Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Category: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Cr P C Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code SVT., 1989 – Sections 306 and 411 – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 39 – The case involves charges against respondents for attempting to ambush a CRPF convoy with explosives – The Special Judge, NIA, took cognizance for some offences but not others due to procedural issues – The appeal challenges the High Court’s judgment on the cognizance of charges under various sections of the RPC, 1989, and UAPA, 1967, particularly focusing on the applicability of Section 196-A of JK CrPC, 1989 – The National Investigation Agency argues that post the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, the CrPC, 1973 should apply, and the need for authorization under CrPC, 1989 is not required – The respondents argue that the complaint was conveyed when CrPC, 1989 was in force, and non-compliance recorded by the court should be upheld – The Supreme Court allows the appeal in part, allowing the appellant to seek appropriate authorization under CrPC, 1989, and directing the trial court to take cognizance if the appellant complies with the required authorization under CrPC, 1989.

Jun 3, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 447 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY NEW DELHI — Appellant Vs. OWAIS AMIN @ CHERRY AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : M. M.…

I P C Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 120(b), 153(A) and 153(AA) – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38 and 39 – The case involves the Popular Front of India (PFI), an extremist Islamic organization accused of spreading extremist ideology, committing terrorist acts, raising funds for terrorism, and recruiting members in Tamil Nadu – The central issue is whether the respondents, accused of serious offenses under the IPC and UAPA, should be granted bail – The Union of India, represented by NIA, argues that the High Court failed to appreciate the gravity of the offenses and the prima facie evidence against the respondents – The defence contends that the allegations are vague and the evidence, particularly the statements of protected witnesses, is unreliable – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, emphasizing the seriousness of the offenses and the sufficiency of prima facie evidence – The Court found that the High Court did not properly consider the material evidence and recorded perverse findings regarding the involvement of the respondents in the alleged offences – The Court relied on the provisions of the UAPA and past judgments to establish the standards for granting bail in cases involving terrorism – The Supreme Court concluded that the respondents should not be released on bail, given the reasonable grounds to believe the accusations against them are prima facie true and the potential threat to national security.

Jun 2, 2024 sclaw

(2024) INSC 452 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA — Appellant Vs. BARAKATHULLAH ETC. — Respondent ( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal, JJ. )…

I P C Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 120(b), 153(A) and 153(AA) – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38 and 39 – The case involves the Popular Front of India (PFI), an extremist Islamic organization accused of spreading extremist ideology, committing terrorist acts, raising funds for terrorism, and recruiting members in Tamil Nadu – The central issue is whether the respondents, accused of serious offenses under the IPC and UAPA, should be granted bail – The Union of India, represented by NIA, argues that the High Court failed to appreciate the gravity of the offenses and the prima facie evidence against the respondents – The defence contends that the allegations are vague and the evidence, particularly the statements of protected witnesses, is unreliable – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, emphasizing the seriousness of the offenses and the sufficiency of prima facie evidence – The Court found that the High Court did not properly consider the material evidence and recorded perverse findings regarding the involvement of the respondents in the alleged offences – The Court relied on the provisions of the UAPA and past judgments to establish the standards for granting bail in cases involving terrorism – The Supreme Court concluded that the respondents should not be released on bail, given the reasonable grounds to believe the accusations against them are prima facie true and the potential threat to national security.

May 27, 2024 sclaw

2024 INSC 452 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA — Appellant Vs. BARAKATHULLAH ETC. — Respondent ( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal, JJ. )…

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Corporate Mining

Bird and Company Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking and Other Properties) Act, 1980 – Sections 3 and 7 – Renewal of mining leases granted to Bird and Company Limited, which were later vested in Bharat Process & Mechanical Engineers Limited (BPMEL) after nationalization. BPMEL, in liquidation, and its subsidiary OMDC are central to the case – The dispute revolves around the renewal of three expired mining leases: Kolha-Roida, Thakurani, and Dalki – TGP Equity Management Private Limited, an assignee of UCO Bank’s claims against BPMEL, seeks renewal or transfer of these leases – The Government of Odisha and the Union of India argue against renewal, citing BPMEL’s non-operation and financial constraints – The Supreme Court dismissed TGP’s appeals and upheld the State of Odisha’s order, rejecting the renewal of the Kolha-Roida lease – The Thakurani and Dalki leases are also rejected, citing the impracticality of renewing leases for a defunct company and the lack of a viable mining operation plan – The dispute should be resolved, with dues settled under the Companies Act, 1956.

Jun 10, 2024 sclaw
Electricity Act

Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013 – Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 – Sections 3 and 4 – Electricity Act – Section 14(b) – Whether a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) developer, deemed to be a distribution licensee under the Electricity Act, is required to make an application for a distribution license and comply with the conditions set out in the Electricity Rules and Regulations. – The appeal challenges the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity’s decision to require an appellant to infuse additional capital as a condition for being identified as a deemed distribution licensee – The court questioned whether a SEZ developer is ipso facto a deemed distribution licensee, obviating the need for an application under section 14 of the Electricity Act – The appellant argued that they are automatically a deemed distribution licensee by virtue of the 2010 Notification and that the conditions imposed by TSERC were in excess of jurisdiction – The respondents argued that the appellant must comply with the 2005 and 2013 Regulations and that TSERC is empowered to impose conditions to assess credit-worthiness – The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, setting aside the condition of additional capital infusion imposed by TSERC – The court reasoned that the appellant must apply to be recognized as a deemed licensee but is not subject to the additional capital requirements of regulation 12 and rule 3(2) – The court concluded that the appellant is required to make an application as per the 2013 Regulations, and the condition to infuse additional capital is not justified.

Jun 10, 2024 sclaw
Bail Granted

BAIL GRANTED NDPS – PROLONGED INCARCERATION – It is to observe that failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates against the precious fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act may, in such circumstances, be considered.

Jun 9, 2024 sclaw
Corporate

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Sections 75(1)(g) and 90- The Supreme Court ruled that Nagar Nigam’s workshop was a ‘factory’ under the Act of 1948, and that it was engaged in a manufacturing process with over 20 workers – The Corporation argued that the workshop was a ‘factory’ and should pay contributions under the Act – Nagar Nigam argued that their workshop was not a ‘factory’ and their employees were not engaged in a manufacturing process – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court’s order, and clarified that Nagar Nigam could seek exemption under Section 90 of the Act of 1948 – The Court relied on precedents and statutory provisions of the Act of 1948 to determine that the workshop was a ‘factory’ and subject to the Act’s provisions – The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in its judgment and Nagar Nigam should have approached the Insurance Court instead of invoking writ jurisdiction.

Jun 4, 2024 sclaw