Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies. Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application. Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench. Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants. Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 – Sections 7, 9 and 25 – Custody Dispute – The case revolves around a custody dispute over two minor children following the deterioration of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent – The High Court granted shared custody, which was challenged by the appellant – The primary issue is the guardianship and welfare of the children, considering their preferences and the capabilities of each parent – The appellant argued that the children have been residing with him for nine years and expressed a desire to continue doing so – The respondent argued that the appellant retained custody against various court orders and alleged ‘parental alienation syndrome’ – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order, and reinstated the Family Court’s decision granting custody to the appellant, subject to the respondent’s visitation rights – The court found no evidence of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ and recognized the support system provided by the Indian Armed Forces for the children’s welfare – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant should retain custody of the children, with the respondent granted visitation rights as per the Family Court’s order.
I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.
I P C
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.
Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.
Limitation
Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.
Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.
Limitation
Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.
Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.
Consumer
Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.
Compassionate Appointment

Appointment on compassionate grounds is not automatic, but subject to strict scrutiny of various parameters including the financial position of the family, the economic dependence of the family upon the deceased employee and the avocation of the other members of the family – Therefore, no one can claim to have a vested right for appointment on compassionate grounds – Application of the respondent for compassionate appointment shall stand dismissed.

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE SECRETARY TO GOVT. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (PRIMARY) AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. BHEEMESH ALIAS BHEEMAPPA — Respondent ( Before : Hemant Gupta and…

Civil Cases

Repayment of Borrowed Amount – A party who admits receipt of certain amount of money on a particular date and pleads discharge by way of a full and final settlement at a latter date, is the one on whom the onus lies -In a suit for recovery of money, a defendant admitting the receipt of money but pleading that the same was a gratuitous payment, is obliged to prove that it was a gratuitous payment – Respondents miserably failed to discharge the onus of proof so cast upon them. Hence, the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to a decree

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ANITA RANI V. ASHOK KUMAR AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. ANITA RANI — Respondent ( Before : Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ. )…

Land Acquisition

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Section 48(1) – Acquisition – Housing and development – Release of land – A notification under Section 48(1) does not warrant any notice or opportunity of hearing, to the original land owners – If at all any person will be aggrieved by the Notification under Section 48(1), it will be the beneficiary of the acquisition, which in this case is the Parishad, and not the land owners – Therefore, This Court can understand if the Parishad makes out a grievance that their rights were taken away by the notification under Section 48(1)

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH U.P. AVAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD THROUGH HOUSING COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. NOOR MOHAMMAD AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Hemant Gupta…

Civil Cases

Respondents have taken up wholly untenable ground that the documents were signed under duress – Large number of documents such as invoices, debit notes and ST-1 Form spread over 3 months is unbelievable to be an exercise of duress – Stand of the respondents is wholly untenable and unjustifiable in law and is only to defeat the legitimate claim raised by the appellant – Appeal allowed.

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S STAR PAPER MILLS LIMITED — Appellant Vs. M/S BEHARILAL MADANLAL JAIPURIA LIMITED AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Hemant Gupta and V.…

SARFAESI

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Non-Performing Asset – Recovery of loan by auction of mortgaged property – Appeal against order of high court granting benefit under the One Time Settlement (OTS) Scheme – No writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directing a financial institution/bank to positively grant the benefit of One Time Settlement (OTS) Scheme to a borrower

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE BIJNOR URBAN COOPERATIVE BANK LIMITED, BIJNOR AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. MEENAL AGARWAL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : M.R. Shah and…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – Setting aside of arbitral award – At the same time when an order is passed without recourse to arbitration and in utter disregard to the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34 of the Act will not apply.

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JHARKHAND URJA VIKAS NIGAM LIMITED — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee and R. Subhash…

Contempt

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 129 – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Contempt jurisdiction is always discretionary which should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection – This is not a fit case to exercise the said jurisdiction by punishing the respondents – However, it is always open for the petitioner to adopt appropriate proceedings for recovery of money as mentioned in the report in accordance with law – Contempt petitions disposed of in terms.

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE BORDEURI SAMAJ OF SRI SRI MAA KAMAKHYA — Appellant Vs. RIJU PRASAD SARMA AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Ajay Rastogi and…

Acquittal

(IPC) – Sections 302 and 34 – Arms Act, 1878 – Sections 25 and 4 – Murder – Death penalty – Acquittal – Prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt –A greater degree of care and caution would be required and a corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, would be necessary to pass an order of conviction – Criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy – Conviction and death sentence imposed on the accused is totally unsustainable in law – Accused persons acquitted.

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH JAIKAM KHAN — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH — Respondent ( Before : L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.…

Consumer

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 13(2) – Consumer Complaint – Limitation period – While entertaining Consumer Complaint, the NCDRC has condoned the delay of 100 days in filing a written statement – Appeal against – No case for interference is made in the order of the NCDRC allowing the application for condonation of delay on merits.

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH DIAMOND EXPORTS AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHER — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Surya…

I B C

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7 – Insolvency Resolution – A requirement only needs to be assessed at the threshold while admitting the petition. Hence, if subsequent to the admission, withdrawal applications are preferred and the 10 per cent threshold is reduced, it shall not affect the maintainability of the original petition.

Dec 19, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH E S KRISHNAMURTHY AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. M/S BHARATH HI TECH BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED — Respondent ( Before : Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud…

You missed

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw