November 18, 2024 12:19 am

Cheque Dishonour

Cheque Dishonour – Concurrent Sentencing Rule Only When Cases Arise Out Of Single Transaction

Bysclaw

Aug 2, 2023

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Banking Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 143A — Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 143A of the Act 1881 — The High Court had held that an authorized signatory of a company is not a “drawer” of a cheque within the meaning of Section 143A of the NI Act —The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the NI Act and the legal precedents on the subject, and concluded that the primary liability for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act lies with the company itself, and the company’s management is only subsequently and vicariously liable — Therefore, it is only the company that is to be considered as the “drawer” of the cheque.

Aug 18, 2024 sclaw

Cheque Dishonour

Burden of Proof in Section 138 N.I. Act Cases — The court reaffirmed that once the issuance of a cheque and its dishonor for insufficiency of funds are established, a presumption arises under Sections 138, 139, and 118(a) of the N.I. Act that the amount mentioned in the cheque was legally due and payable by the drawer to the payee — The burden then shifts to the accused to rebut this presumption by producing satisfactory evidence.

Aug 18, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 — The appellant lent Rs. 2,00,000 to the respondent, who issued a cheque as a guarantee — The cheque was dishonored due to insufficient funds — Whether the respondent committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act, 1881 and Section 420 of the IPC — The appellant argued that the respondent failed to repay the loan and intentionally cheated him — The respondent claimed the cheque was issued for security purposes to a third party and denied the loan transaction — The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court’s judgment that favored the respondent’s acquittal — The court found contradictions in the appellant’s statements and lack of evidence regarding the loan transaction — The court emphasized the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881, and the burden on the respondent to rebut it — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent’s acquittal was upheld.

Aug 11, 2024 sclaw

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw