Supreme Court of India Judgements

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State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Orrder 11 Rules 1(4) & 5 (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015, Sch.) — Additional documents, filing of — Standard of “reasonable cause” — Held, plaintiff obliged to file all documents in its possession along with plaint; leave to file additional documents within 30 days of institution of suit permissible only on establishing reasonable cause for non-disclosure and justification for subsequent discovery — Distinction between “reasonable cause” (applicable standard under Or. XI Rr. 1(4)/(5)) and “sufficient cause” reaffirmed, following Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B., (2021) 13 SCC 71 — However, even applying the lower threshold of “reasonable cause”, application for additional documents rightly rejected where documents were in appellant’s possession since inception of suit and no explanation furnished for delay of over five years — Commercial Courts Act, 2015
C P C State Laws

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
C P C State Laws
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
POCSO
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected
Rent
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —
Evidence Act
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —
Constitution

Foreigners Act, 1946 — Section 9 — Burden of proof — A person who is suspected of being a foreigner and whose case is referred to a Foreigners Tribunal (FT) under the Foreigners Act, 1946, must be given an opportunity to prove that they are not a foreigner — The burden of proof is initially on the state to establish a prima facie case that the person is a foreigner — If the state succeeds in doing so, the burden of proof shifts to the person to prove that they are an Indian citizen — The court must examine the evidence produced by both sides and make a determination based on a preponderance of evidence — If the state fails to establish a prima facie case, the person cannot be declared a foreigner — The court must also ensure that the person’s right to a fair trial is not violated and that they are not subjected to arbitrary detention or deportation -Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 (Referred).

Jul 13, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 511 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MD. RAHIM ALI @ ABDUR RAHIM — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF ASSAM AND OTHERS ( Before : Vikram Nath and…

C P C

Punjab Courts Act, 1918 – Section 41 – Second Appeals – Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Section 100 – The case revolves around the scope of Section 100 of the CPC and Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, specifically regarding the High Court’s power to re-appreciate evidence in second appeals – The petitioner argues that the High Court’s judgment was within its powers under Section 41 of the Punjab Act, and the Will in question was invalid due to suspicious circumstances – The respondent argues that the First Appellate Court’s findings were correct, the Will was genuine, and the High Court erred in its interference – The Supreme Court reviewed its previous judgment, acknowledging an error based on the legal position in Pankajakshi (Dead) Through Legal Representatives & Ors. v. Chandrika & Ors, (2016) 6 SCC 157, and decided to hear the Civil Appeal afresh on merits – The Supreme Court allowed the review petition, recalled its previous judgment, and decided the Civil Appeal on its merits, ultimately dismissing the appeal and upholding the trial court’s judgment.

Jul 5, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 429 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH LEHNA SINGH (D) BY LRS. — Appellant Vs. GURNAM SINGH (D) BY LRS. AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Vikram…

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 32(2)(c) – Termination of proceedings – The dispute revolves around the legality and validity of the termination of arbitral proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) of the Act, 1996, involving a development agreement and a memorandum of understanding between Appellants and Respondent – The Appellant argued that the Respondent abandoned the claim by not taking steps for eight years and failing to attend meetings, justifying the termination – The Respondent argued that there was no abandonment and the proceedings could not be terminated without a positive finding that continuation was unnecessary or impossible – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that abandonment must be established and cannot be readily inferred – The court emphasized that the power under Section 32(2)(c) should only be exercised when proceedings have become unnecessary or impossible, not casually – The Court concluded that the Arbitral Tribunal committed illegality in terminating the proceedings, and the parties were directed to appoint a substituted arbitrator in accordance with the law – The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Jul 5, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 433 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DANI WOOLTEX CORPORATION AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. SHEIL PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S.…

Prevention of Money Laundering

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Sections 4, 19 and 44 (1)(b) – The appellant, accused of complaints under Section 44(1)(b) of the Act, was denied anticipatory bail – They were not arrested post-ECIR registration until the Special Court took cognizance under the PMLA – The appellants argue that the power to arrest should not be exercised post-cognizance, and if an accused appears after summons, there’s no reason for arrest or custody – They also contend that provisions of the CrPC apply to proceedings before the Special Court – The respondent asserts that once an accused appears before the Special Court, they are deemed in its custody and must apply for bail under Section 439 of the CrPC – The Court granted leave to appeal and protected the appellants from arrest through interim orders – The Court examined the applicability of CrPC provisions to PMLA proceedings and the discretion of the Special Court in issuing summons or warrants – The Court concluded that the issuance of summons is to secure the accused’s presence, not custody – If the accused defies the summons, a bailable warrant may be issued.

Jul 5, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 434 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH TARSEM LAL — Appellant Vs. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT JALANDHAR ZONAL OFFICE — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal…

Land Acquisition

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — Section 24(2) — Interpretation of — The court clarified that for land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act), to lapse under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, both conditions of non-payment of compensation and non-taking of possession must be fulfilled.

