Category: Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – Majority award – A dissenting opinion cannot be treated as an award if the majority award is set aside – When a majority award is challenged by the aggrieved party, the focus of the court and the aggrieved party is to point out the errors or illegalities in the majority award

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED — Appellant Vs. M/S NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA — Respondent ( Before : S. Ravindra Bhat and Aravind…

HELD the scope of jurisdiction of a court, under Section 30/33 of the Act, never extended beyond discerning if the award disclosed an “error apparent on the face of the award” which is an “error of law apparent on the face of the award and not an error of fact. The error of law can be discovered from the award itself or from a document actually incorporated therein

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S S.D. SHINDE TR. PARTNER — Appellant Vs. GOVT. OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta,…

Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 – Ss 34 & 37 – The scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction.[3] It is well-settled that courts ought not to interfere with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH KONKAN RAILWAY CORPORATION LIMITED — Appellant Vs. CHENAB BRIDGE PROJECT UNDERTAKING — Respondent ( Before : Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI., Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha…

Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 – Section 8 – Reference to Arbitration – Non-family shareholdings, in any event, cannot be bound by the terms of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) since they are not parties to the document – Order referring the suit to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 set aside – Appeal allowed.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH VINOD KUMAR SACHDEVA (DEAD) THR LRS. — Appellant Vs. ASHOK KUMAR SACHDEVA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.,…

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 11(6), 12 and 12(5) – Appointment of Sole Arbitrator – Arbitration clause which authorises the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, whose relationship with Union of India is that of an employee, to nominate an officer of the Ministry of Law and Justice to act as a Sole Arbitrator, clearly falls within the expressly ineligible category provided in Paragraph 1 of Schedule VII, read with Section 12(5) of the Act

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH M/S GLOCK ASIA-PACIFIC LTD. — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA — Respondent ( Before : Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI., Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and…

Bank guarantee encashed in 2016 requisite amount stood transferred to Government account that was the end of the matter – This “Breaking Point” should be treated as the date at which the cause of action arose – statutory time period cannot be defeated on the ground that the parties were negotiating

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S B AND T AG — Appellant Vs. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI. and J. B.…

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11(6) – It is the duty of the referral court to decide the said issue first conclusively to protect the parties from being forced to arbitrate when there does not exist any arbitration agreement and/or when there is no valid arbitration agreement at all.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MAGIC EYE DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. — Appellant Vs. M/S. GREEN EDGE INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS ETC. — Respondent ( Before : M.R. Shah…

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Temple Bye Laws — Oachira Parabrahma Temple — Ancient structure without a building or deity, governed by Bye-laws with three-tier elected committees — Appellants, elected Secretary and President, challenged two High Court orders (2020 and 2023) that removed their committee and appointed an unelected one under an Administrative Head, citing violations of the temple’s Bye-laws and customs —Legality of appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one contrary to the temple’s Bye-laws — Petitioner argues that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction and violated the temple’s governance structure by appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one without proper legal basis — The High Court’s actions were necessary for the efficient administration of the temple until a scheme could be framed and new elections held — The Supreme Court modified the High Court orders, appointing a new retired Judge as Administrative Head to conduct fair elections within four months, while directing all parties to cooperate — The Court emphasized the need to preserve temple properties and governance as per established customs and laws — The Supreme Court struck down the High Court’s order appointing an unelected committee, appointed a new Administrative Head to conduct elections, and directed all parties to cooperate, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the temple’s established governance structure and Bye-laws.