Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Category: Cr P C

Cr P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 420, 468 and 471 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 156, 160, 167(2), 173, 173(2), 173(2)(i), 173(8), 227, 228 and 319 – Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo moto pass an order for further investigation/reinvestigation after he discharges the accused.

Apr 17, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BIKASH RANJAN ROUT — Appellant Vs. STATE THROUGH THE SECRETARY (HOME), GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI, NEW DELHI — Respondent ( Before : L.…

Cr P C

Criminal Law–Murder–Suspension of sentence pending appeal– The mere fact that during the period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail–What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail

Apr 14, 2019 sclaw

2009(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 636 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly Criminal Appeal No. of 2009…

Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 386 – Power of the Appellate Court – Section 386 then enumerates powers of the Appellate Court which inter alia includes the power to “reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial”. The powers of Appellate Court are equally wide. The High Court in the present case was exercising powers both under Chapters XXVIII and XXIX of the Code. If the power can go to the extent of ordering a complete re-trial, the exercise of power to a lesser extent namely ordering de novo examination of twelve witnesses with further directions as the High Court has imposed in the present matter, was certainly within the powers of the High Court. There is, thus, no infraction or jurisdictional error on the part of the High Court.

Apr 14, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ATMA RAM AND OTHER — Appellant Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ. ) Criminal…

Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S.439–Bail–Cancellation of–Cheating–FIR against builders for not fulfilling their obligations under agreement to sell entered by them with various prospective buyers–Trial Court cancelling bail order of Respondent No.2 who was a proclaimed offender-High Court set aside the order and restored interim bail granted by Trial Court without assigning any reasons and even without issuing notice to complainants—Impugned order of High Court set aside—Respondent No.2 directed to surrender before Session Judge.

Apr 7, 2019 sclaw

2019(1) Law Herald (SC) 790 : 2019 LawHerald.Org 620 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar Crl A. No.…

Cr P C

High Court dismissed the revision by observing that even though Session Court and High Court have concurrent revisionary jurisdiction but there was no special circumstance to bypass the forum of Session Judge—Appeal against this order—Held; keeping in view the matter is already pending for 16 years impugned order of High Court set aside-High Court to hear the revision on merits-Question of law left open

Mar 23, 2019 sclaw

2019(1) Law Herald (SC) 637 : 2019 LawHerald.Org 614 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana Criminal Appeal No.…

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Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 5, 34, and 37 — Scope of Judicial Intervention — Minimum intervention of judicial authority in domestic arbitration matters is required under Section 5 — Challenge to an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds, including patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India — Scope of interference by the Appellate Court under Section 37 is akin to and cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 — Appellate Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or re-interpret contractual clauses if the interpretation by the Arbitral Tribunal was a plausible view and upheld under Section 34 — Setting aside an arbitral award under Section 37, which was upheld under Section 34, based on providing a different interpretation of contractual clauses is unsustainable in law. (Paras 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 50, 51)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54 — Suit for specific performance — Commencement of limitation period — Where the defendant subsequently executed an affidavit ratifying the agreement to sell and conveying no-objection to the transfer, the period of limitation commences from the date of the admitted affidavit, as this is the stage at which the executant finally refused to execute the sale deed to the extent of her share — Trial court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation calculated from an earlier disputed date. (Paras 13, 35, 36, 37)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9(2) read with Rule 9(4) of 2001 Rules — Setting aside High Court judgment — High Court erroneously treated the date of filing of the Section 11 petition (28.06.2024) as the commencement date, leading to the conclusion that proceedings commenced beyond the statutory period — Where the arbitration notice was served (on 11.04.2024) well within the 90-day period from the ad-interim injunction order (17.02.2024), proceedings commenced in time as per Section 21 — High Court’s finding unsustainable, resulting in the restoration of the Trial Court’s initial ad-interim injunction order. (Paras 28, 31, 32) E. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Interim injunction — Dispute regarding existence

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw
Corporate

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Definition of “motor vehicle” — Components — Definition has two parts: an inclusive part (mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads) and an exclusive part — The second part expressly excludes “a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises” — Although Dumpers, Loaders, etc., may fall under the first part of the definition, they are excluded if their nature of use is confined to factory or enclosed premises, being special type vehicles/Construction Equipment Vehicles. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Jan 11, 2026 sclaw