January 15, 2026 2:33 am

Criminal proceedings for rape based on promise to marry are quashed when relationship is consensual, allegations are improbable, and proceedings are an abuse of process.

Bysclaw

May 28, 2025

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 2(s) and 2(o) — Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 — Sections 2(f), 100, 101, 102 — Quashing of FIRs — Jurisdiction of Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Police Station post-bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh — High Court quashed Anti-Corruption Bureau FIRs on hyper-technical ground of lack of specific notification under Section 2(s) CrPC for the relocated ACB office (Vijayawada) after the State Reorganisation — Held: The High Court’s approach leads to a travesty of justice by nipping investigations in the bud on hyper-technical grounds — Pre-bifurcation Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 268 dated 12.09.2003) declaring ACB offices as Police Stations, coupled with the express provisions of the 2014 Act (Sections 100 and 102), ensures continuity of “law” (which includes notifications/orders) in the successor State of Andhra Pradesh without requiring fresh adoption or notification — Section 102 of the 2014 Act facilitates courts/authorities to construe the existing law to apply to the new State, even absent specific adoption — Subsequent clarificatory G.O.Ms. No. 137 (14.09.2022) merely restates the position and its non-retroactive application reasoning by High Court is untenable — Hyper-technical reasoning, ignoring the spirit of the law and the continuity mandated by the Reorganisation Act, cannot be sustained. (Paras 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Inherent power of High Court to quash criminal proceedings — Principles governing exercise of power — High Court must exercise power sparingly, cautiously, and avoid usurping function of trial court or conducting mini-trial — Only requirement is to examine whether uncontroverted allegations in FIR, taken at face value, disclose commission of any cognizable offence — Reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of evidence is not for summary determination under Section 482 CrPC; it is a matter for trial court — Where factual foundation for prosecution exists, criminal law cannot be short-circuited — Reference to Bhajan Lal case delineating categories for quashing (Paras 20-24, 30, 31).

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) Sections 302, 304 Part II, 147, 149 — Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder — Distinction between Murder (Section 302) and Culpable Homicide (Section 304) — Circumstances warranting conviction under Section 304 Part II — Initial conviction under Section 302/149 altered by High Court to Section 304 Part II, IPC — Incident arising from sudden quarrel and group fight (free fight) where two rival parties attacked each other — Both sides suffered injuries — Common object for forming an unlawful assembly (Section 149) not established in a free fight scenario, negating charges under Sections 147, 148, and 149 IPC — Individual role of appellant assessed: causing fatal head injury with a lathi — In a sudden group clash without premeditation, where the appellant also suffered serious injuries, the intention to cause death (requisite for Section 302) is negated, but knowledge that the act (hitting vulnerable part like head with lathi) was likely to cause death is inferred (Section 304 Part II) — Offence rightly reduced to Section 304 Part II, IPC. (Paras 5.1.4, 5.1.5, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw

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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw