December 19, 2024 9:37 am

Insolvency process – Limitation – Burden of prima facie proving occurrence of the default and that the application filed under Section 7 of the Code is within the period of limitation, is entirely on the financial creditor

Bysclaw

Aug 21, 2022

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Liability of a corporate debtor and its subsidiary — The court emphasized that a holding company and its subsidiary are distinct legal entities, and the assets of a subsidiary cannot be included in the resolution plan of the holding company. Separate applications under Section 7 — The court held that a financial creditor can file separate applications under Section 7 of the IBC against the corporate debtor and the corporate guarantor, which can be filed simultaneously. The court clarified that the payment made by the corporate guarantor under a resolution plan does not discharge the liability of the corporate debtor to repay the loan amount.

Jul 27, 2024 sclaw

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 37 Rule 3(6)(b) — Suit for Recovery — Impact of Moratorium under IBC — The appellants argued that the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) should halt the proceedings — However, the High Court rejected this argument, stating that the moratorium only applies to cases where the company is undergoing insolvency proceedings — In this case, the suit was not against a company undergoing insolvency, and therefore, the moratorium did not apply.

Jul 4, 2024 sclaw

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(7) – “financial creditor” – The appeals challenge judgments related to the status of certain creditors of M/s. Mount Shivalik Industries Limited under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – The primary issue is whether the respondents are financial creditors or operational creditors within the meaning of the IBC – The appellants argue that the respondents are operational creditors, as the agreements indicate services rendered to promote the corporate debtor’s products – The respondents contend that the agreements were a means to raise finance, making them financial creditors due to the interest-bearing security deposits – The Court upheld the NCLAT’s decision, recognizing the respondents as financial creditors based on the commercial effect of the transactions – The Court examined the true nature of the transactions and found that the arrangements had the commercial effect of borrowing, satisfying the criteria for financial debt under the IBC – The Court applied the definition of financial debt and operational debt from the IBC, emphasizing the disbursal against the consideration for the time value of money – The appeals were dismissed, confirming the respondents’ status as financial creditors and allowing the resolution process to continue accordingly – The Court’s detailed analysis affirmed the NCLAT’s interpretation of the IBC provisions.

Apr 28, 2024 sclaw

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Classification of Military casualties and the eligibility for Liberalised Family Pension — Battle Casualty —Illness Caused by Extreme Climatic Conditions as Battle Casualty — The Court establishes that a soldier’s death due to illness resulting from extreme climatic conditions while on duty near a sensitive border area (such as the Line of Control) can be categorized as a ‘Battle Casualty’ — This expands the interpretation of what constitutes a battle casualty under military regulations. – Liberalised Family Pension (LFP) — Application of Category E (f) — The judgment clarifies that deaths occurring in war-like situations, including those near international borders or lines of control due to environmental stresses, fall under clause (f) of category E of the relevant military order — This broadens the scope of eligibility for LFP under such circumstances.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Temple Bye Laws — Oachira Parabrahma Temple — Ancient structure without a building or deity, governed by Bye-laws with three-tier elected committees — Appellants, elected Secretary and President, challenged two High Court orders (2020 and 2023) that removed their committee and appointed an unelected one under an Administrative Head, citing violations of the temple’s Bye-laws and customs —Legality of appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one contrary to the temple’s Bye-laws — Petitioner argues that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction and violated the temple’s governance structure by appointing an unelected committee and removing the elected one without proper legal basis — The High Court’s actions were necessary for the efficient administration of the temple until a scheme could be framed and new elections held — The Supreme Court modified the High Court orders, appointing a new retired Judge as Administrative Head to conduct fair elections within four months, while directing all parties to cooperate — The Court emphasized the need to preserve temple properties and governance as per established customs and laws — The Supreme Court struck down the High Court’s order appointing an unelected committee, appointed a new Administrative Head to conduct elections, and directed all parties to cooperate, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the temple’s established governance structure and Bye-laws.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 364, 302 and 201 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant of murder charges as the prosecution failed to prove the crucial link of the accused’s disclosure leading to the discovery of skeletal remains under Section 27 and the DNA evidence was also found to be inconclusive due to lack of proper collection of samples. – Proof of Disclosure Statements under Section 27 — Voluntariness and Uninfluenced Nature — The Court reiterates that the information provided by an accused under Section 27 must be voluntary and uninfluenced by threat, duress, or coercion.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Arms Act, 1959 — Sections 25, 54 and 59 — Buttondar knife — Specific Intent Required — The court clarifies that mere possession of a knife covered by a notification like the DAD Notification is not sufficient to constitute an offense under the Arms Act — There must be specific intent to use it for the prohibited purposes such as “manufacture, sale, or possession for sale or test.” – The prosecution must clearly allege and prove the intent of the accused to use the weapon for the specified prohibited purposes — Absence of such allegation in the charge-sheet renders the proceedings defective.

Dec 8, 2024 sclaw