November 18, 2024 5:22 am

Specific Performance

Agreement to Sell—Limitation—Buyer cannot claim that the cause of action for filing the suit has not arisen on the date fixed in the contract on the ground that certain conditions in the contract have not been complied with

Bysclaw

Jun 2, 2019

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Specific Performance

Suit for Specific Performance — Agreement to sell — The respondent-plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land — The appellant-defendant allegedly failed to execute the sale deed despite receiving earnest money — Whether the agreement was valid and enforceable, and whether the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to specific performance or alternative relief —The appellant-defendant claimed the agreement was fraudulent, without consideration, and prepared through misrepresentation — The respondent-plaintiff argued that the agreement was genuine, and the appellant-defendant breached its terms by not executing the sale deed — The trial court, first appellate court, and high court ruled against the appellant-defendant, ordering the refund of earnest money with interest —The Supreme Court found the lower courts’ judgments perverse, noting inconsistencies and lack of evidence supporting the respondent-plaintiff’s claims —The Supreme Court emphasized the need for clear evidence and adherence to legal procedures, highlighting the suspicious nature of the agreement —The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts’ judgments, ruling in favor of the appellant-defendant and dismissing the respondent-plaintiff’s claims.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

Specific Performance

Date of Performance determines Limitation Period — The Court clarified that when a specific date for performance is fixed in a contract, the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance begins to run from that date, not from any later date mentioned in the agreement regarding its validity — This interpretation reinforces the principle that the statute of limitations is triggered by the failure to perform as agreed, not by the contract’s overall duration.Validity Clause does not Extend Limitation Period — The Court held that a clause in a contract extending its validity does not automatically extend the limitation period for enforcing the contract’s terms — This distinction is crucial for determining when legal action must be initiated to seek specific performance.

Aug 13, 2024 sclaw

Specific Performance

Agreement to sell – Suit for Specific performance – The appellant entered into a sale agreement with respondent 4, a Power of Attorney, for respondents 2 to 11 – The sale was to be completed by a certain date, which was extended multiple times – However, the land was sold to respondents 1 to 3, who were also Power of Attorney holders – The main issue was whether the sale agreement was valid and the appellant had the right to specific performance of the contract – The appellant argued that the agreement was valid, the earnest money was paid, and the suit was filed within the time limit – The respondents argued that not all co-owners signed the agreement, the appellant was not ready with the funds, and the suit was barred by limitation – The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, but the High Court set aside this decree, leading to the current appeal – The court found that not all co-owners signed the agreement, the Power of Attorney was not proved in the trial, and the appellant’s failure to appear as a witness was noted – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, dismissing the appeal and concluding that the appellant was not entitled to specific performance.

Jun 3, 2024 sclaw

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw