Month: June 2024

Bird and Company Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking and Other Properties) Act, 1980 – Sections 3 and 7 – Renewal of mining leases granted to Bird and Company Limited, which were later vested in Bharat Process & Mechanical Engineers Limited (BPMEL) after nationalization. BPMEL, in liquidation, and its subsidiary OMDC are central to the case – The dispute revolves around the renewal of three expired mining leases: Kolha-Roida, Thakurani, and Dalki – TGP Equity Management Private Limited, an assignee of UCO Bank’s claims against BPMEL, seeks renewal or transfer of these leases – The Government of Odisha and the Union of India argue against renewal, citing BPMEL’s non-operation and financial constraints – The Supreme Court dismissed TGP’s appeals and upheld the State of Odisha’s order, rejecting the renewal of the Kolha-Roida lease – The Thakurani and Dalki leases are also rejected, citing the impracticality of renewing leases for a defunct company and the lack of a viable mining operation plan – The dispute should be resolved, with dues settled under the Companies Act, 1956.

(2024) INSC 440 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH CHIEF SECRETARY GOVERNMENT OF ODISHA — Appellant Vs. BHARAT PROCESS AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) AND OTHERS — Respondent (…

Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013 – Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 – Sections 3 and 4 – Electricity Act – Section 14(b) – Whether a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) developer, deemed to be a distribution licensee under the Electricity Act, is required to make an application for a distribution license and comply with the conditions set out in the Electricity Rules and Regulations. – The appeal challenges the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity’s decision to require an appellant to infuse additional capital as a condition for being identified as a deemed distribution licensee – The court questioned whether a SEZ developer is ipso facto a deemed distribution licensee, obviating the need for an application under section 14 of the Electricity Act – The appellant argued that they are automatically a deemed distribution licensee by virtue of the 2010 Notification and that the conditions imposed by TSERC were in excess of jurisdiction – The respondents argued that the appellant must comply with the 2005 and 2013 Regulations and that TSERC is empowered to impose conditions to assess credit-worthiness – The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, setting aside the condition of additional capital infusion imposed by TSERC – The court reasoned that the appellant must apply to be recognized as a deemed licensee but is not subject to the additional capital requirements of regulation 12 and rule 3(2) – The court concluded that the appellant is required to make an application as per the 2013 Regulations, and the condition to infuse additional capital is not justified.

(2024) INSC 439 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH M/S SUNDEW PROPERTIES LIMITED — Appellant Vs. TELANGANA STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Sanjiv Khanna…

BAIL GRANTED NDPS – PROLONGED INCARCERATION – It is to observe that failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates against the precious fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act may, in such circumstances, be considered.

It is to observe that failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates against the precious fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the…

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Sections 75(1)(g) and 90- The Supreme Court ruled that Nagar Nigam’s workshop was a ‘factory’ under the Act of 1948, and that it was engaged in a manufacturing process with over 20 workers – The Corporation argued that the workshop was a ‘factory’ and should pay contributions under the Act – Nagar Nigam argued that their workshop was not a ‘factory’ and their employees were not engaged in a manufacturing process – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court’s order, and clarified that Nagar Nigam could seek exemption under Section 90 of the Act of 1948 – The Court relied on precedents and statutory provisions of the Act of 1948 to determine that the workshop was a ‘factory’ and subject to the Act’s provisions – The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in its judgment and Nagar Nigam should have approached the Insurance Court instead of invoking writ jurisdiction.

(2024) INSC 441 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH THE EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION LTD. — Appellant Vs. NAGAR NIGAM ALLAHABAD AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala…

Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 62(3) and 111 – Levy of reliability charge – Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. imposed a reliability charge for uninterrupted power supply, which was challenged by JSW Steel Ltd – The appellant argued that non-participation in the public hearing by JSW Steel Ltd. amounted to consent to pay the charge – JSW Steel Ltd. argued that they were already paying a higher tariff and should not be subjected to the charge – The Tribunal set aside the Commission’s order imposing the charge, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal – The Court found no statutory basis for the charge and noted that JSW Steel Ltd. had already paid a higher tariff for continuous supply – The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to impose a reliability charge on customers like JSW Steel Ltd. and found no merit in the appeal.

(2024) INSC 442 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION CO. LTD. — Appellant Vs. M/S JSW STEEL LTD. AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Abhay…

Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Sections Section 47(c)(1) and 47(c)(5) and 48 – Bombay Stamp Rules, 1939 – Rules 21 and 22A – Refund of stamp duty paid for an un-executed conveyance deed – The High Court upheld the respondents’ decision, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order and orders of the respondents – The court held that the case of the appellant was fit for refund of the stamp duty paid, as the appellant was a bonafide purchaser who had paid the stamp duty in good faith but was a victim of fraud played by the vendor – The court also referred to the judgment in Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech Private Limited & Ors., which stated that when the State deals with a citizen, it should not rely on technicalities, and the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under any law may bar the remedy but not the right.

(2024) INSC 443 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH BANO SAIYED PARWAZ — Appellant Vs. CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY AND INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND CONTROLLER OF STAMPS AND OTHERS…

Agreement to sell – Suit for Specific performance – The appellant entered into a sale agreement with respondent 4, a Power of Attorney, for respondents 2 to 11 – The sale was to be completed by a certain date, which was extended multiple times – However, the land was sold to respondents 1 to 3, who were also Power of Attorney holders – The main issue was whether the sale agreement was valid and the appellant had the right to specific performance of the contract – The appellant argued that the agreement was valid, the earnest money was paid, and the suit was filed within the time limit – The respondents argued that not all co-owners signed the agreement, the appellant was not ready with the funds, and the suit was barred by limitation – The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, but the High Court set aside this decree, leading to the current appeal – The court found that not all co-owners signed the agreement, the Power of Attorney was not proved in the trial, and the appellant’s failure to appear as a witness was noted – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, dismissing the appeal and concluding that the appellant was not entitled to specific performance.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH RAJESH KUMAR — Appellant Vs. ANAND KUMAR AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Pankaj Mithal and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981- Dispute over the permanent status of certain workmen – The Court considered whether the Act, 1981 applies to the parties and if the suggestion to institute an ‘Industrial Disputes Claim’ was sustainable – The Corporation argued that the Act and the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 do not apply to them, and that certain activities, like construction, exempt them from the Act – The Union argued that the Corporation has exploited temporary employees for years and that the Inspector of Labour’s order granting permanent status should not be questioned – The Corporation’s appeal was dismissed, and the Union’s appeal was allowed – The Court found the Corporation an industrial establishment, and the employees had uninterrupted service qualifying them for permanent status – The Court analyzed the Act’s definitions, the Corporation’s activities, and previous orders and judgments – The Court concluded that the Act applies to the dispute, and the Inspector of Labour’s findings should not have been disturbed.

(2024) INSC 446 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH TAMIL NADU MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION LIMITED — Appellant Vs. TAMIL NADU MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION EMPLOYEES WELFARE UNION AND ANOTHER — Respondent…

Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code SVT., 1989 – Sections 306 and 411 – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 39 – The case involves charges against respondents for attempting to ambush a CRPF convoy with explosives – The Special Judge, NIA, took cognizance for some offences but not others due to procedural issues – The appeal challenges the High Court’s judgment on the cognizance of charges under various sections of the RPC, 1989, and UAPA, 1967, particularly focusing on the applicability of Section 196-A of JK CrPC, 1989 – The National Investigation Agency argues that post the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, the CrPC, 1973 should apply, and the need for authorization under CrPC, 1989 is not required – The respondents argue that the complaint was conveyed when CrPC, 1989 was in force, and non-compliance recorded by the court should be upheld – The Supreme Court allows the appeal in part, allowing the appellant to seek appropriate authorization under CrPC, 1989, and directing the trial court to take cognizance if the appellant complies with the required authorization under CrPC, 1989.

(2024) INSC 447 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY NEW DELHI — Appellant Vs. OWAIS AMIN @ CHERRY AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : M. M.…

You missed

Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013 – Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 – Sections 3 and 4 – Electricity Act – Section 14(b) – Whether a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) developer, deemed to be a distribution licensee under the Electricity Act, is required to make an application for a distribution license and comply with the conditions set out in the Electricity Rules and Regulations. – The appeal challenges the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity’s decision to require an appellant to infuse additional capital as a condition for being identified as a deemed distribution licensee – The court questioned whether a SEZ developer is ipso facto a deemed distribution licensee, obviating the need for an application under section 14 of the Electricity Act – The appellant argued that they are automatically a deemed distribution licensee by virtue of the 2010 Notification and that the conditions imposed by TSERC were in excess of jurisdiction – The respondents argued that the appellant must comply with the 2005 and 2013 Regulations and that TSERC is empowered to impose conditions to assess credit-worthiness – The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, setting aside the condition of additional capital infusion imposed by TSERC – The court reasoned that the appellant must apply to be recognized as a deemed licensee but is not subject to the additional capital requirements of regulation 12 and rule 3(2) – The court concluded that the appellant is required to make an application as per the 2013 Regulations, and the condition to infuse additional capital is not justified.