Jul 5, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 456 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY — Appellant Vs. TEJPAL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan,…

Bail Declined

Criminal Law – Double Murder – The case involves multiple criminal appeals against bail granted by the Allahabad High Court to accused in a double murder – The main issue is whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to the accused considering the seriousness of the offence and the stage of the trial -The appellant-complainant argued that the accused have a history of criminal activity, were the aggressors in the incident, and there is a risk of them tampering with witnesses – The accused-respondents assured they would not abscond and would cooperate with the trial, highlighting their permanent residence in the village – The Supreme Court quashed the bail orders, directing the accused to surrender, and emphasized that the observations made are not an opinion on the merits of the matter – The Court found that the High Court did not adequately consider the seriousness of the offense, the role of the accused, and their criminal antecedents – The Supreme Court applied established legal principles for bail consideration, focusing on the nature of the accusation, the gravity of the offense, and the likelihood of influencing the trial – The Supreme Court concluded that the respondents do not deserve bail and set aside the High Court’s orders, with a provision for the accused to apply for bail under new circumstances at a later stage.

Jul 5, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 438 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH AJWAR AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. WASEEM AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. )…

SC/ST

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 4(2) – The Olympic Riding and Equestrian Academy (OREA) is facing disputes over allegations of caste-based discrimination and other complaints filed against trainees and administrators – The main issue is whether the complaints filed under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, were substantiated and whether FIRs should be registered – The appellants argued that the complaints were not made in public view and lacked specific details, thus not constituting offenses under the Act of 1989 – The respondent claimed that the complaints were ignored by the police and not investigated as mandated by the Act of 1989 – The Supreme Court allowed the criminal appeal, upholding the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order that dismissed the application for FIR registration under the Act of 1989 – The court found the allegations vague, did not specify the offenses, and were not made in public view – The impugned judgment of the High Court directing the registration of an FIR was set aside

Jul 4, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 437 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH PRITI AGARWALLA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF GNCT OF DELHI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : M.…

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 120(b), 153(A) and 153(AA) – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38 and 39 – The case involves the Popular Front of India (PFI), an extremist Islamic organization accused of spreading extremist ideology, committing terrorist acts, raising funds for terrorism, and recruiting members in Tamil Nadu – The central issue is whether the respondents, accused of serious offenses under the IPC and UAPA, should be granted bail – The Union of India, represented by NIA, argues that the High Court failed to appreciate the gravity of the offenses and the prima facie evidence against the respondents – The defence contends that the allegations are vague and the evidence, particularly the statements of protected witnesses, is unreliable – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, emphasizing the seriousness of the offenses and the sufficiency of prima facie evidence – The Court found that the High Court did not properly consider the material evidence and recorded perverse findings regarding the involvement of the respondents in the alleged offences – The Court relied on the provisions of the UAPA and past judgments to establish the standards for granting bail in cases involving terrorism – The Supreme Court concluded that the respondents should not be released on bail, given the reasonable grounds to believe the accusations against them are prima facie true and the potential threat to national security.

Jul 4, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 452 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA — Appellant Vs. BARAKATHULLAH ETC. — Respondent ( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal, JJ. )…

Accident

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Enhancement of compensation – Indigent person – Appellant, an indigent person, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and filed a claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) for Rs. 10 lakhs – The MACT awarded her Rs. 2,41,745 with 9% interest from the date of the claim petition till realization – The appellant then filed an appeal before the High Court of Gujarat seeking enhanced compensation – The High Court dismissed the appeal and denied the appellant permission to file the appeal as an indigent person, stating that she had received compensation by the MACT and was therefore not indigent – The appellant argued that she was still indigent despite receiving compensation from the MACT, as she had not yet received the awarded amount – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment – The court held that the appellant was still indigent despite receiving compensation from the MACT, as she had not yet received the awarded amount – The court granted the appellant liberty to appeal as an indigent person and requested the High Court to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment – The court relied on previous judgments to define the concept of an ‘indigent person’ and applied the principle that lack of monetary capability should not preclude a person from seeking justice – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and granted the appellant liberty to appeal as an indigent person.

Jul 4, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 457 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ALIFIYA HUSENBHAI KESHARIYA — Appellant Vs. SIDDIQ ISMAIL SINDHI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : J.K. Maheshwari and Sanjay Karol,…

Bail Declined

Bail — The Supreme Court has disposed of two petitions filed by Manish Sisodia, challenging an order passed by the High Court of Delhi in Bail Application Nos. 1557 and 1559 of 2024 — The court has granted liberty to Sisodia to move a fresh application for bail in case of change in circumstances or if the trial is protracted and proceeds at a snail’s pace in the next three months — The court has clarified that the observations made in the judgment are only for the disposal of the present appeals and will not influence the trial court on the merits of the case, which will proceed in accordance with law and be decided on the basis of the evidence led — The court has also noted that all disputed factual and legal issues are left open — The Solicitor General has assured that the investigation will be concluded and the final complaint/charge sheet will be filed expeditiously, and at any rate on or before 03.07.2024, after which the trial court will be free to proceed with the trial.

Jul 4, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA VACATION BENCH MANISH SISODIA — Appellant Vs. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT — Respondent ( Before : Aravind Kumar and Sandeep Mehta, JJ. ) Petition(s) for Special Leave…

You missed

C P C State Laws

State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
POCSO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
Rent

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw
Evidence Act

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw