Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Category: I P C

Anticipatory Bail I P C

Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999 – Sections 3 and 4 – Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 341, 323, 354, 354 (B), 379, 504, 506 and 149 – – The respondent opposes anticipatory bail, asserting that the petitioner’s involvement is established – They contend that the seriousness of the charges warrants denial of bail – The court acknowledges that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy – It emphasizes that such relief should be granted sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances – The court considers the petitioner’s status as an absconder and weighs the evidence against them – After thorough consideration, the court rules on the anticipatory bail application – Appeal Dismissed.

Mar 23, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SRIKANT UPADHYAY AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ. )…

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 376(2)(n) and 506 – Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the FIR, holding that the complainant was a mature and intelligent woman who consented to the relations with the appellant during the subsistence of her earlier marriage – The Court also relied on a similar case, Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), where the accused was not held guilty of rape on false promise of marriage.

Mar 9, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH XXXX — Appellant Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

Acquittal I P C SC/ST

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 306 – Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 3(2)(v) – Abetment of suicide – Necessary ingredients – This court ruled that the charge under the SC/ST Act was unwarranted because the prosecution did not allege that the offence under the IPC was committed based on the deceased’s caste – The court also found that the allegations in the suicide note were not sufficient to establish abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the IPC – Appeal Allowed.

Mar 8, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH PRABHAT KUMAR MISHRA @ PRABHAT MISHRA — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF U.P. AND OTHER — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai and Sandeep…

Food Safety and Standards Act I P C

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSSA) – Sections 3(zz), 59 and 89 – Penal Code, 1860(IPC) – FSSA is a comprehensive and exhaustive legislation on all aspects of food and food safety, and that Section 89 of the FSSA gives an overriding effect to its provisions over any other law, including the IPC, in so far as the law applies to the aspects of food covered by the FSSA

Mar 3, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH RAM NATH — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S. Oka and Sanjay Karol, JJ.…

I P C

High court had not applied the correct standard of proof for invoking Section 319 CrPC, which requires more than a prima facie case but short of evidence that would lead to conviction – The supreme court also noted that the allegations against the appellants were vague and omnibus and that the trial court order was well reasoned and not perverse.

Feb 25, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH N. MANOGAR AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma,…

Cr P C I P C

Forging a power of attorney and a sale deed – High Court erred in assuming that there was no criminality involved in the alleged offences and that the matter was purely civil in nature – The Supreme Court also clarifies that the Sub-Registrar had the authority to initiate prosecution under the Registration Act, 1908, and that the quashing of the circular on which the Sub-Registrar relied did not affect the merits of the case.

Feb 25, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NAVIN KUMAR RAI — Appellant Vs. SURENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai and Sanjay Karol, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal…

I P C

Respondent appears to have been hurt in view of the statements made by the petitioner generally about Gujarati people – Now, after the petitioner has explained the context in which he made the statements and after withdrawal of those statements, in the facts of the case, it is unjust to continue the prosecution – No purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution – Defamation complaint quashed – Appeal

Feb 25, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH TEJASHWI PRASAD YADAV — Appellant Vs. HARESHBHAI PRANSHANKAR MEHTA — Respondent ( Before : Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. ) Transfer Petition…

I P C

Deposition would reveal that after the other accused assaulted the deceased with sword, A-3 came thereafter and assaulted the deceased with stone lying there – Prosecution has not been in a position to establish that A-3 shared the common intention with the other accused to cause the murder of the deceased – Appeal of A-3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC.

Feb 18, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH VELTHEPU SRINIVAS AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (NOW STATE OF TELANGANA) AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : B.R. Gavai…

I P C

Rape with a 7 year old girl in temple – Petitioner-convict was aged 40 years on the date of occurrence and he took the victim to a temple, unmindful of the holiness of the place disrobed her and himself and then committed the crime – in terms of the provisions under Section 376 AB, IPC when a sentence of imprisonment for a term not less than 20 years which may extend upto life imprisonment is imposed, the convict is also liable to suffer a sentence of fine which shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim – Conviction under Section 376 AB, IPC was upheld with the sentence modified to 30 years of rigorous imprisonment – Petition partly allowed.

Feb 18, 2024 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BHAGGI @ BHAGIRATH @ NARAN — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH — Respondent ( Before : C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.…

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I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw