November 24, 2024 5:54 am

Customs & Excise

Labelling and Re-Labelling of Containers Qualifies as ‘Manufacture’ for CENVAT Credit Under Excise Act

Bysclaw

May 26, 2024

This content is restricted to site members. If you are an existing user, please log in. New users may register below.

By sclaw

Related Post

Customs & Excise

Customs Act, 1962 — Sections 28, 28AB and 125 — When goods are confiscated under Section 125 of the Act, 1962, and later redeemed by paying a fine, the owner of the goods is liable to pay customs duty under Section 28 of the Act — This duty obligation arises only after the option to pay the fine is exercised, and it is a precondition for redemption — The court also held that the interest on delayed payment of duty under Section 28AB of the Act is also applicable in such cases — The decision settles the confusion regarding the applicability of Section 28 and Section 28AB in confiscation proceedings under Section 125 of the Act.

Jul 27, 2024 sclaw

Customs & Excise

“Supreme Court Expands Definition of ‘Manufacture’: Labeling Alone Qualifies for Cenvat Credit and Rebate” Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35L(1)(b) – qualification as ‘manufacture’ under the Act – The primary issue is whether the labeling activity constitutes ‘manufacture’ as per Note 3 to Chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, thereby making respondent eligible for cenvat credit and rebate on exported goods – The revenue (petitioner) argued that the additional labeling done by Respondent did not amount to manufacture and hence, they were not entitled to the cenvat credit and rebate claims – Respondent contended that the labeling activity is deemed as manufacture according to Note 3 to Chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, justifying their claims for cenvat credit and rebate – The Supreme Court affirmed the CESTAT’s order, dismissing the revenue’s appeal and upholding Jindal Drugs Ltd.’s entitlement to cenvat credit and rebate on the duty paid – The Court reasoned that the amendment to Note 3, which replaced ‘and’ with ‘or’, broadened the scope of activities considered as manufacture, including labeling – The Court interpreted the definition of ‘manufacture’ in the Central Excise Act and the amended Note 3 to Chapter 18, concluding that labeling alone suffices as manufacture – The Supreme Court concluded that the labeling activity carried out by respondent amounts to manufacture, entitling them to cenvat credit and rebate, with no order as to costs.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

Customs & Excise

“Central Excise Dispute: Fresh Start Ordered! Court Remands Case for Tribunal to Reassess Impact of Missing Letter on Show Cause Notices” Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35C (2) – Orders of Appellate Tribunal – The appellant, M/S Madura Coats is involved in a legal dispute with the Commissioner of Central Excise regarding the clearance of goods without payment of duty – The case involves multiple orders and appeals, with the primary contention being the non-furnishing of a crucial letter dated 20.01.2001 – The main issue is whether the non-furnishing of the letter dated 20.01.2001 has caused prejudice to the appellant’s ability to respond to the show cause notices effectively – The appellant contends that the final order by the tribunal, which directed the respondent to furnish the letter dated 20.01.2001, is binding and its non-compliance should result in the appeals being allowed – The respondent argues that the letter dated 20.01.2001 is the appellant’s own document and its absence does not prejudice the appellant’s case – They also assert that the appellant has been delaying the adjudication process – The court affirmed the High Court’s decision to remand the matter back to the tribunal for fresh adjudication of the show cause notices, subject to the appellant demonstrating how the non-furnishing of the letter has caused prejudice – The court reasoned that the letter dated 20.01.2001 was not relied upon adversely against the appellant and that the appellant should have retained a copy of their own document – The court found that the non-furnishing of the letter did not violate principles of natural justice as it was not used to draw adverse inferences against the appellant – The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs, and the matter was remanded back to the tribunal for fresh adjudication, with the appellant’s contentions kept open

May 5, 2024 sclaw

Categories

Archives

You missed

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw