatory character. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 415 — Appeal — Maintainability — Conviction recorded for first time by appellate court reversing acquittal — An appeal under Section 374 CrPC (Section 415 BNSS) is not maintainable against a judgment of conviction recorded by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and reversing an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court — No such second appeal is contemplated under CrPC or BNSS — The only remedy available is revision under Section 397 r/w 401 CrPC (Section 438 r/w 442 BNSS) Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 44B — “Carriage” of passengers — Meaning and scope of — Cruise operations by non-resident shipping entity — Held, the word “carriage” under Section 44B cannot be restrictively construed to mean movement only from Port A to Port B. A round-trip cruise voyage, where passengers have the option to disembark at intermediate ports without compulsion to return to the originating port, constitutes carriage of passengers within the meaning of Section 44B. Provision of incidental on-board entertainment and hospitality does not alter the essential character of the activity as carriage of passengers. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR — Scope of inquiry — Mini-trial impermissible — At the stage of considering quashing of an FIR, the Court’s inquiry is confined to whether the allegations, taken at face value, prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence — Court cannot conduct a “mini-trial” by sifting evidence, assessing probabilities, or evaluating witness credibility — High Court exceeding these limits by examining trap proceedings, absence of personal recovery, and departmental enquiry findings, held impermissible. Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 33, 35 and 38 — Hindu/Christian Succession — Applicability of S. 33 confined to property owned by deceased male; erroneous application by High Court set aside — Where property was purchased and registered in the joint names of two wives, the same is owned by them and not by the husband, notwithstanding that he provided the consideration — Section 33, which governs devolution on intestacy of a male’s property between his widow and lineal descendants, is not attracted to property never vested in the husband’s name — High Court’s application of S. 33 to the entirety of the suit property held misconceived.

The power under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be exercised only if, for some reason, the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible mere existence of a reason for terminating the proceedings is not sufficient. The reason must be such that the continuation of the proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible.

    2024 INSC 433 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6462 OF 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) no.19301 of 2023)…

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

2024 INSC 393 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SELVAMANI — Appellant Vs. THE STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai and Sandeep…

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

2024 INSC 394 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VIJAY LAXMAN BHAWE SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS — Appellant Vs. P & S NIRMAN PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS —…

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

2024 INSC 396 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH K.P. KHEMKA AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before…

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

2024 INSC 395 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MRS. BHUMIKABEN N. MODI AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA — Respondent ( Before : A. S.…

Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 – Sections 7, 9 and 25 – Custody Dispute – The case revolves around a custody dispute over two minor children following the deterioration of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent – The High Court granted shared custody, which was challenged by the appellant – The primary issue is the guardianship and welfare of the children, considering their preferences and the capabilities of each parent – The appellant argued that the children have been residing with him for nine years and expressed a desire to continue doing so – The respondent argued that the appellant retained custody against various court orders and alleged ‘parental alienation syndrome’ – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order, and reinstated the Family Court’s decision granting custody to the appellant, subject to the respondent’s visitation rights – The court found no evidence of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ and recognized the support system provided by the Indian Armed Forces for the children’s welfare – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant should retain custody of the children, with the respondent granted visitation rights as per the Family Court’s order.

2024 INSC 397 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH COL. RAMNEESH PAL SINGH — Appellant Vs. SUGANDHI AGGARWAL — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.…

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 17(2)(viii) – Income Tax Rules, 1962 – Rule 3(7)(i) – The appeals involve challenges to the vires of Section 17(2)(viii) of the Income Tax Act and Rule 3(7)(i) of the Income Tax Rules, concerning the taxation of perquisites in the form of interest-free/concessional loans to bank employees – The primary issues are whether these provisions result in excessive delegation of legislative function to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) and if Rule 3(7)(i) is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by using the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate as a benchmark – The Court reasoned that the legislative policy and standards are sufficiently clear in the primary legislation, and the rule-making authority’s actions fall within the permissible parameters of delegation – The Court found that the provisions align with the common understanding of ‘perquisites’ and ‘fringe benefits’ and that the use of SBI’s rate promotes tax efficiency and certainty – The Supreme Court concluded that Section 17(2)(viii) and Rule 3(7)(i) are intra vires and do not lead to excessive delegation or violate constitutional principles – The judgment emphasizes the importance of clarity, consistency, and fairness in tax legislation.

2024 INSC 389 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ALL INDIA BANK OFFICERS’ CONFEDERATION — Appellant Vs. THE REGIONAL MANAGER, CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjiv…

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