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Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on. State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected

Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — “Decree or order” — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of “civil death”, must be strictly construed — Expression “decree or order” must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a “court” in a “suit” — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge’s quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge’s direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent’s superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.

Drunken driving – Breath analyzer test or blood test is not mandatory for an insurer to deny an accident policy claim on the ground of drunken driving – Presence of alcohol in excess of 30 mg per 100 ml. of blood is not an indispensable requirement to enable an Insurer to successfully invoke the clause – What is required to be proved is driving by a person under the influence of the alcohol –

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED — Appellant Vs. PEARL BEVERAGES LIMITED — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit, Indira Banerjee and K.M.…

Conspiracy to Destabilize Judiciary – Phone call conspiracy against the High Court Chief Justice and a senior sitting Judge of the Supreme Court – Investigation- Authenticity and genuineness of the transcript having been admitted to the extent as contained in audio tape – Direction by the High Court calling for report from Justice R.V. Raveendran need not be allowed to continue – Order accordingly.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JUSTICE V. ESWARAIAH (RETD.) — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Ashok Bhushan and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ.…

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI) – Section 138 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 258 – Cheque Bouncing Cases – Power to Stop Proceedings – Section 258 of the Code is not applicable to complaints under Section 138 of the Act. B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI) – Section 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Expeditious Trial – Directions

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CONSTITUTION BENCH IN RE: EXPEDITIOUS TRIAL OF CASES UNDER SECTION 138 OF N.I. ACT 1881. ( Before : S.A. Bobde, CJI, Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai, A.S.…

A suit for specific performance cannot be dismissed on the sole ground of delay or laches – Escalation of prices cannot be the sole ground to deny specific performance -However, an exception to this rule is where an immovable property is to be sold within a certain period, time being of the essence, and it is not found that owing to some default on the part of the plaintiff, the sale could not take place within the stipulated time.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH A.R. MADANA GOPAL ETC.ETC. — Appellant Vs. M/S RAMNATH PUBLICATIONS PVT. LIMITED AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : L. Nageswara Rao and S.…

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 -Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding. Not satisfied that a case of conspiracy has been made out at this stage only on the ground that the Appellant met the members of the organization. Not agree with the prosecution that the amount is terror fund. At this stage, it cannot be said that the amount seized from the Appellant is proceeds from terrorist activity. There is no allegation that Appellant was receiving any money. On the other hand, the Appellant is accused of providing money to the members of organisation

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SUDESH KEDIA — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA — Respondent ( Before : L. Nageswara Rao and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

Tender Call Notice-A reading of Section 4 would show that the registration of an establishment under the Orissa Act is to categorise the establishment as a shop, commercial establishment, hotel, etc. and not for the purpose of issuing a labour licence which, in the context of the present Tender Call Notice, can only be a labour licence under the Contract Labour Act

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S UTKAL SUPPLIERS — Appellant Vs. M/S MAA KANAK DURGA ENTERPRISES AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Rohinton Fali Nariman and B.R. Gavai,…

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