November 22, 2024 12:57 am

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 120(b), 153(A) and 153(AA) – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38 and 39 – The case involves the Popular Front of India (PFI), an extremist Islamic organization accused of spreading extremist ideology, committing terrorist acts, raising funds for terrorism, and recruiting members in Tamil Nadu – The central issue is whether the respondents, accused of serious offenses under the IPC and UAPA, should be granted bail – The Union of India, represented by NIA, argues that the High Court failed to appreciate the gravity of the offenses and the prima facie evidence against the respondents – The defence contends that the allegations are vague and the evidence, particularly the statements of protected witnesses, is unreliable – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, emphasizing the seriousness of the offenses and the sufficiency of prima facie evidence – The Court found that the High Court did not properly consider the material evidence and recorded perverse findings regarding the involvement of the respondents in the alleged offences – The Court relied on the provisions of the UAPA and past judgments to establish the standards for granting bail in cases involving terrorism – The Supreme Court concluded that the respondents should not be released on bail, given the reasonable grounds to believe the accusations against them are prima facie true and the potential threat to national security.

Bysclaw

Jul 4, 2024

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings under Section 482 in Cases with Predominantly Civil Character — The court reiterated the principle that criminal cases with overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions, matrimonial relationships, or family disputes, should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves — This principle is applied in the present case, where the dispute involved a loan transaction between the accused persons and the bank, and the parties had settled the matter through the One Time Settlement (OTS).

Oct 9, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Passports Act, 1967 — Section 12(2) — The appellant was convicted for abetting the issuance of a second passport to a person already possessing a passport — The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and acquitted appellant due to insufficient evidence proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt — Conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires each circumstance to be proven beyond reasonable doubt and the circumstances taken together should lead to an irresistible inference of guilt — Under Section 12(2), the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the accused knowingly furnished false information or suppressed material information with the intent to secure a passport or travel document — The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, and acquitted appellant of the offences alleged against her.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302 and 304 Part I — Murder — Alteration of Sentence — The main issue was whether the appellants’ conviction under Section 302 IPC was justified or if it should be altered to a lesser offense — The appellants argued that there was a delay in lodging the FIR, contradictions in witness testimonies, and that the injuries sustained by the appellants were not explained by the prosecution —The respondent-State maintained that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and that the conviction and sentence were justified —The Supreme Court altered the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Part-I of Section 304 IPC, sentencing the appellants to the period already undergone —The Court found that the incident occurred in a sudden fight without premeditation and that the prosecution failed to explain the injuries sustained by the appellants —The Court concluded that the case fell under Part-I of Section 304 IPC due to the lack of premeditation and the sudden nature of the fight —The appeals were partly allowed, and the appellants were ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Sep 29, 2024 sclaw

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw